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Introduction 
I. Politics and History  
 Recently, there has been a surge of attention focused on the question of historical 
memory, much of which has been dedicated to tracing out its political manifestations: 
how historical memory impacts the contemporary well-being of nation-states, or various 
collectivities embedded within nation states. This body of literature as a whole covers a 
wide range of episodes, from slavery reparations (Spinner-Halev 2012), to holocaust 
memorials (Booth 1999), to Native American land claims (Hendrix 2008), and is largely 
concentrated on tracing the specific ways in which historical memory plays a role in 
politically traumatic episodes, “in countries where the past is one of grievous injury, 
where large sections of the population have been silenced by mass violence”. (Rahman 
2010, 62)  Typically, these grievous historical episodes are characterized as ones in 
which the weighty and difficult memories of trauma produce a contemporary situation 
where politics is necessarily truncated due to the fact that memory is ‘out of joint’.  In 
writing about contemporary war trials, Michael Ignatieff neatly summarizes this idea 
when he describes these troubled communities as “not living in a serial order of time but 
in a simultaneous one, in which the past and present are a continuous, agglutinated mass 
of fantasies, distortions, myths and lies” (Ignatieff 1997, 15).  In Ignatieff’s precise 
formulation, historical memory appears to come to the fore as an important component of 
politics when a political community is expressly navigating a transition from trauma to a 
‘healthier’ set of political and social arrangements 
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 The philosopher Avishai Margalit offers another, more comprehensive 
contribution to this type of discourse.  In The Ethics of Memory, Margalit states that 
“collective memory has agents and agencies entrusted with preserving and diffusing it.  
One sort of agent should be of particular concern for those who are interested in the 
questions of what we should remember and what, if anything, we should forget…The 
agent I have in mind is the moral witness” (Margalit 2002, 147).  Margalit, like Ignatieff, 
seems to anchor his conception of memory, and his role of ‘moral witness’ in the 
situation of ‘transitional justice’.   Also like Ignatieff, Margalit’s ethics generally is 
similarly burdened with responding to an immediate and catastrophic environment.  
Margalit asserts that “what we expect from a moral witness is an elucidation of the dark 
and sinister character of human sacrifice and of the torture and humiliation inflicted by 
evil regimes” (Margalit 2002, 170).  Again, we see the recourse to historical memory 
when describing a social response to ‘evil regimes’. 
 While not denying the importance, or the catastrophic nature of those historical 
episodes, it seems that allying historical memory almost exclusively to such examples 
works to legitimate a certain arrangement of politics from a more critical reading.  
Specifically, if these instances of extreme political instability are to be taken as 
paradigmatic examples of history and memory being ‘out of joint’, does that then imply 
that stable liberal democratic political systems have somehow all ‘correctly’ ordered their 
relationship to the various strains of memory that run throughout their history?  Does 
liberalism present itself as being a ‘post-historical’ political arrangement, able to 
surmount or settle definitively with the issues surrounding historical memory that plague 
   3 
 
political regimes ‘in transition’?  Margalit seems to believe so, writing in the introduction 
to The Ethics of Memory, “a democratic regime, so it seems to me, anchors its legitimacy 
not in the remote past but in the current election.  It would seem, therefore, that liberal 
democracies are exempt from an orientation to the past and rest their power on their 
vision of the future.  Dwelling on the past in a democracy is as irrational as crying over 
spilt milk” (Margalit 2002, 11-12).  By separating the functioning of power and politics 
from memory, is he allowing this categorical distinction of historical/non-historical 
regimes to serve as an ideological barrier to questions that we should be able to pose to 
liberal democratic regimes?   
 This dissertation will argue that, far from transcending history, or thinking of its 
politics in non-historical terms, even stable, engagement with contemporary politics 
needs to begin with the acknowledgement that political communities are fundamentally 
historical communities. The failure to do so is not simply academic, but works to create 
political conditions in which a certain conception of citizenship can emerge that 
fundamentally disempowers citizens as political actors. To help illuminate that 
connection between a political-historical sense and the emergence of a certain idea of 
citizenship, I would like to turn to the democratic theory of Sheldon Wolin, who I believe 
offers a strong argument about just how this historical understanding of the political 
community is connected to issues central to contemporary citizenship. 
II:  The Presence of the Past and the Crisis of the Present  
 How Wolin analyzes modern conceptions of citizenship, and how it relates to the 
possibility of democratic activity within a political community centers around what he 
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sees a certain type of loss within contemporary citizenship, and this loss is essential to 
our claims about the urgency of seeing contemporary societies as historical.  The 
democratic loss that he charts is, according to Wolin,  our contemporary failure to exist as 
‘political beings’, by which he means the growing lack of, “our capacity for developing 
into beings who know and value what it means to participate in and be responsible for the 
care and improvement of our common and collective life,” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 139) and 
actively “originating or initiating cooperative action with others” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 150).  
But I argue that, for Wolin, what is lost is not just a general sense of taking part in action, 
or perhaps a consequence of the rise of political apathy, but something more central and 
important. What is key is that, for Wolin, democracy requires, “a citizen who can become 
an interpreting being, one who can interpret the present experience of the collectivity, 
reconnect it to past symbols, and carry it forward” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 141). A democratic 
citizen, for Wolin, is one that actively engages in the process of interpreting the past of 
one’s political community in the hopes of engaging in democratic action to carry to 
community into the future. I would like to make the argument that Wolin’s crisis of 
democracy, or perhaps a crisis of citizenship, is, at bottom, a hermeneutic-interpretive 
crisis. If democracy is to be pursued, then it must be pursued at least in part on this 
hermeneutic-interpretive level, which means that the more a society sees itself in strictly 
non-historical terms, or that denies the importance of its historicity, the more difficult it 
becomes to carry forward a conception of citizenship that is democratic, in Wolin’s sense 
of the word. All of these various concerns culminate, I believe, in a powerful theoretical 
idea that appears in The Presence of the Past, but does not receive extended treatment by 
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Wolin himself: the idea of democracy as entailing a ‘public hermeneutic’. Even though 
Wolin largely ignorers this idea, I argue that it offers us a robust way not only to 
understand the various concerns that Wolin has regarding democracy and citizenship.  
 Wolin’s crisis of citizenship and is returned to and elaborated upon by Wolin in 
his most recent work, Democracy Inc.  Here Wolin writes of what he sees as a full-blown 
and fully matured crisis in American citizenship and a nearly obliterated existence of 
American democracy.  What is not held onto is the hermeneutic nature of political life.  I 
assert that while Wolin’s overall political crisis is a powerful diagnosis of modern politics 
and his connection of historical memory to a structuring of permissible/impermissible 
politics is similarly important, the diagnosis he offers in Democracy Inc is necessarily 
incomplete because he departs from the immensely historical theorization that 
characterized The Presence of the Past.  What was so promising about Wolin’s work in 
The Presence of the Past, linking potentials for democracy and citizenship to this 
conception of a ‘public hermeneutic’ disappears in his later work, to the detriment of the 
overall project. 
 In the chapters that follow I hope to accomplish two interrelated theoretical 
(political) tasks: using historical material I will deepen and flesh out the Wolin 
problematic that he begins to develop in The Presence of the Past, by insisting on 
relationship between citizenship and this idea of a ‘public hermeneutic’, and from there 
developing a coherent theory of how politics can and should be understood 
hermeneutically. Secondly, by bringing Wolin into theoretical conversation with the 
hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, I hope to return to Wolin’s work an importance 
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that can come from more fully elaborating this idea of a ‘public hermeneutic’ and placing 
Wolin’s theoretic project firmly within it. I believe that the development of this idea of a 
‘public hermeneutic’ is important not only because it allows us to see political 
communities as immediately historical, but it also creates a condition by which that very 
historical understanding can be seen as a powerful force for the encouragement and 
development of Wolin’s citizens who can perhaps exist more successfully as political 
beings. The work of Paul Ricoeur is important to this investigation because he engages in 
the very language that Wolin discards in his later work.  That this language and 
perspective is lost in Democracy Inc., renders Wolin’s arguments more tenuous, so my 
hope that that by re-engaging this type of language and theoretical investigation, the 
deficits of the latter work can be overcome. 
III. Outline of the Work 
 In his essay, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, Paul Ricoeur argues that in putting 
together a philosophy that is both hermeneutic and phenomenological, there are two ways 
to do so, the short route and “the long route, the one I propose to travel” (Ricoeur 2007, 
6). In the spirit of this ‘long route’ of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy, these 
dissertations take a bit of a circuitous route to get from Wolin to Ricoeur. Although it is a 
bit of an indirect route, I believe the journey will be fruitful because it produces an 
enhanced conception of the relation between hermeneutics, the past, and politics, within 
which to situate both Wolin and Ricoeur, as well as the relations between the two 
thinkers. 
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 The first two chapters present a detailed analysis of Wolin’s work in democracy, 
focusing specifically on The Presence of the Past and Democracy Inc. In these chapters I 
attempt to demonstrate the way that Wolin’s work almost unconsciously utilizes this idea 
of a hermeneutic philosophy. Despite the fact that Wolin does not offer a sustained theory 
of interpretation within his democratic theory, I believe that his idea of democracy, can 
be best understood by taking greater account of the way in which a certain relationship 
between history and politics animates his early concerns. Chapter two is an extended 
analysis of how this relationship between history and politics, this spectral ‘public 
hermeneutics’ that we find in Wolin’s early work on democracy drops away in 
Democracy Inc., and how the loss of that hermeneutic concern weakens his overall 
theoretical project. From there I argue that a more robust conception of democracy as a 
‘public hermeneutics’ can strengthen Wolin’s work, reanimating the importance of his 
political concerns and his political project more generally. 
 Chapter three is where the detour begins. If we are commit to this Wolin/Ricoeur 
understanding of citizenship, we need to arrive at a conception of politics that primarily 
involves acts of interpretation.  I begin by forwarding a conception, borrowed by Paul 
Ricoeur, of hermeneutics that is ‘ontological rather than simply epistemological’. What I 
mean by this move is that we cannot simply understand hermeneutics as a method of 
investigation, but as what Ricoeur refers to as the ‘universal problem’. For Ricoeur, this 
means that our entire world and our existence within it must be understood 
hermeneutically, we relate to every part of our world through the ongoing collective and 
individual acts of interpretation. Or, as he writes in Lectures On Ideology and Utopia, 
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“what is a relation to the conditions of existence if not already an interpretation?” 
(Ricoeur 1986, 144). I outline an understanding of politics as a realm of competition over 
what will be define as ‘imaginary’ and ‘interpretative’ elements, which is further 
developed through an analysis of the Funeral Oration from Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian War, showing how political speech constructs what Nicole Loreaux calls 
‘social imaginaries’. I develop the larger social importance of these imaginaries by 
turning to Cornelius Castoriadis, who helps us to see how these institutions function in 
society and how they serve as important parts of our political world. However, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, Castoriadis is a very important step forward, and an even 
more important half a step back. Though he helps draw our attention to the symbolic 
nature of politics, his theorization, which separates the historical from the creative (the 
democratic, in his terminology) fails to see how hermeneutics, as a process of 
interpretation of inherited symbols and ideas, might function as a resource for the 
construction of the symbolic nature of society that he links to democracy. 
 Chapter four helps us to remedy some of the deficiencies in Castoriadis’ work by 
turning to the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. I argue, following J.G.A. Pocock, that we 
need to see Machiavelli as a theorist concerned with the idea of natural decay and 
corruption, but I also argue that history is a means by which Machiavelli believes 
communities can stave off that decay. While Machiavelli is far from offering us a 
‘hermeneutical’ conception of politics, he does take an important step in that direction: 
that is, how institutions have been interpreted over time is Machiavelli’s key concern and 
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he posits a very strong relationship between interpretation, practice, and the political 
health of the community.  
In addition, I believe that Machiavelli offers an important argument concerning 
the relationship between historical memory and political practice. In The Discourses, 
Machiavelli writes of the ‘return to first principles’ but the question remains just why and 
how these first principles must be returned to, and how a republic might be able to return 
to them?  Is he positing a type of political nostalgia? In answering this pressing question, 
we will see just how important to Machiavelli’s political thinking his concern for 
interpretation truly is. I argue that, instead of political nostalgia, Machiaveli is offering 
these first principles as a motivational force for powerful political activity and creativity. 
 Chapter five expands upon the connection between the interpretation of history 
and citizenship by analyzing the writings of Max Weber.  I contend that in his writings on 
Nationalism, Weber presents us with an idea of the nation as a ‘community of memory’ 
as a means to enlargen citizen responsibility and action and to counteract the ‘crushing 
tendencies’ of bureaucracy and capitalism in a disenchanted age.  This chapter serves as a 
bit of a bridge of sorts, tying the types of dynamics that we see in operation in 
Machiavelli’s work with the more contemporary political concerns that Wolin seems to 
have regarding contemporary citizenship and political life. What is most important for 
my analysis of Weber is the way in which he refuses to empty his concept of citizenship 
of historical content and simply think of them as abstract entities. Instead, Weber offers a 
very distinct understanding of citizenship as a category that can only be thought of with 
the ‘heritage’ of its own historical lineage, but a lineage of a specific sort. Weber asserts 
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that descendants must be able to recognize a certain commonality with their ancestors, 
while not being unduly constrained by the past actions of those very same ancestors. In 
this way, Weber highlights the difficulty of thinking of contemporary citizenship as a 
category shot through with history, memory and acts of interpretation, even though it is 
one of the only things Weber believes we still have recourse to in our disenchanted age. 
My departure from Weber concerns the way he theorizes memory as part of the nation 
itself in a way that seems to allow for very little difference, which can very easily become 
a formula for thinking about citizenship and memory directly from the perspective of the 
state, or other hierarchical positions, which Wolin would take great issue with and I 
believe Ricoeur allows us to avoid.  
 Chapter six locates the work of Paul Ricoeur firmly within the discussion of 
citizenship, history, and interpretation that has emerged thus far. The addition of Ricoeur 
allows us to move from the Weberian conception of the state to a more phenomenological 
conception of memory and citizenship where the citizen exists in relation to the state but 
our mode of thinking is, to some degree, ‘de-essentializes’ the state in a way that eludes 
Weber’s own analysis. Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy will allow us to highlight some 
of Wolin’s own democratic concerns. By more fully engaging this idea of a ‘public 
hermeneutic’ through the hermeneutical impulses of Ricoeur’s philosophy, we can view 
Wolin’s democratic theory through a lens that offers us not just clarity, but a means to 
substantialize some of the concerns Wolin has but he himself does not fully articulate. It 
also allows us, by tying citizenship and democracy to a flesh out conception of this idea 
of a ‘public hermeneutic’, allows to avoid the deficiencies that Wolin’s later work on 
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democratic theory seems to exhibit, and see this re-invigorated theory of democracy as a 
vital and important means to think of our collective existence.  
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Chapter One 
 
But of course, the act of writing a constitution is never the end of the story. 
-Josiah Ober, Athenian Legacies 
I.  Sheldon Wolin: Citizenship in America 
Sheldon Wolin asserts that political theory “is primarily a civic and secondarily an 
academic activity” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 1).  If political theory is to occupy both of these 
positions, this means that any properly theoretical investigation must illuminate a 
corresponding civic or political problematic.  In The Presence of the Past, the critical 
investigation that Wolin is interested in is “collective existence and with the political 
experiences of power to which it gives rise,” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 1) and Wolin conducts 
this general inquiry through several direct theoretical investigations centered around 
understandings of constitutionalism and meditations on the political importance of the 
American bicentennial celebrations of the late 1980’s.  However, this constitutional-
commemorative context serves as a theoretical lens to illuminate what for Wolin is a 
larger political crisis: a crisis of contemporary American1 citizenship and the loss of a 
mode of being most easily defined as immediately political, understood by Wolin to 
mean, “our capacity for developing into beings who know and value what it means to 
participate in and be responsible for the care and improvement of our common and 
collective life” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 139).  Wolin later makes the more explicit claim that 
this is not simply a general lack of ‘political’ being or awareness, but is a condition that 
renders citizens less than capable of engaging in democratic practices where, “ordinary 
                                                 
1 Though specifically American in its immediate context, the manner with which Wolin elaborates his 
argument seems to support the idea that his contention is concerning citizenship under conditions of 
modern power and systems of political representation and, in his own words, de-politicization.   
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individuals are capable of creating new cultural patterns of commonality at any moment” 
(S. Wolin 1995, 58).  This stunting of the capacity of citizens to act as (more) democratic 
participants serves as the pivot point around which his meditations revolve, and forms the 
‘civic’ component to his critical-theoretical enterprise.  
Before we can grasp the contours of Wolin’s ‘crisis of citizenship’, it is 
imperative that we understand exactly what Wolin means by ‘citizen’: how he theorizes 
this term will impact how he comprehends the accompanying crisis.  In doing so, one 
element immediately stands out as the primary thrust of his theorization: a rejection of the 
abstract ‘empty’ citizen of the contract theory tradition.  As Wolin himself makes clear, 
“in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the memory less person was said to exist in 
a state of nature where no social, political economic distinctions existed…the same lack 
of historicality surrounds the society that results from the Rawlsian contract.  It begins 
with no past, no legacy of deeds or misdeeds, nothing to remember” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 
142).  In rejecting the ‘abstract citizen’ as a suitable theoretical model, Wolin is making 
two important but interrelated points.    
The first point is primarily theoretical: the notion of the ‘abstract citizen’ is a poor 
way to understand the very category of citizenship.  Wolin believes that what the 
category discards in order to achieve better philosophical ‘purchase’ are in fact essential.  
In a review of the work of John Rawls, Wolin writes, “Rawls’s fiction2 is tantamount to a 
denial of the contemporary political relevance of those historical scars inflicted on 
particular groups that helped to shape not only their identities but their notions of political 
                                                 
2 The fiction that Wolin is referring to here is, of course, Rawls’s use of the ‘abstract citizen’, behind the 
veil of ignorance’ as an adequate starting point for a properly ‘political’ philosophy. 
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rationality” (S. S. Wolin 2004, 538).    What is lost in this highly de-contextualized 
manner of theorizing citizenship is precisely that: the context.  It is the context of 
citizenship, that for Wolin produces the identity and rationality of the citizen, or citizens 
understood collectively.  Therefore, any theoretical enterprise that attempts to 
‘understand’ the category of citizen as an abstract category may in fact be able to grasp it, 
but for Wolin, there is an unbridgeable divide between ‘abstract category’ and ‘citizen’.  
One can theorize about one or the other, but not both simultaneously.   
The second point that Wolin is more difficult to extrapolate; it is much more 
political and contains a certain amount of irony. Through Wolin initially seems to be 
interested in discredit the abstract category itself, he actually ends up buttressing the idea 
of the abstract citizen as a tool for understanding contemporary politics, while 
simultaniously disparaging (despairing) the conditions that make this connection 
possible.  As Wolin notes, the emergence of the ‘abstract citizen’ is not simply a 
contemporary construction, but is the result of a long lineage of theorization about 
politics, finding significant traction with the contract theorists of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, The Federalist Papers and, notably for Wolin, The Constitution of the 
United States itself.  This inclusion is quite important to Wolin’s formulation for a 
constitution, as he sees it, is much more than simply a theoretical document or 
enumeration of rights and responsibilities.  Instead, a constitution must be thought of as 
“about power: about what power is to be used for, by whom, and according to what 
understandings and justifications, as well as to privilege certain public meanings and 
symbols…a constitution is an attempt to constitute the conditions that will favor certain 
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forms of politics over others” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 3-4).  Thus, if a constitution is a way of 
(theoretically) organizing relations of power and politics, we must assume that the 
formulations contained within will have immediate and immense political consequences 
on those relations.  This then, forms the heart of Wolin’s second injunction against the 
idea of ‘abstract citizen’.  It may be a faulty way of fully grasping the contours of what 
can (ideally should) be considered a citizen, but it has not only entered our theoretical 
lexicon, but has been deployed by documents of immense rhetorical and political import.  
What are the consequences of such theorization, what political effects follow from this 
legitimizing of a certain category of citizenship, and one type of self-understanding, 
rather than another? 
For Wolin, the consequences are immense, and this ties his two claims together in 
an immediate political question.  If citizens are constructed by context, and if the 
overriding theoretical and political context that we find ourselves in today is one that has 
largely been influenced by this abstract category of citizen self-understanding, what type 
of citizen has thus been produced.  Wolin posits the idea that what has been constructed 
is largely an idea of citizen as object rather than subject.  In his analysis of the political 
theories of The Federalist Papers, Wolin notes that one of the most fundamental political 
principles of the document was the idea of federal power being exerted directly upon in 
significant and continuous manner.  For Wolin, how this idea is legitimated ties directly 
into the category of ‘abstract citizenship’.  The legitimacy of this type of national power 
deployment was largely produced, “by abstracting the citizen from his local culture and 
reconstituting him as a new kind of being, one who would be the object of national 
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administration rather than an active subject in local self-government” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 
134).  Here, Wolin demonstrates that by producing an idea of citizen that is highly de-
contextualized and ‘abstract’, a certain deployment of power is able to arise and, in time, 
become quite accepted.  This arrangement of power works to produce not simply a 
citizen as object but also one that lacks a certain type of political nature: a strong sense of 
subjectivity, activity and responsibility for politics, whether quotidian or exceptional. 
If the abstraction of citizenship produces a citizen as object, with a truncated 
sense of political responsibility and inability to ‘act’ politically, is there some type of 
counterforce that Wolin thinks we may have recourse to as a political antidote to this 
underdeveloped capacity?  Throughout The Presence of the Past, Wolin invokes the idea 
of ‘local culture’ as being able to fill just such a role, but what exactly does Wolin mean 
with this idea of ‘local culture’?   And moreover, if this political crisis is directly tied to 
the inability of citizens to engage in democratic practices, what are the immediate 
connections between local culture and the idea of democratic practice, as Wolin 
understands them? 
II.   Local Culture and Plurality  
In his essay, E Pluribus Unum, Wolin offers some striking claims on behalf of 
this idea of local culture that prove to be fundamental for understanding Wolin’s ideas of 
democracy and a democratically developed citizen.  In this essay he contrasts what he 
sees as a centralizing tendency in the political landscape of The United States, Unum, 
which Wolin characterizes as “political exodus from a condition of political polytheism 
to one of political monotheism” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 124), with the idea of local pluralities, 
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Pluris, which are understood by Wolin to be “the diverse political cultures of the separate 
states…local shrines identified with particular places, values that cannot be separated 
from the physical places where they have been experienced” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 125).   
Wolin sees this ‘political monotheism’ mostly clearly in the claim to national unity “in 
which lineage, cultural homogeneity, religious uniformity, and political institutions are 
represented as a seamless web” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 124) and produces a particular 
deployment of national power by emphasizing certain rhetorical and political themes.  As 
Wolin notes, “Thus, Unum’s pattern is woven of such primary elements as national unity, 
patriotism, centralization, and state.  Its subthemes are power, majesty and control” (S. S. 
Wolin 1989, 123).   Ultimately, this centralization of power produces the very same 
effects that Wolin links to the emergence of the ‘abstract’ citizen: a powerless, but highly 
power-receptive populace, one that becomes, “the object of national administration rather 
than an active subject in local self-government” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 1).  In fact, this idea 
of Unum that Wolin is trying to develop exists very much in that same mode of political 
rationality.  Power is not only reinforced, but also removed, from local centers of activity, 
to more distant and concentrated places.   
If this centralizing tendency of Unum produces a concentration of power that is 
substantially removed from the level of the citizen which then makes the deployment of 
political power easier and more consistent, the diversity of local cultures represented in 
the idea of Pluris would seem to speak to a breaking up of that smooth functioning of 
power.  In the specifically American context that he is offering as his field of 
investigation in this essay, Wolin sees these cultures as the individual states versus the 
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centralized national state, although in other writings Wolin has seen these ‘local shrines’ 
as a much more diverse array of locations and institutions.  More important to this 
investigation however, is Wolin’s insistence not simply on the ability of local culture to 
disrupt and complicate the functioning of political power, but that active and engaged 
citizenship can only emerge from within this array of local cultures.  In the essay “What 
Revolutionary Action Means Today”, he explicitly links this idea of a citizenship with 
this broad yet robust collection of local connections.  Here, Wolin defines a ‘political 
being’ as “a person whose existence is located in a particular place and draws its 
sustenance from circumscribed relationships: family, friends, church, neighborhood, 
workplace, community, town, and city.  These relationships are the sources from which 
political beings draw power…and that enable them to act together” (S. S. Wolin 1982, 
27).  In connecting the potential for citizenship with a certain array of relationships and 
locations, Wolin is reinforcing, though slightly recasting Hannah Arendt’s connection 
between political freedom and proximity.  In her work, On Revolution, Arendt draws the 
conclusion that, “because of the enormous weight of the [federal] Constitution and of the 
experience in founding a new body politic that the failure to incorporate the townships 
and the town-hall meetings, the original spring of all political activity in the country, 
amounted to a death sentence for them” (Arendt 1990, 9).  While Wolin and Arendt have 
several contrasting concerns, her discussion of the ultimately irony of the American 
Revolution contains strong echoes of Wolin’s concern over the apolitical ‘universality’ of 
unum.    Arendt’s tragic conclusion that the local centers of political activity produced 
strong political/revolutionary movements and longings for political freedom that 
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eventually settled on a national form of political management that severely threatened the 
very continuity of survival of those local forms and locations of political expression, 
tracks neatly with Wolin’s own trajectory of the American political experience and the 
diminishing capacity for strong political citizenship.  In both cases, it is the neglect of 
these local centers of politics or (for Arendt) action and freedom in favor of a more 
removed center of that power proves to be the important, development.  And inextricably 
bound up with that question is the issue of the capacity for citizens to engage in 
continuous, meaningful political activity. 
But is this opposition simply a matter of multiplicity versus unity, or is there 
something within this condition of plurality that Wolin is attempting to bring to light?  By 
setting this initial conflict between Pluris and Unum in the American, and more 
specifically immediately post-colonial period, Wolin offers a bit more detail.   In this 
context, Wolin notes that “unum is the mytheme for the transformation of several states, 
with their diverse and conflicting loyalties…into something new, a “consolidation of 
power,” as the Founders described it, a unified people whose oneness would for the 
immediate future be represented by the state” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 128).  Seen as a 
rhetorical and political tactic at work within The Federalist Papers, which, for Wolin, 
serve as the clearest distillation of this theme, the idea of Unum becomes the centerpiece 
of a “notion of theory which favors the reduction of difference to enable us to advance 
generalizations” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 135).  Thus, it is not simply a matter of numerical 
multiplicity, but recognition of a certain type of cultural, or at the very least political, 
diversity that can resist a the drive to generalization and uniformity that Wolin sees as 
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very important to the emergence of a potentially democratic citizenry.  Whereas, in 
Wolin’s estimation, the ‘abstract citizen’ represents the emergence of a political 
construction that allows for power to operate relatively easily upon citizens from a 
distance and at a substantial remove from their own individual participation, the existence 
of local cultures would, in effect, act as a buffer to the smooth deployment of power over 
citizens.       
To reinforce this point, Wolin refers to Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, 
specifically his ideas concerning decentralized power.  On Wolin’s reading, Montesquieu 
“adopted the idea that inherited rights and aristocratic institutions formed a natural barrier 
to absolutism, but he expanded it to include a complex array of local institutions and local 
bodies of law and custom” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 131), and saw these local bodies and 
inherited rights as a means to ‘complicate power’ much the same way that Wolin sees the 
multiplicity of the pluris (at least potentially) complicating the functioning of power on 
the national level.  And where Montesquieu saw these inherited and local qualities as so 
many barriers against absolutism, for Wolin, this plurality might be able to serve as a 
barrier against a continuously anti-democratic functioning of power.  But this brings us to 
an important and difficult complication: it seems that the counter-example Wolin offers 
to that of the ‘abstract’ citizen is one mired in the context of aristocratic privileges and 
rights.  To say that this context is not empty or abstract may in fact be a plausible thesis, 
but if the alternative to ‘abstract national politics’ is ‘’substantive aristocratic-feudalism’ 
does that in any way allow for a political and cultural system where ‘ordinary 
individuals’ would be any more able to act in common?  Aristocracy may be a barrier 
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against absolutism, but that, in and of itself does not make it a bastion for democracy.  
How then is it that Wolin can utilize this conception of largely aristocratic rights, 
privileges and legal arrangements to defend a properly democratic conception of cultural 
patterns and diversities?  How does Wolin attempt to shift from aristocracy to democracy 
within the idea of cultural or local practice and is he successful? 
III. Democracy’s Birthright 
Wolin looks to wed the feudal/aristocratic idea of pluris with the idea of 
commonality inherent in demos through his development of the concept ‘birthright’ as a 
political/critical term.  For Wolin, the idea of birthright stands in opposition to the 
abstract ‘contract’ just as pluris stands in opposition to the idea of unum.  Whereas the 
contract3 posits “a memoryless person…it begins with no past, no legacy of deeds or 
misdeeds, nothing to remember.  The contract depends upon collective amnesia,” (S. S. 
Wolin 1989, 142) the birthright, “was an inherited identity…a collective identity, bound 
up with a people and extending over time.” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 137).  That the birthright 
is pregnant with an ‘inherited identity’, a pervasive historical quality that the contract 
explicitly neglects is what Wolin believes preserve the diversity of the aristocratic pluris.  
But if the condition of the birthright is one of history and identity, what of the content and 
why is that of political importance?  For Wolin, it is the very condition, historical and 
inherited identity that provides the substance of the act of ‘taking part’ in politics.  This is 
                                                 
3 For Wolin, the theoretical concept of the contract is primarily the invention of the ‘contract theorists’ of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while updated by contemporary thinkers such as John Rawls, but 
in the context of the essay, he is not simply looking at the political theoretical deployment of this term but 
also the uncanny way in which, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the concept has become so widespread 
as to impact the self-understanding of citizens and political actors.  So the criticism of the contract in this 
essay is both a theoretical rejoinder to the tradition of contract theory as well as a civic rejoinder to rethink 
the impact of contract theory on collective political understanding in the contemporary world. 
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the insidious result of the ‘universalized’ citizen of the social contract, by rendering 
citizens equal only insofar as the contract strips them of the inherited conditions 
(birthrights) the theorist has subsequently removed perhaps the necessary conditions of 
political consciousness while not solving the political social and economic issues that 
these conditions point to.  As Wolin notes, in his critique of Rawls: 
The original position imposes a certain sameness upon beings who, prior to that moment, 
would otherwise be dissimilar.  If we accept that inequality is sociologically richer than 
Rawls’s category of ‘disadvantaged’ suggests – that it is grounded in cycles of poverty, 
ignorance, crime, and disease, and is a matter of everyday pain and despair to many – 
then the suspension of that experience is, in effect, a discounting of it.  It is difficult to 
recognize Rawls’s conception of an abstracted equality and undistracted rationality as a 
plausible account of human actors, since those actors have been deprived of essential 
human attributes, such as historical memory, and retain only the barest social 
consciousness. (S. S. Wolin 2004, 548) 
Thus, Wolin’s introduction of the idea of the birthright is an attempt to provide us with a 
richer social consciousness and overcome the ‘bad conscience’ of the contract tradition.  
Although Wolin does not use the term explicitly, it appears that Wolin conceives of 
citizenship in a more phenomenological manner.  He writes, “the idea of a birthright 
denies that we are ‘thrown into the world.’  It asserts, instead, that we come into the 
world preceded by an inheritance.” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 138).  In this temporally and 
historically structured conception of citizenship, Wolin is nearly recreating Alfred 
Schutz’s concept of a ‘social actor’ that is found in The Phenomenology of the Social 
World.  Schutz links the very definition of the acting agent to this strong sense of what 
one might call a ‘thick temporality’, where inherited elements of the past must be seen as 
continually informing and affecting the motivations, means and practices of social action 
and interaction.  These elements force us to understand that “motivational 
understanding…is not tied to the world of directly experienced social reality (Umwelt).  It 
can take as its object any action of the more distant worlds of contemporaries (Mitwelt), 
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or predecessors (Vorwelt), or even to a certain extent of successors (Folgewelt)” (Schutz 
1967, 30).  A contemporary social actor can only “come to know the world of my 
predecessors through records and monuments.  These have the status of signs, regardless 
of whether my predecessors intended them as signs for posterity or merely for their own 
contemporaries” (Schutz 1967, 209).  Ultimately, this condition of absolute ‘pastness’ 
that Schutz attributes to both predecessors and the larger ‘world of predecessors’ does not 
mean that there is a similar lack of connection between contemporary social actors and 
their various predecessors.  Although there can be no purely social or simultaneous 
connection, the ‘records’, ‘monuments’, and ‘signs’ that make up our contemporary 
understanding of these predecessors inhabit and color our contemporary existence.   
Schutz’s insistence on understanding our contemporary world as filled with signs 
and monuments (both consciously and unconsciously constructed as such), helps to 
produce an understanding of a lived environment in which this previously lived world of 
predecessors still exists, and partially structures our field of action.  As Paul Ricoeur 
notes, Schutz’s work demonstrates how “the direct relationship of the I to the Thou and to 
the We is temporally structured from its very beginning.  We are oriented, as agents and 
sufferers of actions, toward the remembered past, the lived present, and the anticipated 
future of other people’s behavior (Ricoeur 1988, 113-114).  This does not mean, 
however, that the actions of contemporaries are somehow fully determined by the 
inherited signs of the past.  In this regard it is worth noting Ricour’s apt characterizations 
of Schutz’s social world as one in which agents are oriented, and that the contemporary 
world is structured, rather than determined. 
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This ‘remembered past’ that ‘temporally structures’ our acting world seems to be 
close to what Wolin is developing through his idea of the birthright, and perhaps helps us 
to clarify exactly what Wolin means by the ‘inheritance’ of the birthright.  The birthright 
has “a historical quality without being merely historical.  A birthright is defined by the 
historical moments when collective identity is collectively established or reconstructed 
(S. S. Wolin 1989, 140).   The birthright is, for Wolin, intimately connected to memory 
and collective identity and goes beyond being simply a ‘merely historical’ phenomenon. 
It exerts a certain type of structure upon the contemporary world and the actions of 
individuals and groups therein, Wolin’s idea of a birthright hopes to produce a self-
understanding of citizenship as, not a determined outcome, but an identity largely 
conditioned by this web of historical and memorial relations.  
In addition to the birthright being a means by which we can see our contemporary 
world as structured (though not determined) by signs and monuments of our 
predecessors, there is a further importance that Wolin sees to the idea of birthright.  In 
proposing citizenship as something that is animated by the categories of history, 
inheritance, memory and identity, Wolin believes that citizenship can then be more 
clearly seen as “an inherited obligation to use it, take care of it, pass it on, and, hopefully, 
improve it” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 137).  He seems to be convinced that it is only by locating 
a self-understanding of our ‘citizenship’ within these thick categories of belonging, that 
by re-acquainting citizenship with the concept of birthright, and all that it entails, we can 
begin to shift to that more action based concept of citizenship, and recapture something 
of the participatory ideal that is “not primarily about ‘taking part,’ as in election or office 
   25 
 
holding.  It means originating or initiating cooperative activity with others” (S. S. Wolin 
1989, 150).    But this understanding of citizenship as activity seems to lead us into a bit 
of a paradox concerning the relationship of the ‘inheritance’ of a birthright (something 
seemingly oriented to the past) with the ability or freedom to act (something that is 
seemingly oriented toward the future).  This paradox can only be resolved by looking 
more closely at the very content of Wolin’s birthright, which I believe allows us to see 
just how a relationship between this orientation toward the past of the inheritance and the 
orientation to the future contained within the freedom of action are related. 
IV: Democratic Preservation 
The idea of the birthright initially seems to speak to the idea of preservation, that 
an understanding of citizenship that takes this idea of the birthright seriously has a vested 
interest in the preservation of something essential from the past and carry it into the 
present, and preserve it for the future.  In this sense, it is again helpful to have recourse to 
Schutz.  In characterizing a potential dynamic of the relationship between contemporaries 
and predecessors, Schutz asserts that, “what at first glance may appear to be a social 
relationship between myself and one of my predecessors will always turn out to be a case 
of one-sided Other-orientation on my part.  The cult of ancestor worship is a good 
example of such orientation toward the world of predecessors” (Schutz 1967, 208).  Is 
Wolin highlighting this type of relationship, does this conception of citizenship bears an 
elective affinity with a mentality of ‘ancestor worship’?  This seems plausible, especially 
given Wolin’s pointed use of the English Philosopher Richard Hooker to explain and 
characterize the idea of birthright.  Most notably, there seems to be a great deal of 
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preservation inherent in Hookers formulation (quoted positively by Wolin) that “so the 
act of a public society of men done five hundred years thence standeth as theirs who 
presently are of the same societies, because corporations are immortal; we were then 
alive in our predecessors, they in their successors to live still” (Hooker 1989, 92).  Wolin 
has elsewhere argued that Hooker is in fact a major theoretical forerunner of English 
conservative thought, noting that, “Hooker…was…far closer to the kind of constitutional 
conservatism which began to take shape in the seventeenth century and received its most 
distinctive expression with Burke” (S. S. Wolin 1955, 29).  What is the impact of this 
theoretical lineage on Wolin’s idea of the birthright?  Does this produce (or re-produce) a  
type of politics of nostalgia or Burkean historical consciousness?  
Because Wolin connects the idea of the birthright to the establishment of 
collective identity, what needs to be grappled with is the idea (found in Hooker) of 
collective wisdom and reason and how it directly relates to the connection of 
contemporaries and predecessors, and what resulting relationship that might have to the 
Wolin’s own democratic ideals.  Given Hooker’s “limited faith in [individual] reason”4 
(S. S. Wolin 1955, 36), as well as his strong Christian/Aristotelian conviction that 
“society was a natural grouping” (S. S. Wolin 1955, 34), Wolin demonstrates how 
Hooker is forced to elaborate and defend to a certain conception of collective wisdom in 
order to provide a type of rational basis to political authority.  For Hooker, this collective 
wisdom does not come from any currently assembled deliberative body or collective but 
                                                 
4 Although Wolin notes that this ‘limited faith’ is something that the conservative political/theoretical 
lineage (most clearly discerned in Burke own doctrine of prejudice) shares, he takes great pains to 
demonstrate that Hooker (as well as Burke) is far from being an ‘irrationalist’.  Rather, because of the 
strong religious element in Hooker’s writings, humankind must never be understood apart from its ‘sinful 
nature’ and natural imperfection. 
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from “a kind of historical reason shaped by the experience and wisdom of other ages.” (S. 
S. Wolin 1955, 36).  Moreover, “nor was it the collective reason of a particular time that 
was superior, but rather the shared agreement which linked together past and present 
generations” (S. S. Wolin 1955, 37).  This type of collective wisdom, an explicit ‘linking 
together’ of the past and present works to minimize the political present insofar as, “the 
present moment is without enduring significance, and therefore without claims, except in 
relation to a divine and an historical order” (S. S. Wolin 1955, 47).  Given this active 
divine presence, politics becomes little more than a matter of preservation, and the 
imperfect world of human reason can only be effectively ruled by this type of trans-
historical collective wisdom that will always act in deference to, ‘our venerable 
predecessors’.   
This is not to say that Hooker, or conservatives tout court are simply defenders of 
a status quo or nostalgic dreamers of a type of restoration.  Hooker, as Wolin notes, was 
to some extent an advocate of reform, but only of a certain type: reform that takes as both 
its bearings and its designs the very ‘venerable predecessors’ that inform Hooker’s 
collective wisdom.  In this sense, then, we see that “reform, in short, was a method of 
continuity.  Hooker also voiced…that the statesman mush cast his eye back to earlier 
generations and forward to succeeding ones if he is to preserve continuity” (S. S. Wolin 
1955, 9).   If politics is to be ordered by a type of divine history and collective wisdom 
that sees as its most important task that of preservation, does that seem to negate the very 
type of ‘politicalness’ that Wolin is trying to recapture, the idea of citizens as actively 
sharing in power and collectively working to ‘create new cultural patterns’?  If society is 
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to be structured along the lines of this divine/historical/collective rationality that is clearly 
set apart from and above claims of individual rationality (which are at least slightly 
suspect), as well as claims of contemporary collective rationality, (which exist apart from 
this divine ordering of history and therefore are at least potentially dangerous and partial) 
authority has, as its as its ultimate justification and referent, the continuity of this 
historical wisdom and, only as a distant second, contemporary political consent.  This is 
made clear in Hooker’s idea of ‘tacit acceptance’5 where, in disputing the Puritan idea of 
the election of clergy by a congregation, Hooker believes that surrendering this power for 
convenience and the smooth functioning of authority is legitimate and desireable, as 
active consent is not as important as the maintenance of the organic society and 
preservation of the historical claims upon which it is based (Hooker 1989).  Wolin sums 
up as such: “consent nowhere played the role in Hooker’s ideas that it did in Locke’s: as 
a rug under the feet of the governors, ready to be jerked out from beneath them by the 
nervous fingers of the citizenry” (S. S. Wolin 1955, 43).  Clearly, these strongly anti-
democratic elements that figure into this politics of preservation are all theoretical strands 
that Wolin needs to extricate his theory from if the idea of the birthright is to have the 
democratic consequences he believes it truly has.   
These issues are not simply theoretical demands, but carry with them strong 
contemporary political importance that have recently found modern elaboration in 
                                                 
5 For Wolin, this is another distinguishing characteristic of English conservative though, which he 
distinguishes from the consent based theories of English liberal thinkers like John Locke, although a type of 
‘tacit consent’ plays a fairly prominent role in his own contract theories – a fact that Wolin curiously 
overlooks. 
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various arguments6 that speak to the ‘wisdom of the founders’ and ‘the original intent of 
the constitution’ as examples of this type of  ‘collective wisdom’ that must be preserved 
through strong political continuity and ‘originalist’ constitutional interpretation and 
jurisprudence.  Jeremy Elkins, writing specifically about American constitutional thought 
notes that for originalism, “the meaning of the Constitution is simply and naturally given 
by the intentions of the founders…and the that greatness of the original Constitution lies 
in the fact that it did not merely establish, but was founded upon, a higher law – one 
grounded in the natural, divine order of things” (Elkins 2005, 284-285).  Often, the 
natural law of originalist thought is directly tied into the Christian theological armature of 
Hooker; Charles Rice, for example, drawing largely on the thought of Augustine, writes 
that “the Constitution itself [is] subject to the higher natural law and the law of God” 
(Rice 2002, 57).   Although much originalist jurisprudence makes reference to ‘natural 
law’ and eschews overt Christian theology, the Christian structure that Hooker uses 
largely animates the contours of ‘natural law’ in this rendering.   
In addition, originalism often produces a type of political thought that can be seen 
as (at least) lukewarm and (at most) hostile toward the democratic will of the political 
community.  Writing about the originalist thought of Harry Jaffa, Matthew Frank notes 
that Jaffa takes to task scholars of constitutional thought7 “for expressing the view…that 
the ‘values’ embodied in the Constitution derive all their legitimacy from no source 
deeper than the will of the sovereign people” (Frank 1996, 392).  For Jaffa, grounding 
                                                 
6 Although this type of political ideology is quite wide and varied, Wolin’s major rhetorical targets in The 
Presence of the Past, include: politically, the nationalism of the Reagan administration; jurisprudentially, 
Robert Bork; and theoretically, The Closing of the American Mind, by Allan Bloom. 
7 Here, Jaffa is also taking to task the jurisprudence of Robert Bork and William Rehnquist, whom many 
people would associate with ‘originalism’. 
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constitutional principles solely in the will of the people is directly equivalent to the idea 
that “there is no foundation in reason for the distinction between right and wrong” (Jaffa 
1994, 83) and instead we must remember, “it is not simply the will of the people that is to 
be paramount under the Constitution by the rational and moral will, formed in accordance 
with ‘the laws of nature and of nature’s God8’” (Jaffa 1994, 273).  Although in this 
rendering Jaffa does seem to combine the will of the people with natural law, it begs the 
question just how much authority the will of the people can actually share with a divine 
order?  How much will do the people actually possess? 
Not all originalist thinkers are, at least at initial glance, interested in 
delegitimizing the will of the people.  Keith Wittington defends originalism on the 
grounds that it actually “best facilitates the realization of a political system grounded on 
popular sovereignty” (Whittington 1999, 3); and much of his work is animated by, as 
Susan Burgess notes, “a tension between a desire to remain true to the founders’ 
objective constitutional expression and a desire to foster subjective expression in popular 
constitutional expression” (Burgess 2001, 932).  By limiting the judicial branch to 
originalist constitutional interpretation, it opens a space for creative, possibly democratic, 
political activity: “Our inheritance from the founders is not just a law, but the power to 
make law.  The judicial adoption of originalism ensures that we do not squander that 
inheritance” (Whittington 1999, 217).  However, this tension between the objective 
expression of the founders and the subjective expression of popular sovereignty is never 
adequately balanced in Whittington’s formulations and result in an attenuation of 
                                                 
8 Does this, then, mean that Jaffa’s mentioning of the will of the people in this context is nothing more than 
the requisite lip service he feels he has to pay. 
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democratic potential that other forms of originalist thought also succumb to.  In the first, 
there is a tension between the ‘creative development’ of the constitution and those parts 
that are beyond development.  As Burgess notes, Whittington advocates “the regular 
practice of constitutional construction by the popular branches as a means of empower 
the people, through their agents, to continue to develop the Constitution – at least that 
part of the Constitution that is not fixed by original intent”9 (Burgess 2001, 935).  Given 
the sprawling adoration that Whittington has for the founders, to the point where 
“Whittington’s work contains no direct criticism of the founding, and no indication of 
why he supports the founders’ substantive political choices” (Burgess 2001, 934), and the 
breadth with which original intent can be utilized, just how much room does the 
Constitution truly have for ‘development’?  It seems that any true discussion of the 
democratic potential of Whittington’s originalism hinges largely on the elaboration and 
specification of just what is ‘fixed by original intent’. 
If the strength of the Constitution, and the power of original intent, is not fixed by 
natural law, it must rely, as Whittington repeatedly declares, on the fact of sovereignty.  
“The Constitution is authoritative, that is, because it is the last sovereign will that 
existed” (Elkins 2005, 287), and that its adoption by the sovereign ‘people’ lends to it the 
credibility of sovereignty that makes originalism the correct treatment of the 
Constitution: it is the only form of interpretation that has full recourse to the sovereign 
will.  In constructing the argument, Whittington is not blind to the mythology of the 
literal adoption of the Constitution by the sovereign people as such.  He goes so far as to 
admit that the adoption of the constitution was not, and could not have been unanimous 
                                                 
9 Italics added. 
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and even states that popular sovereignty itself is a fiction and a metaphor.  However,10 
Whittington believes that because the Constitution became accepted over time means that 
the metaphor of popular sovereignty can be justifiably used as the defining element of the 
Constitution.  The authority of sovereignty was bestowed retroactively in Whittington’s 
account and in his formula, “popular sovereignty is only ever possible in what has 
already passed” (Elkins 2005, 288).  However, Whittington does not seem to see the 
democratic deficit in this conceptual schema.  He believes that “by maintaining the 
principle that constitutional meaning is determined by its authors, originalism provides 
the basis for future constitutional deliberation by the people” (Whittington 1999, 156) 
and that “the existing Constitution is a placeholder for our own future expression of 
popular sovereignty” (Whittington 1999, 133).  Instead of providing an actual 
groundwork for the production of actually existing sovereign power, Whittington places 
sovereignty, and thus the legitimate process of ‘constitutional construction’ beyond the 
reach of any actually existing (potentially) democratic people.  As Elkins sums up the 
formula: 
Only by treating the sovereign as a past people that never was until after it was can we 
assure the sovereignty of a future people that won’t be until it is past.  For Whittington, 
the myth of the Constitution’s enactment by the people serves not to open up the question 
of popular sovereignty and of the relationship of the people to the Constitution, but to 
render popular sovereignty as that which is always too early or too late. (Elkins 2005, 
289) 
The application of tacit consent to the founding, and the retroactive application of the 
myth of popular sovereignty upon the document itself bestows it with an authority that 
becomes impossible to replicate in the present, because we cannot retroactively apply 
tacit consent to contemporary political activity.  As such, a ‘deficit of sovereignty’ will 
                                                 
10 Much like Hooker’s idea of ‘tacit consent’ 
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always exist that Whittington’s own legitimizing process, by definition, will not and 
cannot bestow upon contemporary politics.  Thus, although Whittington attempts to 
justify originalism as a means to defend democracy, what he actually defends is 
sovereignty, and only sovereignty of a particular type, which is made possible by his own 
temporal application of sovereign authority.  His constitutional theory, and its use of tacit 
consent may effectively demonstrate a more democratic or sovereign constitution, but it 
does so at the very expense of a sovereign contemporary citizenry. 
This contemporary manifestation of a politics of continuity is in direct contrast to 
the dynamic that Wolin sets forth in The Presence of the Past.  Though Wolin makes it 
clear that the intentions of the essays in the book ‘revolve around the Constitution’ to 
‘elicit further meanings’ from the document itself, he flatly rejects the idea of meaning as 
being linked to some type of divine/historical province: 
Each angle is chosen in the belief that it will illuminate the present political condition.  
Circling the Constitution is not offered as a way of establishing the “real” meaning of it 
nor the “intent of the founders,” both of which strike me as incoherent notions induced by 
a misplaced Biblicism.  A constitution is not a revelation, and the Philadelphia 
Convention was not an epiphanic moment. (S. S. Wolin 1989, 3) 
Moreover, Wolin’s understanding of democracy in direct contrast to the politics of 
continuity represented in originalist thought.  Throughout The Presence of the Past, as 
well as other later writings of Wolin, “Democracy is committed to the claim that 
experience with, and access to, power is essential to the development of the capacities of 
ordinary persons…power is…something to be used collaborative in order to initiate, to 
invent, to bring about” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 154).  This explicit linking of ‘ordinary people’ 
to both ‘power and ‘invention’ seem to run contrary to a politics framed by either ‘natural 
law’, ‘god’s law’, or ‘originalism’: here, citizens are entrusted with an access to 
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sovereignty.  Neither the restrictions that natural law places upon political creativity, nor 
the deficit of sovereignty that comes with tacit consent and authority of originalism are 
present in Wolin’s understanding of democracy.   
But this brings us to a certain paradox that needs unraveling.  Sheldon Wolin is 
summarily rejecting the theoretical Biblicism that underscores ‘original intent’ while 
forwarding an alternative idea – the birthright – that quite consciously draws on biblical 
language and example,11 and while also drawing quite consciously on a theorist, Richard 
Hooker, whom Wolin has identified elsewhere as one of the originators of the very type 
of divine/historical theorization that Wolin himself is writing in direct response to.  How 
then does Wolin balance this idea of the birthright within a self-consciously democratic 
context that manages to draw on issues of collective identity, inheritance and historicity 
without having ultimate recourse to the divinely historical collective that Wolin identifies 
as a guiding thread of European (specifically English) conservative thought?  How can a 
birthright enable a fully active and expressive ‘politicalness’ to “become incorporated in 
the everyday lives of countless people” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 150) instead of suppressing 
the political activities and potentialities of ‘the present moment’ under an historical 
authority that would render “the modern democratic overtones of an active popular will” 
(S. S. Wolin 1955, 43) nearly nonexistent, beyond the mere duty of preservation? 
While Wolin indeed imbues the idea of ‘birthright’ with collective identity and 
the historical inheritances of ideas and memory, the very idea of inheritance is given a 
more contestable, and thus less firmly fixed definition: one that grasps historical material 
                                                 
11 In introducing the idea of the birthright into his theoretical discussion, Wolin initially draws upon the 
biblical story of Jacob and Esau.  
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(memories etc) without them serving as blinders that work to close off democratic 
activity.  As Wolin notes, “we inherit from our fathers, but we are not our fathers12” (S. S. 
Wolin 1989, 140), and it is this separation of inheritance (memory) from identity that he 
is pursuing through his discussion of the birthright, and which separates his concerns 
regarding historical memory from those of more conservative thinkers or from the 
various schools of constitutional originalism. 
Rather than the inheritance of memory serving to fix ideas in place, Wolin locates 
the idea of the birthright within the very context of contestability.  The most important 
element of Wolin’s understanding of ‘inheritance’ is precisely the lack of finality or 
fixity, the need for continuous political activity to even comprehend what it is that is 
being inherited, and to elaborate our place in the world.  As Wolin notes, “Historical 
things “are”; they have spatial and temporal attributes that can be described.  But, as 
elements of a birthright, they have to be interpreted.  Interpretation is not historical 
description but a theoretical activity concerned with reflection upon the meaning of past 
experience and of possible experiences” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 140).  These ‘historical 
things’ that make up our inheritance are fundamentally ambiguous, in that, “they are 
contestable; and because contestable, there is not absolute finality to the interpretation.  
Birthrights are transmitted, and because of their meaning will have to be reconsidered 
amidst difference circumstances” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 140).  Thus within Wolin’s 
                                                 
12 This gendered use of language seems to serve a very specific political point in this essay (and in the 
collection of essays more generally).  First, he seems to be using it to more succinctly compare his idea of 
the birthright with the biblical story, which is rooted in a gendered narrative.  Secondly, this seems to be a 
strategic rhetorical ploy on Wolin’s part to self-consciously critique the type of historical/political narrative 
that surrounds the familiar motif of the ‘founding fathers’.  In doing so, Wolin is not simply disrupting 
general ideas about democratic politics, but is specifically disrupting the coherence of that very type of 
narrative.    
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conception of birthright is the necessity of interpretation, which produces a demand for 
political activity in the present, rather than subordinate it to either fixed political ideals or 
historically constituted precepts of settled law.  It is only in recognizing that the historical 
materials of the birthright manifest themselves as phenomena that must be interpreted 
before being understood and engaged with that he can maintain his concern with the 
democratic political capacity of citizens.  Historical material enables rather than 
constrains political activity only when it is accompanied by the ongoing necessity of 
interpretation.  The birthright is not simply the inheritance of a fixed and established 
collective identity but is in fact the very thing that, through the process of interpretation, 
the collective can use to reestablish and reconstitute its own identity.   
  It is here, within this ambiguous legacy of inheritance that Wolin’s full concern 
with constitutional thought emerges.  Wolin does not attempt to deny the importance or 
the centrality of the constitution as an historical and political document.  In fact, it is 
precisely due to its political centrality that Wolin incorporates the idea of the constitution 
into his discussion, where he defines it as an indispensable part the ‘lost’ birthright of 
citizens that he hopes to recapture.  But as perhaps the prime example of a birthright, a 
constitution necessarily carries with itself an ambiguous legacy in its very existence as an 
historical document and political product.  As Wolin writes, “Thus, the Constitution is 
part of our inheritance.  Its formation and contents can be described historically, but the 
interpretation of its origins and documents have been highly contestable subjects and 
remain so.  No interpretation enjoys undisputed hegemony” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 140).  
While on the one hand a constitution is a concrete historical document, a ‘record of our 
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predecessors’ to use Schutz’s terminology, it remains for Wolin only partially known and 
thus incomplete.  A constitution can only exist as a political resource if we are forced to 
continually interpret its meaning and purposes in light of contemporary situations and 
conditions.  Why this interpretation is so important for Wolin, and what it allows us to 
understand about contemporary democratic practice and potential, has a direct link to the 
operations of historical memory in the context of contemporary politics. 
That the act of interpreting a constitution is necessary if citizens are to engage 
their full political potential becomes clearer if we understand that “a constitution is 
simultaneously a political and a hermeneutical event” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 3).   As a 
political event Wolin remarks that “Constitutions are not neutral or purely 
formal…Constitutions and their politics are about power: about what power is to be used 
for, by whom, and according to what understandings or justifications, as well as to 
privilege certain public meanings and symbols” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 3).   What Wolin is 
trying to make manifest is the idea that certain modes of narrating or conceiving of an 
historical past works primarily to produce, reproduce and uncritically naturalize the 
boundaries of both permissible/impermissible politics as well as understandings of 
permissible/impermissible citizenship.  A certain conception or interpretation of the past 
works to produce that very conception of citizenship.  Wolin seems to offer us an answer 
to a very pressing question about the shape and content of political communities: just 
how does this dominant conception of citizenship, with its corresponding political and 
cultural boundaries, emerge and gain/maintain the amount of discursive and political 
power that it has? 
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If a certain historical (memorial) conception of the past creates an understanding 
of citizenship, as well as corresponding boundaries to (re)enforce that self-understanding, 
we can see what Wolin wants to accomplish by bringing together citizenship with 
interpretation.  If one of the primary powers that a political citizenry has is the ability to 
create new cultural patterns, it means that they must first, necessarily, reinterpret past 
events, ideas and documents in order to question the cultural and political boundaries that 
were the result of previously held interpretations.  The historical memories that such 
interpretations helped to produce also helped to legitimate the cultural patterns and 
political self-understandings that Wolin sees as the potential target of democratic actions.  
Thus, for democratic action (or a truly political citizenry) to produce new cultural 
patterns, it is this nexus of interpretation and memory that must be engaged and 
challenged – but only insofar as that challenge, and the corresponding acts of 
reinterpretation – allows for these new cultural and political boundaries to emerge. 
V: Re-interpreting Democracy 
This call of interpretation allows us to contextualize Wolin’s bringing together of 
democracy with rebellion in a way that shows it to be seen as a much more creative 
process.  In “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy”, Wolin turns his 
analysis toward ancient Athenian democracy, asserting how the very idea of democracy 
is seemingly synonymous with transgression and rebellion.  Wolin writes that “the 
political challenge of the demos inevitably overflowed the customary and institutional 
boundaries within which elites were attempting to fix politics.  Consequently, democratic 
politics appeared as revolutionary and excessive” (S. Wolin 1995, 48).  This repeated link 
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has led some commentators to despair that his conception of democracy is simply 
agonistic, at best, and destructive at worst.  This position is perhaps best expressed by 
George Kateb when he writes, “Modern fugitive democracy…enacted denunciations of 
the nature of things, of the history of things…the democratic energies of creation are 
redirected to destruction” (Kateb 2001, 56).  Here, Kateb is focusing on the connections 
that Wolin has drawn between the twin ideas of ‘democracy’ and ‘revolution’, and 
forwards the conclusion that, by allying the two terms together so closely, Wolin 
produces an understanding of democracy that is irresponsible because of its destructive 
nature.  Even an enthusiastic commentary notes that Wolin, “describes democracy as a 
mode of action that is episodic, fugitive, and challenges boundaries.  The demos is 
activated and takes shape in the midst of revolt, resistance, and revolution, releases of 
human energies that contest established boundaries, institutions and practices” (Gabardi 
2001, 563).  As Gabardi illustrates, even theorists sympathetic to Wolin’s project seem to 
draw conclusions similar to some of the most trenchant critics of his theorization.13   
This interpretation is quite easy to understand.  Wolin often characterizes 
democracy as something that resists being settled into a stable form, which form 
necessarily truncates and distorts the energy and potential of democracy.  Furthermore, 
this form that distorts democracy is typically embodied in the very idea of a 
‘constitution’, and Wolin goes to great lengths to disentangle the two concepts.  In 
                                                 
13 For a similar interpretation that seems to fall somewhere between the two examples above, but relies on 
much the same interpretation, see Zumbrunnen (2008).  Josiah Ober (1996) offers a criticism of Wolin that 
is less concerned with the destructive nature of his conception, and more with the fugitive and ephemeral 
nature of Wolin’s definition.  In fact, in Ober (2005), he takes a position quite complimentary to Wolin 
when he worries over the political desire to pursue nondemocratic solutions that favor ‘good ends 
(constitution order)’ and not to prioritize ‘fallible means (democratic process)’.   Although Ober seems to 
be more concerned with the ‘costs’ of democracy than Wolin, this type of political diagnosis resonates 
quite strongly with Wolin’s major concerns. 
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Wolin’s own words, “I attempt to show that ‘constitutional democracy’ is not a seamless 
web of two complementary notions but an ideological construction designed not to 
realize democracy but to reconstitute it and, as a consequence, repress it” (S. Wolin 1995, 
32).  In contrast, Wolin produces a more unsettled idea of democracy, one that that he 
reads in the Athenian democratic politics of the fifth-century.  In this idea of democracy 
we see that “the politics of the demos was disorderly and often rebellious, defined by its 
opposition to existing arrangements rather than by them…Athenian democracy was less a 
constitution in the Aristotelian sense of a fixed form than a dynamic and developing 
political culture, a culture not only of participation but of frequent rebellion” (S. Wolin 
1995, 41-43).  In trying to disengage democracy from a settled form (i.e. ‘constitutional 
democracy), Wolin seems to be left with nothing more than a concept that is nothing 
more than, in Hegelian terms, negative content.  Hence, we begin to understand more 
clearly Kateb’s criticism that Wolin “never produces a theory of justice or even sustained 
thoughts about it” (Kateb 2001, 45), and that Democracy without settled form becomes 
nothing more than democracy as, “eruption for the sake of eruption, apart from its content 
or even because of its lack of content” (Kateb 2001, 45).  This reading, however, is 
incomplete and does a disservice to Wolin’s work, in that it overlooks several important 
components of his theorization that an increased attention to memory and interpretation 
can help to illuminate. 
While not denying the important connection between democracy and rebellion in 
Wolin’s work, it would be a mistake to treat rebellion and democracy as identical terms.  
In fact, Wolin goes to great lengths to set up a sort of triadic relationship between 
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‘constitution’, ‘democracy’, and ‘rebellion’.    In the very introduction to “Norm and 
Form”, Wolin explicitly sets out this relationship: 
My concern in this essay is with the political uses of “democracy” in relations to two 
diametrically opposed notions that symbolize two equally opposed states of affairs.  One 
is the settled structure of politics and governmental authority typically called a 
constitution, and the other is the unsettling political movement typically called 
revolution.  Stated somewhat starkly: constitution signifies that suppression of revolution; 
revolution, the destruction of constitution.  The two notions, though opposed, are 
connected by democracy (S. Wolin 1995, 29).14 
Although it may be fair to say he does not clearly elaborate the specifics of the dynamic 
between the three terms, it is evident that Wolin is attempting to draw a relationship 
between democracy and revolution, and goes to some lengths to make it clear that the 
terms are not identical.  Rather, democracy exists in a space between constitution (form) 
and revolution (destruction), or more specifically, democracy can only be understood as 
existing in the tension between the two other terms.  Furthermore, there is a curious 
linguistic maneuver that Wolin uses to describe what he seems to understand as the 
experience of democracy.  In this description of democratic action, Wolin writes that 
“historically, it falls to democracy to have to reinvent the political periodically, perhaps 
even continually…democracy is a political moment, perhaps the political moment, when 
the political is remembered and recreated” (S. Wolin 1995, 55).  If, in Wolin’s 
estimation, democracy is simply a formless action with purely negative content, why do 
we see the continued recourse to ‘memory’, ‘recreation’ and ‘reinvention’ in his 
descriptions?  How does the destructiveness of revolution have anything in common with 
(re)creation?  Further, how does this linking of the transgression of boundaries, relate to 
democracy’s ‘restorative power’? 
                                                 
14 The italics are my addition. 
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Kateb might be correct in his assertion that Wolin never produces an explicit 
theory of justice, but what Wolin’s insistence on transgression accomplishes is the 
creation of the possibility for the pursuit of justice; without naming the specific content of 
‘justice’ he is searching for a political means to make such an activity possible.  If we 
understand the relationship between constitution and democracy anew, could we say that 
what is being transgressed in democratic activity is not the ‘constitution’ itself, but a 
certain historical interpretation of that constitution, which results in a destabilization of 
the forms and limits of political activity and legitimate political claims that are enabled 
and (re)enforced through such an interpretation.  Furthermore, the ability to reinterpret 
the ‘dominant symbols’ and ‘public meanings’ can be transgressive insofar as it 
destabilizes the political order that relies on such public meanings and symbolic 
representation to maintain a certain configuration of power and political structure.  
Guided by this reinterpretation, when Wolin seems to pit democracy against the idea of a 
constitution, what we really see Wolin attempting to destabilize (or transgress) is a settled 
idea of ‘proper politics’ that is supported by the accepted ‘form’ of the constitution – not 
simply a set of rules that are agreed upon, but (most important for Wolin) the unequal 
forms of power that emerge.  Wolin sees democracy as a means to question the 
inequalities that are written into such a settled form of politics.   
Through reinterpretation, Wolin opens up the possibility for (provisionally) 
resettling these terms and relationships in a way that responds to such inequality or 
injustice.  But, in order to accomplish these tasks, the very memories and interpretations 
that buttress these inequalities must be questioned and destabilized, for the link between 
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memory and present experience is more than a fleeting connection; it is one of intimate 
co-existence.  In describing that intersection, Henri Bergson writes, “memory, 
inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the present” (Bergson 1991, 
73).  In his description of bicentennials, Wolin makes a similar pronouncement on an 
explicitly political level when he writes that they “are rituals organized to promote a 
mythic history…an official story that narrates a past to support an image of collective 
identity that confirms a certain conception of the present” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 3).  What 
Wolin draws our attention to is that any conception of the present necessarily is a settled 
form of power dynamics and inequality that are buttressed in part through an 
understanding of the past, an explicit political memory that ‘imports the past into the 
present’ as a mode of legitimization.   
A democratic response to these forms of inequality destabilizes the present to 
draw these inequalities into relief and question them, but only so long as the 
interpretations of the past that stabilize them are somehow transgressed.   As such, 
transgression is not simply destruction devoid of content but it is a thoroughly political 
activity that allows us to see and call into question the very fabric of inequality contained 
within a settled form of politics, and potentially to open a path toward the remedy of 
those forms of inequality and injustice. 
This ability, to transgress through interpretation, is precisely what Wolin is trying 
to recover through his incorporation of the term birthright into this theorization.  A 
citizen that is in ‘possession’ of his or her birthright, laden with history and identity is not 
in such a position to simply inherit a stable and fixed form.  Rather, citizens possess such 
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historical consciousness in order to destabilize such inherited meanings.  “Birthrights are 
transmitted, and because of that their meaning will have to be reconsidered amidst 
different circumstances…our birthright is composed of these ambiguous historical 
moments, and so its political meaning is rarely obvious.” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 140-141).  
The inherent ambiguity of this legacy, the destabilization that comes with all historical 
inheritance necessitates a certain type of citizen.  “This calls for a citizen who can 
become an interpreting being, one who can interpret the present experience of the 
collectivity, reconnect it to past symbols, and carry it forward” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 141).  
This notion of citizen as an interpretive being ties directly into Wolin’s second major 
definition of a constitution: a hermeneutical event.  After all, a constitution can only truly 
legitimize a set of power relations if that document (and corresponding relations) are 
understood and interpreted in a certain way.  If we can understand citizens as interpreting 
beings, we can see how this process of interpretation can be a continually unsettled 
process consisting of, “[rituals] of remembrance that contributes to the continuing 
formation and reformation of a public memory and collective identity… They are an 
element in a continuous process of interpretation, a public hermeneutics” (S. S. Wolin 
1989, 82).  This idea of a public hermeneutics can help to situate more clearly the 
importance, in Wolin’s theorization, of the citizen who can become an interpreting being. 
VI: A Public Hermeneutics 
Wolin immediately situates this idea of a ‘public hermeneutics’ within a field of 
power relations that are quite unbalanced, perhaps almost to the point of despair.  In 
continuing to define a ‘public hermeneutics’ Wolin claims that, “various authorities shape 
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collective understandings, which, in turn, produce reliable social behavior in support of 
the regime and its leaders” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 82).  These ‘authorities’ are presented 
many guises: written rhetoric (The Federalist Papers), spoken rhetoric (political 
addresses), ceremonial events (bicentennial celebrations, elections), theoretical 
understandings. However, all of them serve to shape behavior and control/limit politics 
through the settling of interpretations. But would citizens as interpreting actors be able to 
engage with this ‘public hermeneutics’ by perhaps challenging certain memories and 
interpretations that could enable a more robust contestation of these settled forms of 
social/political behavior?  Clearly if an essential part of the ongoing legitimacy of 
contemporary political institutions/arrangements is the ever present ‘public 
hermeneutics’, then citizens, as interpretive beings could meaningfully engage in this 
‘public hermeneutics’ in a challenging manner: a democratic-interpretive power to 
complicate and transgress the centralizing modes of interpretation that serve to buttress 
existing social arrangements and obfuscate relationships and discourses of injustice.  
If the hermeneutical side of citizenship is that important for Wolin, and is 
intimately connected to his understanding of democratic activity, it seems to be this very 
same aspect that he laments as being all but lost in the transition that he sees toward a 
depoliticized/ahistoricized citizenship.  This is clearly evident when one considers the 
two major backdrops against which he is writing The Presence of the Past: the 
Bicentennial celebration of the American constitution, and the powerful and popular 
political rhetoric of the Reagan administration.  The worry that Wolin saw with the 
ongoing fervor of the bicentennial celebrations was precisely the anti-hermeneutical 
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understanding of events and artifacts they fostered in the citizenry at large: these 
celebrations worked to ‘naturalize’ what is ultimately a profoundly political document 
[the constitution] and event [ratification].  Just what was lost in all of this celebratory 
deification of these historical documents was, ironically, their profoundly historical 
(therefore interpretable) nature.  The Reagan administration, as a producer of political 
rhetoric (and political self-awareness) ran much the same dangerous course in Wolin’s 
estimation.  The Reagan administration constantly appealed to the ‘nation’s past’ but, for 
Wolin, this was being done through “the de-historicizing tendencies of contract theory” 
(S. S. Wolin 1989, 144) and as such, produced an uncritical narrative that seemed to 
resist conflicting interpretations as well forge citizen’s self-understanding in such a way 
that the political imperative to interpret was diminished.  Ultimately, for Wolin, the crisis 
in collective citizenship and democratic potential that he was working to diagnose in The 
Presence of the Past can now be refashioned as a crisis in both the application of and 
(lack of) engagement with historical memory.   
Firstly, Wolin observed that the political symbols and official interpretations he 
analyzed were productive of an historical memory that uncritically celebrated 
contemporary political arrangements by obfuscating and suppressing precisely those 
ambiguous and contentious historical moments that Wolin is seeking to (re)present.  As 
such these historical memories were largely un-historical insofar as they resisted the very 
ambiguity and uncertainty that is part of any historical tradition.  Secondly, this ongoing 
political rhetoric also cast citizens (perhaps objectively but at the very least in terms of 
their own self-understanding) in this largely un-historical role, complimentary to the 
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attendant institutions.  A political self awareness that lacks a strong understanding of its 
own (contentious) historical construction is one that lacks the very means to engage in 
just such interpretative undertakings that can recast (or call to light) those inequalities and 
injustices that Wolin understands to be the driving impulse of democratic activity.  The 
ahistorical context of citizens is thus productive of this diminished political nature 
because it denies the very method of political contestation that democratic activity 
requires: the ability to (re)interpret the past in such a way that it destabilizes settled 
political arrangements in the name of injustice that is codified (formalized) into those 
very same arrangements of power and responsibility.  If citizens within contemporary 
democratic regimes now largely understand themselves in this context their diminished 
political nature and their diminished ability to advance truly democratic activity all stem 
from a very specific loss: the loss of a deep, complex and fundamentally ambiguous 
historical legacy that provides both the means (interpretation) and motives (historically 
felt injustices) for powerful action. 
To re-engage, or reclaim, these legacies and these powers, Wolin’s twin ideas of 
‘a citizen who can become an interpreting being’ and a ‘public hermeneutics’ are 
indispensable.  An interpreting being means that one is not simply the recipient of an 
historical legacy, but one is also the creator of its meaning and application.  Of course, 
this does not mean that in Wolin’s estimation, all citizens simply have the power to 
seamlessly re-imagine the entirely of their political existence.  Such an interpretation 
leaves out massive disparities in power or influence as well as the fact that in this context, 
multiple (perhaps innumerable) interpretations will be engaging with each other.  
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However, the important point is that citizens can actively work to shape these legacies, 
identities and resultant political arrangements.  They may not be (both individually and 
collectively) able to fully re-create the terms of their existence, but neither are they 
simply the passive result of this legacy.  They are both produced and productive.   
Although Wolin, in The Presence of the Past, only uses the term ‘public 
hermeneutics’ on two occasions, and leaves the term largely under-theorized, he makes 
the beginnings of an important move in recasting the web of political arrangements, 
documents and legacies that make up the phenomenal word of contemporary citizens as 
so many parts of this ongoing ‘public hermeneutics’.  It brings to the fore the very 
historical nature of these elements of contemporary citizenship, as well as the fact they do 
not operate in a neutral manner nor are they productive of a neutral political form.  It 
allows citizens to see that, even though these elements are part of our inherited legacy, 
the inherited manner in which we understand them is not transcendent but has been 
produced, and as such, the process of interpretation can and should be an ongoing 
process.  It forces citizens to acknowledge that no part of their political inheritance or 
collective identity should be reified beyond its historical construction and elevated to a 
place that absolves it from the process of reinterpretation and reengagement.  A public 
hermeneutics allows the conditions of politics, as well as the limits of 
permissible/impermissible politics, to be refashioned because the political inheritance that 
structures these boundaries is simply the result of prior historical interpretation and that 
process is one that needs to continue.  For Wolin’s crisis of citizenship to be abated, 
perhaps even remedied, the interpretive capacities of citizens must be re-engaged and 
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heightened, the birthright, which I want to tie to a public-hermeneutical activity, must be 
recognized and recovered.  To understand contemporary political arrangements within 
the framework of a public hermeneutics is an indispensable means to achieve this end.   
In the next chapter, I will investigate some of Wolin’s later writings on democracy and 
try to illustrate how, by losing this hermeneutical impulse, his overall democratic project 
is weakened. I will also look at one attempt to construct a full and robust conception of a 
public hermeneutic, and through that engagement, set the course for the rest of the 
dissertation to follow. 
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Chapter Two 
I. Introduction 
 In the first chapter, I offered a detailed analysis of Sheldon Wolin’s work as a 
theorist of democracy, primarily through his writings in The Presence of the Past. In that 
collection of essays, Wolin is primarily concerned with a weakening of democratic 
impulses and energy in the politics of the modern state, and how those energies can 
somehow be revitalized and a more robust conception of democratic citizenship can be 
theorized and fought for. While arguing that Wolin’s work is a very important 
contribution to the field of democratic theory, I believe that what is so paradoxical about 
his theorization is that the most important potential contribution his work makes to 
democratic thinking is the aspect that he, as well as other commentaries on Wolin’s work, 
leaves the most under-theorized.  While many analyses focus on the ‘fugitive’ or 
‘eruptive’ nature of his understanding of democracy, or on the idea of democracy as a 
wholly ‘transgressive’ act, I argue that what is most important to Wolin’s project is the 
idea that a ‘public hermeneutic’ should be seen as an essential part of the process of 
democracy. I would argue that as Wolin’s own work moved more toward an elaboration 
of democracy as ‘fugitive’ or ‘momentary’, his earlier, more hermeneutic theorizations 
began to fade further from view, but remained, in a largely unspoken way, essential. That 
is, to understand how democracy can be a momentary, or an eruptive force, we need to 
see it arising from a hermeneutical engagement with the conditions of politics.  
 Indeed, I believe that it is only by recasting his entire theory of democracy and 
democratic action under the gaze of a more systematic understanding of this ‘public 
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hermeneutic’ that we can truly make sense of Wolin’s insistence on seeing democracy as 
a ‘transgressive’ and ‘fleeting’ momentary eruption of activity. In fact, it is my assertion 
that all of Wolin’s concerns that he lays out in The Presence of the Past make sense when 
this idea of a ‘public hermeneutic’ is made explicit. In the first chapter, I attempted to 
show just how important this idea is to all of Wolin’s more systematic concerns with 
democracy and citizenship.  
 As important as it appears this idea of a ‘public hermeneutic’ is within the 
dynamics of his theory, Wolin himself makes very little mention of it. In The Presence of 
the Past, he only uses the term once, and the term is not elaborated upon, nor is it ever 
returned to. Because he focuses such little attention to how this ‘public hermeneutic’ 
functions in relation to his other, more immediately democratic concerns, I believe that it 
functions as something akin to a ‘spectral presence’ within his work: important, but 
largely unrecognized. While he himself does not devote time and energy to theorizing a 
full understanding of this idea, it has been my contention that his theorization makes use 
of the dynamics of the ‘public hermeneutic’ through his extended discussion of the power 
of the ‘mythistorical’ in modern politics, his insistence on seeing the Constitution, as a 
‘hermeneutic moment’, and his notion of the democratic ‘birthright’ of modern citizens, 
among other important democratic conversations he has in The Presence of the Past.  So 
while this idea of a ‘public hermeneutic’ is not theorized, it plays an important part within 
his overall work. The first chapter tries to elaborate on just how we can understand these 
dynamics in a way that does justice to the under-theorized idea of the ‘public 
hermeneutic’. 
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 Although this chapter continues my discussion of both Wolin’s continuing work 
on democracy and the idea of a ‘public hermeneutic’, now I am focusing not on how 
these two things come together, but on how they have diverged, and to what extent it 
hinders his work on democracy.  It is my contention that Wolin’s later writings suffer 
because, while he continues to focus his concern on modern citizenship, the power of the 
contemporary state and his sense of a lack of democratic energies, his fragile connection 
of those concerns with this idea of the ‘public hermeneutic’ is severed completely. What 
was merely a ‘spectral presence’ in his earlier work, is now not present at all in his later 
contributions to democratic theory, and because this ‘spectral presence’ has now 
disappeared completely, his work loses an important critical edge and robustness. This 
chapter, however, does not attempt to ‘bury’ Wolin, but, in a circuitous way, to continue 
to praise his work, but to praise it as a project that requires recovery. What I hope to do in 
this chapter is to demonstrate that, to the extent that the loss of the idea of a ‘public 
hermeneutic’ weakens his overall concerns with democracy, if we can re-integrate 
Wolin’s democratic theory into a more robust understanding of both the hermeneutic 
nature of politics, and the idea of a ‘public hermeneutic’ more generally, we can present a 
strong and important contribution to democratic theory. After analyzing the ways in 
which this loss of the ‘public hermeneutic’ is a misstep for Wolin’s work, I consider one 
attempt to theorize democracy as a hermeneutic project, by analyzing the work of 
Roberto Alejandro’s work Hermeneutics, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere. While I 
note that Alejandro’s insistence on the hermeneutic nature of democracy and democratic 
citizenship overcomes some of the shortcomings of Wolin’s later political theory, it 
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moves away from some of the concrete theorizations of power that were so key to 
Wolin’s early theory. I believe that while focusing on the ‘hermeneutic’ side of ‘politics’ 
he moves away from the ‘political’ side of the equation in a way that is problematic. 
Ultimately, I argue that the most successful way to theorize a properly political and 
democratic theory of a ‘public hermeneutics’ is to re-integrate the work of Sheldon Wolin 
with the hermeneutical theory of Paul Ricoeur. This chapter will end with a preliminary 
introduction to Ricoeur’s understanding of hermeneutics, which will be developed more 
throughout the following chapters, culminating with a synthesis of Wolin and Ricoeur in 
Chapter six. 
II. Losing the Hermeneutical Project 
If the crisis of citizenship is outlined in The Presence of the Past, it receives its 
culminating description (eulogy) in Democracy Inc.  In this, Wolin’s most recent work, 
he attempts to systematically theorize what he now sees as a fully matured crisis in 
American citizenship.  The new terminological constructions that emerge in this book: 
‘managed democracy’ and ‘inverted totalitarianism’, are deployed to chart this further 
development.  As Wolin writes in the instruction, ‘inverted totalitarianism…represents 
the political coming of age of corporate power and the political demobilization of the 
citizenry” (S. S. Wolin 2008, x).  ‘Managed democracy,’ meanwhile, is a concept that 
Wolin deploys, largely to answer the query, “what causes a democracy to change into 
some non- or anti-democratic system, and what kind of system is democracy likely to 
change into?” (S. S. Wolin 2008, x).  His understanding of democracy retains similar 
themes and continues to privilege the idea of democracy as activity in common, asserting 
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that “democracy’s idea is based on a culture that encourages members to join in common 
endeavors…as the means of taking care of a specific and concrete part of the world and 
its life-forms” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 288).  Nonetheless, Wolin downplays the absolute idea 
of ‘new beginnings’ by trying to situate democratic creativity with the context of 
historically recovered and re-engaged material.  Ultimately, this idea of democracy as 
common activity that stresses care and self-(and other-) improvement, of democracy as 
being “about the conditions that make it possible for ordinary people to better their lives 
by becoming political beings, and by making power responsive to their hopes and 
needs…managing together those powers that immediate and significantly affect the lives 
and circumstances of others and one’s self” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 260) retains the 
phenomenological hue that is in keeping with his earlier definition of democracy, as well 
as the idea of birthright, developed in The Presence of the Past.   
Further, Wolin continues to draw the close connections that he sees between 
democracy and transgression.  These connections are given their most starkly drawn 
description in Democracy Inc. when Wolin writes that “Democracy, in this early 
meaning, stood for a politics of redress, for common action to alleviate the sharp 
inequalities of wealth and power…it was, of necessity, a fugitive democracy, given to 
moments of frustration, rage and violence” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 227).  Here, we see Wolin 
continuing with motifs familiar to his previous contributions to democratic theory: 
democracy as an episodic activity that is, by necessity, diminished when it is housed in a 
constitutional form, which forms are universally concerned with controlling the surplus 
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energies of democracy: energies that (episodically) engage in “challenging the structure 
of power” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 278) in a fleeting manner.      
Most important for our purposes is Wolin’s continued concern with the impulse 
toward ‘originalism’ or, as he also terms it in Democracy Inc., ‘archaism’.  “Originalism 
is the doctrine that exhorts politicians to be guided by the wisdom of the Founding 
Fathers, the Constitution of 1789, and the Bible…the quest for a privileged moment when 
a transcendent truth was revealed” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 276).15  The terminological move 
from ‘originalism’ to ‘archaism’ is a conscious move by Wolin to account for and 
theorize “the remarkable commingling of politics and religion that has occurred in recent 
years and gives every indication of increasing in the future” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 115).  
Although a certain weakness in this formulation is Wolin’s silence on the details of what 
he means by ‘recent years’ and much of the specifics of this trend are left aside, his 
primary concern is to show how a certain type of religious influence in politics is not only 
complimentary to a doctrine of originalism, but can add to its power and reach.  In tracing 
out these parallels, Wolin writes, “The archaist, whether political or religious, has a 
fondness for singling out privileged moments in the past where a transcendent truth was 
revealed, typically through an inspired leader” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 117), and just as in its 
purely religious form Wolin notes a belief in “the inerrancy of Scripture and the 
unchanging nature of its truths” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 115), we are led to see that “in the 
                                                 
15 Though Wolin continues to equate ‘originalism’ with ‘Biblicism’, in Democracy Inc we see Wolin much 
more consciously positing the bible as part of the doctrine of ‘originalism’. It could be that, in his 
estimation, ‘originalism’ now to a very large degree encompasses the latter term or he is trying to chart the 
growing influence of biblical rhetoric into political language and sees this as a rhetorical effect of the 
growing political reliance on a strategy of ‘originalism’.  Either way, Wolin is much more explicit in bring 
a non-metaphorical religious element to this political-rhetorical strategy. 
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narrative of the political archaist the United States was blessed with a once-and-for-all-
time, fixed ideal form, an original constitution of government created by the Founding 
Fathers in 1787…the political counterpart to the Bible…inerrant, unchanging – not 
‘interpreted’” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 120).  What is important for Wolin in both of these 
conceptions is the fundamental denial of the interpretability of these documents, and 
hence the unchanging nature of the political or religious forms and structures that such 
unapproachable documents forward and legitimize.    
As a result, both of these positions seem largely (if not wholly) resistant to the 
type of democratic activity, and democratic concerns, that Wolin goes to great length to 
theorize.  Writing on the consequences of a specifically political archaism, Wolin notes 
that “The vision of an idealized original constitution rarely, if ever, includes the kind of 
participatory democracy that Tocqueville celebrated” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 121) and that 
one of its primary effects is to de-legitimize any democratic power or energies that would 
challenge existing political and social arrangements.  This is due to the fact that archaism 
is not simply an exercise in nostalgia; this non-interpretable interpretation of certain 
fundamental documents is not an atavistic remnant.  Rather, “An archaic belief is one that 
flourished in the past and carries identifiable marks of that past, but unlike a relic, it is 
operative, employed rather than simply preserved” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 118).  Just as in his 
discussion of originalism, constitutions remain here a prominent aspect of Wolin’s 
discussion and their overtly political nature is reasserted: “a constitution, or rather its 
authoritative interpretation, may be made to legitimate powers originating elsewhere” (S. 
S. Wolin 2008, 98).  If archaism is indeed an ascendant political-rhetorical reality, it is 
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not simply indicative of a nostalgic polity but, of necessity, a less energetic and creative 
one.  A polity largely under the influence of political archaism is one wherein existing 
structures, and the power relations they engender are largely seen as beyond political 
contest because the ‘authoritative interpretation’ that legitimates them is simultaneously 
triumphed as doctrine and obfuscated as interpretation.  The resulting ‘naturalization’ 
privileges these forms of power and suppresses the legitimacy of democratic responses. 
Noting the danger of such a politics of archaism, Wolin tries to make a very fine 
move when he writes that contemporary democratic practice must largely be a process of 
“relearning some hard earned lessons” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 274), and he is very conscious 
of how he positions democracy as a form of retrieval.  Though he tries to distinguish a 
more democratic attempt to revive what has been lost from one that an originalist view 
might contend is necessary.  Attempting to side step the mistake of simply positing a 
democratic archaic dynamic, Wolin contends that “Going back for democracy differs 
from originalism.  It is not the quest for a privileged moment when a transcendent truth 
was revealed.  Rather it is the attempt to remind ourselves what democracy is about by 
becoming acquainted with forms of democratic experience, their possibilities and 
limitations – not with imitating” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 276).  In keeping with Wolin’s 
assertion that democratic activity needs to resist the reduction to a single form, it seems 
that he is not searching for an historical essence to democratic activity to be copied and 
maintained but using historical material as a type of political inspiration or imagination: 
by ‘recovering’ the ways in which democratic activity has engaged politically in the past, 
we might be able to envision new modes of activity that, while keeping with the spirit of 
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democratic activity resists the archaist tendency to elevate a particular ‘interpretation’ of 
democratic activity to an unchanging essence.  It becomes a means to retrieve a type of 
democratic spirit or motivation that is both protean and translatable.   
What Wolin wants contemporary citizens to take from these various historical 
examples fits very neatly into the conception elaborated above.  “In the historical 
‘moments’…democratization was associated with a conscious effort to throw off the past 
and to challenge the present with a vision of a future for which there was no 
precedent…attuned to popular needs and grievances and to the needs to the everyday” (S. 
S. Wolin 2008, 276).   The ability to, in various ways, address previously unaddressed 
injustices, and the largely episodic ways in which underrepresented people and ideas 
were able to assert themselves serves as a sort of ‘motivational template’ by which 
contemporary democratic activity can draw inspiration.  Thus, we see once again the 
claim that democracy is the vehicle with which the political moment is ‘recreated’.  
Challenging present configurations of politics by opening up the space for new cultural 
and political patterns to emerge and gain credibility and allowing previously unaddressed 
inequalities the space to be heard and examined seems to be quite consistent with Wolin’s 
earlier theorizations of the process of democratic activity. 
However, a certain tension emerges throughout Democracy Inc. that poses some 
difficulties for this most recent theorization of democratic activity.  While this process of 
retrieval seems to be very much concerned with the means and methods for opening up 
space for new cultural and political ideas to emerge, the relationship between this 
retrieval of the past and a democratic concern for the future seems much more fraught.  
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Within his discussion of democracy that closes the book, there seems to emerge a certain 
hesitance in Wolin’s formulation concerning the balance of retrieval versus creation.  At 
the very end of the book Wolin, in encapsulating the task for modern democratic activity 
writes that “This contemporary version of the old struggle between ‘enclosure’ and the 
‘commons,’ between exploitation and commonality, pretty much sums up the stakes: not 
what new powers we can bring into the world, but what hard-won practices we can 
prevent from disappearing” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 292).  Within the scope of Democracy 
Inc., one can see why Wolin shows a seemingly idiosyncratic reluctance toward this idea 
of ‘new powers’.  The driving force of novelty in the contemporary world, in Wolin’s 
theorization, is corporate capitalism, which Wolin sees as being at odds with democratic 
activity and experience16.  “Superpower is the union of state and corporation…as these 
have become integral, so the citizenry has become marginal and democracy more 
manageable” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 131).  Given the growth of capitalism within the 
contemporary political landscape (privatization of goods and services, media monopolies) 
it would seem reasonable for Wolin to resist describing democracy in the same terms or 
with the same purpose as contemporary capitalism. 
However, this leaves us with Wolin attempting to give democratic activity two 
distinct tasks that, in this most recent theorization he can only elaborate one at a time, and 
often to the detriment of the other task itself; whereas in The Presence of the Past, he was 
able to articulate a theory of democratic activity that could simultaneously incorporate 
both tasks into the same framework.  For Wolin to talk about the democratic process of 
                                                 
16 In fact, the reduction of democratic activity to the requirements of capitalism (docility, periodic voting 
and significant demobilization) is one of the major contributors to the extreme de-politicization of the 
contemporary citizen.   
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retrieval, engaging with those historical moments of democratic importance, he must go 
to great lengths to distance his retrieval from a retrieval based on originalist principles, 
and he can only accomplish this by focusing on the creative power that is to be drawn 
from these examples.  Thus, in order to fashion a democratic form of retrieval, he must 
focus entirely on how this retrieval is a strategic means of opening up new political 
energies and is productive of an immense political creativity.  However, when he later 
talks about the task of contemporary democratic activity, the idea of new political 
energies or the production of new cultural patterns that had been commonplace in 
Wolin’s earlier discussion of democratic activity immediately drops away.  Whereas 
earlier, political creativity was used as a means to distance democracy from archaism, 
here political creativity is downplayed to strategically distance democracy from the 
dynamics of capitalism.  Rather than the ‘creation of new powers’, which sounds very 
similar to the dynamic of endless creation that is endemic to capitalism, now the task of 
democracy becomes one of preventing the disappearance of hard won, presumably 
democratic, practices.  This produces a democratic theory that seems to have abandoned 
the democratic tension of simultaneous ‘recreation’ and ‘renewal’ that was an integral 
part of Wolin’s earlier democratic theory.  Where is the idea of democracy as a term held 
between revolution (new forms) and constitution (stable practices)?   
The sudden diremption of democratic activity into either an activity of creation or 
one of protection adds an additional difficulty to Wolin’s overall project, further 
diminishing its power.  If the task of democracy is now one that must engage in the 
prevention of loss, one immediately needs to ask, what just what ‘hard won practices’ we 
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need to protect and what others can be consigned to the dust bin of history?  Although 
Wolin does not offer a comprehensive list, he does offer many examples of just what it is 
that he believes needs democratic protection.  Some of these gains are almost too large to 
be workable.  While lying in politics and culture more generally may in fact be disruptive 
or have destructive effects, exactly how does one ‘rescue’ truth telling?  And how can we 
be sure that we have achieved a ‘more authentic’ form of politics?17  It may be more 
productive to think about what more specific requirements might help to produce a 
political culture that is more concerned with truth-telling in politics as a good.  Again, 
Wolin does not clearly elaborate these connections but we can see that, in large part, 
Wolin seems to be calling for the rolling back of the privatization of public functions, 
“notably education, welfare programs, administration of prisons, military operations, 
postal services, even space travel” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 284).  Additionally, Wolin calls for 
“public ownership of the airwaves and encouragement of noncommercial broadcasting” 
(S. S. Wolin 2008, 292) as well as, “affirming the primacy of Congress, curbing the 
growth of presidential power, disentangling the stranglehold of lobbyists, democratizing 
the party system by eliminating the barriers to third parties, and enforcing an austere 
system of campaign finance” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 258).  What we seem to end up with, 
despite Wolin’s best rhetorical efforts to the contrary, is a type of political nostalgia for 
the New Deal-era United States.  This interpretation is given additional credibility with 
                                                 
17 Language like ‘authenticity’ lends a certain feel of trading in absolutes to many of the passages in 
Democracy Inc. that are largely absent in earlier writings. 
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Wolin’s repeated descriptions of “New Deal experiments in participatory democracy”18 
(S. S. Wolin 2008, 39) and the underdeveloped but present narrative arc that equates 
every move away from New Deal politics as a move away from democratic activity and 
toward the twin terrors of ‘inverted totalitarianism’ and ‘managed democracy’.  Because 
Wolin’s new theoretical framework separates creativity from retrieval, the whole retrieval 
aspect of democratic activity takes on (to use Wolin’s own phrase) a slightly ‘archaic’ 
tone and purpose.  Furthermore, it complicates the theoretical applicability of this work.  
Is Wolin, by succumbing to this type of retrieval-as-archaism producing a type of 
American exceptionalism or a political concern that cannot escape the confines of the 
nation?  While his major focus in Democracy Inc is undoubtedly the contemporary 
political culture of the United States, he makes no assertion that the dynamics of 
capitalism and imperial state power are unique to the United States; and that if the United 
States is his exemplary case study, it is largely to be used as a diagnostic tool extending 
beyond the United States itself.  Even beyond that, however, lies a more specific 
question.  Even if we are simply to take the book as a diagnosis of American democracy, 
given all the constraints and antidemocratic tendencies that Wolin heaps upon anarchism, 
how satisfactory of a democratic solution can an exercise in retrieval be that seems, at 
very important moments, seems to succumb to that very same temptation?  Not only does 
Wolin seem to be confined within the immediate context with which he is working (the 
United States), but even within that context, his proposals seem to fall back upon some of 
the very elements that he is critiquing.  If part of the contemporary democratic task is to 
                                                 
18 This is not to deny that New Deal politics engaged in quite meaningful participatory politics, or at least 
made moves toward a culture that could have been productive of strong democratic energies, but the place 
that Wolin gives it in his narrative arc is more problematic than his description. 
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critically engage with the megastate, might we be able to draw on energies and impulses 
that do not have as their immediate context the raw historical data of that same state?  
This is not to say that Wolin needs to be theorizing a wholly cosmopolitan democratic 
agency, but might we be able to expand the definition of ‘historical material’ or 
‘inheritance’ to include elements outside the state itself.  By defining ‘inheritance’ within 
the narrow definition of the state, what type of counter-productive exclusions are being 
enacted?   
What has lead to these changes in Wolin’s work that seem to render it much more 
problematic than earlier theorizations?  Why do we find his democratic theory now 
seemingly divided between tasks of creation and recovery that are not only irreconcilable 
but almost contradictory in goals and expectations?  How has his idea of recovery seemed 
to slip into the very idea of archaism that he roundly criticizes, leaving his account 
suffering for a nostalgia that makes the work even further self-contradictory?  How can 
democratic activity find its apparent motivation in an underlying idea of American 
exceptionalism, when that very exceptionalismis what Wolin criticized in the rhetoric of 
Ronald Reagan and theories of constitutional originalism?  Clearly these are not Wolin’s 
intentions: his work does not deliberately depict a ‘golden age’ of democratic politics to 
be restored, be it ancient Athens or mid-century United States. In my estimation, the 
theoretical and political problems that Wolin faces in Democracy Inc. are not 
fundamental to his overall theoretical project, but are the result of a certain terminological 
loss. 
   64 
 
What is not held onto in Democracy Inc. from Wolin’s earlier writings on 
democracy and democratic activity are the twin ideas of a public hermeneutics and a 
citizen as an interpreting being, and this terminological neglect leads to the 
abovementioned theoretical deficiencies; the diagnosis he offers in Democracy Inc. is 
incomplete because he departs from the historical-hermeneutical theorization that he 
began to develop in The Presence of the Past.  By rendering the connection between 
historical memory and present political forms more explicit, as Wolin does in The 
Presence of the Past, interpretation can serve as a middle term, connecting recovery and 
creation within one single process, where the creation of ‘new cultural forms’ can be 
analytically separated from the “unending quest for markets, new products, new 
discoveries” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 124) that is the hallmark of contemporary capitalism.  By 
situating creation within the process of interpretation of the past, creation is embedded 
within the ‘cultural inheritance’ that was emblematic of the idea of birthright, but absent 
from Democracy Inc, and it allows democratic creativity to find its impulse in historically 
felt injustice that, for Wolin, are an indispensable part of democratic activity generally: it 
is creativity, but not a creativity devoid of an immediate political context.   
This would allow us to avoid the bonds of nostalgia that seem to resolve into an 
unwitting case of American exceptionalism.  A method of political (or theoretical) 
recovery that focuses not on an isolated act of recovery but rather on the re-interpretation 
of the ‘recovered material’ means that what is important about historical material is its 
contestable nature, that the political identity or form is the very thing that is contestable 
and what is being recovered is the language, means, or space to contest the bounds of 
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politics, the very ability to ‘throw off the past’ – even if that process remains always 
partial and incomplete.   This is also a very important point: because the process of 
interpretation is, as Wolin asserts in The Presence of the Past, always an incomplete (and 
ongoing) project, we cannot conceptualize politics in terms like ‘authenticity’ that are 
present in Democracy Inc., and at times lend the work a sense of theorizing in a language 
of absolutes – much the same way that a politics of archaism justifies and defines its own 
purview.  In this sense, there is very little difference between speaking of a political 
culture in terms of authenticity and inauthenticity and Wolin’s critical assertion that “The 
archaist is convinced that his core beliefs are superior to rival beliefs and are true because 
unchanging” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 119).  In both cases, the language used to describe a 
political ideal or concept is one that places the concept in such a privileged position that it 
very easily can be reified beyond the realm of contestation and political engagement – the 
very consequences that Wolin criticizes in the politics of originalism and archaism.  
Additionally, because this recovery can avoid reification by privileging the recovery of 
contestable material, this allows for multiple interpretations to be forwarded concerning 
the same historical material, which is “more reflective of the pluralistic character of 
reality,” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 278), further allowing us to avoid a certain privileging of a 
particular historical interpretation that can result in an unproductive homogenization of 
democratic discourse and activity.  Lastly, this distancing of recovery from the historical 
form of the material in question allows a certain political space to emerge wherein 
democratic activity is separated from nostalgia for a form as such and democratic 
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recovery takes the shape of contestation rather than restoration: recovery that is (like 
democratic creativity) contextualized but also not determined by pre-existing forms. 
Ultimately, Wolin’s diagnosis brings to light several important trends in 
contemporary political discourse that need to be engaged.  The transformative effects of 
capitalism, an increasingly centralized and distanced governing elite and the continued 
depoliticization of contemporary citizens are all in need of sustained investigation.  
Additionally, his definition of democratic activity as a creative process wherein citizens 
influence at least partial control over common concerns and engage in political creation 
as well as a unique type of self-production and realization of a certain type of human 
potential is a great addition to democratic theory, as is Wolin’s insistence on a process of 
creation that is predicated on the transgression of inherited forms of political 
arrangements.  I have tried to show that all of these concerns, as well as his innovative 
contributions to democratic theory can be traced back to his connection of historical 
memory and dominant interpretations of historical material to a structuring of 
permissible/impermissible politics.  However, Wolin’s overall project suffers in its latest 
application because what he seems to drop from the conversation is the very thing that 
supports the advances he has made previously.  His inability to fully theorize the idea of 
public hermeneutics and to define a citizen as an interpreting being in The Presence of 
the Past, and his subsequent removal of that very language from Democracy Inc renders 
the overall project more incomplete than it could be.  What is needed, then, to address 
this lack is a democratic theory that forwards many of the democratic insights that Wolin 
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develops with an explicitly hermeneutic understanding of citizenship and political life 
more generally. 
III. Hermeneutic Recovery 
One promising attempt at developing a hermeneutic conception of citizenship and 
democracy is Roberto Alejandro’s Hermeneutics, Citizenship and the Public Sphere.  
Drawing primarily on the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer wherein, “nothing that 
is can remain outside the realm of interpretation and intelligibility in which we have our 
common being” (Gadamer 1985, 279).  Alejandro sees “understanding and  interpretation 
as the fundamental elements defining the human condition.  With this framework as a 
starting point, Alejandro contends that the citizen “ought to be constructed as an 
individual who deliberates and decides” (Alejandro 1993, 39) and citizenship is “a terrain 
of struggles, memories, interpretation, critique, transformation; namely, citizenship as a 
dimension where the interpretive tasks of our human condition are unfolded” (Alejandro 
1993, 39).  Much like Wolin’s insistence on citizens that can become interpreting beings 
that are immersed in their inherited histories, Alejandro’s hermeneutics casts citizens as 
“interpreters who filter and revise that intricate background of beliefs, traditions, and 
practices which is history” (Alejandro 1993, 69).   
This elaboration of a hermeneutic understanding of citizenship elaborates the very 
principles that Wolin was attempting to theorize in The Presence of the Past: citizens 
firmly rooted in an historical and cultural context, with multiple received traditions and 
inheritances, but who, through the act of interpretation are able to engage in acts of 
political (democratic) creativity.  for both authors, citizens as bearers and inheritors of 
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history is not “a journey in nostalgia, and much less a museum where the curators-
citizens guard and preserve a mummified past” (Alejandro 1993, 97), but rather it is a 
means by which citizens are presented with the material from which they can create new 
political and social possibilities.   
To elaborate this position, Alejandro theorizes a Hermeneutic-Historical 
Consciousness, which is advanced largely to combat “the effacement of the past that 
seems to characterize advanced liberal societies” (Alejandro 1993, 96).   Alejandro is 
offering an alternative to the depoliticizing (and dehistoricizing) idea of citizenship that 
has accompanied the growth of the modern megastate19:  “The megastate needs masses, 
not citizens; obedience to state’s prescriptions, not critique; a ‘memory-less’ public, not 
citizens willing to examine the discourses and practices of government” (Alejandro 1993, 
222).  Alejandro recasts the political as “a terrain where interpreters construct meanings 
and, in so doing, carry out the interplay between them and their surrounding 
circumstances” (Alejandro 1993, 72).    
This close and sustained development of a hermeneutic conception of citizenship 
allows us to avoid one of the shortcomings of Wolin’s later work in Democracy Inc.: the 
easy slippage into the narrow confines of the nation state itself.  For Alejandro, the 
collective memory of a political community “does not refer only to the history of a 
particular community.  Rather, this memory takes into account the history of other 
societies, alien and familiar, in an effort to learn from both their achievements and 
failures” (Alejandro 1993, 99).  By recognizing not only the legitimacy but potential 
power of ‘other societies’ Alejandro’s formulation seems to open the space for an 
                                                 
19 Here is he explicitly referring to Wolin’s own work on democracy. 
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increased legitimacy of those democratic actors who may have past experiences different 
from those historical moments that are firmly part of any particular nation state.  This 
provides political credibility for, among others, immigrant groups that may have an 
historical inheritance that is perhaps only tangentially related to that ‘dominant’ 
inheritance of the nation state.  It also allows for the possibility of an historical 
consciousness that, even if rooted firmly within the nation state itself, recognizes that the 
ambiguous historical material itself has a much more far reach (perhaps global) 
connection.  By bringing into the hermeneutic conversation material from other societies 
we can in fact be augmenting, expanding and complicating some of the historical issues 
of the nation state itself (military foreign policy, capitalist practices) that have a truly 
global reach. 
However useful Alejandro’s elaboration of a hermeneutic citizenship is in 
clarifying some of Wolin’s own conceptions, and avoiding one of the more prevalent 
shortcomings of his later work, there is much in Alejandro’s own theorization that needs 
to be overcome.   The first is related to his understanding of collective memory, which is 
an important part of his hermeneutic-historical consciousness.  For Alejandro, the 
collective memory is “a permanent act of remembrance as well as a dialogical encounter 
with the past and the present” (Alejandro 1993, 98).  The idea of a collectivity is 
extremely important for understanding any type of hermeneutic citizenship, where 
memories and historical material is never simply individualistic, but spills into 
collectivities, groups and societies.  Yet what is not adequately theorized is the 
relationship between communities (plural) and collective memory (a singular 
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conception).  While Alejandro attempts to elaborate a conception of collective memory 
that is constantly undergoing change, addition and reconceptualization, the way in which 
his categories are presented leave these dynamics quite under-analyzed.  In his discussion 
of community, this lacuna is made evident.  Alejandro writes: 
A communitarian historical consciousness assumed this variety of voices and appears as 
the collective memory of values, virtues, vides, and sufferings that form the heritage of 
the community.  The community is never a passive recipient of those common assets, 
though.  The community, at any moment, can give meaning to old values, erase old vices 
from its present practices, and construct other arrangements to write off past 
sufferings…the heritage is not fixed, but, like a text, it is subject to interpretation 
(Alejandro 1993, 99). 
How exactly does this community change these values ‘at any moment’ and still retain its 
collective and plural identity.  How easy is it for us to even define a collectivity if it is to 
be understood as a ‘variety of voices’?  That is to say, what is it exactly that singularizes 
the collectivity of plural voices into a ‘community’?   
This becomes all the more important when we see Alejandro rejecting the 
political realm and public sphere as simply two neutral sites of open and free dialogue: 
for Alejandro, the acceptance of a hermeneutic-historical consciousness means the 
acceptance of, at the very least, “a minimalist conception of the good life as a course of 
norms guiding both society and the individual’s goals” (Alejandro 1993, 97).  In rejecting 
this principle of political neutrality, while simultaneously defending a hermeneutic 
version of the liberal ‘marketplace of ideas’, Alejandro forwards what he deems a ‘fluid’ 
version of the good which he recasts as akin to a process rather than a ‘a fixed 
destination’.  The good “is meant to be a never ending process of education about shared 
goods and self-knowledge” (Alejandro 1993, 106).   This principle of the good is then 
meant to be seen as a largely political rather than as a metaphysical idea of the good.  But 
the question still goes unanswered: how is this ‘provisional’ idea of the good arrived at or 
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produced?  Alejandro seems to offer something of an answer when he writes that “a 
shared conception of the good could be worked out from a repository of moral values that 
are part of the vocabularies of a democratic society” (Alejandro 1993, 106), but even here 
we see some problematic moves that go unchallenged (or under theorized).  Given that 
Alejandro is attempting to formulate a highly political conception of citizenship, and a re-
politicization of the public realm against what he sees as the de-politicization of many 
contemporary conceptions of citizenship, it seems odd that Alejandro would simply move 
the question of ‘the good’ to the realm of morals rather than, say, political principles.  We 
seem to be able to arrive at a conception of the good that is based on moral principles, 
even though this seems to be the very ground of disagreement that Alejandro is focusing 
on in his hermeneutic conception.  Furthermore, it seems as if arriving at (or maintaining) 
this conception of the good, however provisional it may (or may not) be, is spoken of 
without reference to ideology, power or other forms of inequality that are not only 
present in the political realm, but might in fact help to structure conceptions of the good 
themselves. 
This leads us directly to the largest problem in Alejandro’s theorization, which 
can in large part explain these other related issues.  When it comes to the very workings 
of this citizenship, it is theorized in a highly depoliticized manner that seems to take very 
little account of the issues of power that were so prevalent in Wolin’s work.  Even though 
Alejandro offers a very reasoned critique of Habermas’ communicative theory as highly 
depoliticizing and his idea of ‘undistorted speech’ as unhelpful for understanding speech 
within a highly politicized context, in putting forth his idea of a hermeneutic public 
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sphere, Alejandro seems to fall prey to the same temptation that he criticizes.  In defining 
this public realm, he writes that “a hermeneutic construction of the public realm is thus a 
dimension of citizens who do not relinquish their judgment to any minority and who 
engage in dialogue and argumentation without being subject to structures of domination 
and repression” (Alejandro 1993, 226).   Given that Alejandro wants to hold onto the 
presence of “ideology, domination, or hidden prejudices” (Alejandro 1993, 191), that he 
criticized Habermas for attempting to provide an exit from, this seems to be a very odd 
definition.  If political arrangements, as Wolin points out, are expressions of power and 
inequality20 how can we conceive of citizenship as an activity that happens outside of 
structures of domination.  It is conceivable that his ‘public sphere’ exists in a place 
outside of the ‘political realm’, which he admits is “characterized, in many instances, by 
the power of money and technological discourses attempting to erode judgment” 
(Alejandro 1993, 226).  A ‘pure’ public realm distinct from the ‘distortions’ of the 
political realm is a tenuous assertion to make, and one that does not adequately address 
the reach of these structure of power that domination that characterize the realm of 
politics.  This conceptualization of public sphere/political sphere seems especially 
crippling for Alejandro when one notes that, earlier in the work, he writes that “many 
citizens in democratic societies do not see themselves as detachable compartments – the 
private, the public; the religious, the political language; a comprehensive doctrine, a 
political conceptions” (Alejandro 1993, 20).  Given that Alejandro’s entire hermeneutical 
project is one that seeks to create a citizen that is not compartmentalized, but where all 
                                                 
20 Given how adamantly Alejandro asserts the political non-neutrality of liberal principles, it seems that he 
would have much the same interpretation of existing political structures. 
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aspects of a citizen’s existence comes into play in the political realm itself,  is the final 
recourse to a public sphere that is both distinct from the political realm and free of 
structures of domination a fatal oversight? 
IV: Conclusion 
 Ultimately, his failure to theorize a conception of hermeneutical citizenship 
within the structures of domination that were so present in Wolin’s nascent theorization is 
Alejandro’s biggest shortcoming.  A properly political conception of hermeneutic 
citizenship is one that must take this interpretative task as happening alongside, in 
Wolin’s assertions ‘various authorities’ that work to shape collective understandings.  If 
we acknowledge that interpretations of historical events can, and often to, work to 
support regimes and structures of power, those very structures must  be taken into 
account when we are theorizing the hermeneutical activities of citizenship.  Moreover, a 
properly hermeneutical theorization of citizenship is one that can actively theorize the 
very power relations that Wolin is so keenly aware of, and that Alejandro seems, in the 
end, to retreat from.  Paul Ricoeur asserts this task when he writes, “Only, it seems to me, 
a hermeneutic of communication could assume the task of including the critique of 
ideologies in self-comprehension” (Ricoeur 1975, 92).  The necessity of a continued 
critique of ideology due largely to the fact that, for Ricoeur, “prejudice is a fundamental 
structure of communication in its institutional forms” and that “hermeneutics could reveal 
the necessity of a critique of ideologies, even if this critique could never be total” 
(Ricoeur 1975, 92).  Rather than assuming a position that seems to place the hermeneutic 
process outside of the bonds of ideology and domination, or envisioning a hermeneutical 
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process that has, as its end, the final overcoming of ideology, a hermeneutical conception 
of citizenship must constantly wrestle with the limits of ideology and power in two 
distinct ways.  First, the continued presence of structures of power will always make the 
hermeneutic process a complicated undertaking.  Second, the very hermeneutical process 
of interpretation cannot view itself as outside of ideology altogether.  Hermeneutic 
interpretation might be able to resist some of the effects of ideology by offering critique 
(for Ricoeur this is the important of the idea of ‘distantiation’), but as Ricoeur makes 
clear, that will never be a totally critique, that is to say, interpretation will always run up 
against a limit in the recognition of the unavoidable nature of ideology.  Thus, for a 
hermeneutic citizenship, ideology serves as both the internal limit of the process, and the 
ever present external force muddying the picture.   
While Alejandro’s approach demonstrates the importance of using history to 
recover new possibilities and destabilizing that which has been handed down to us, we 
cannot be tempted into the idea that, given the ‘play’ of hermeneutics, politics is simply a 
blanket matter of reinterpretation.  Power dynamics work to reify certain elements that 
make them harder to re-interpret, reevaluate or change.  Placing this process within 
structures of power would produce a hermeneutics that “consists in keeping ‘open’ our 
access to our contemporaries, predecessors, and successors even when many of our 
projects, norms and institutions are already reified to such an extent that they have 
become incapable of recovery” (Ricoeur 1976, 690).  Even if one would want to qualify 
Ricoeur’s assertion about institutions being completely incapable of recovery, he points 
out the important fact that historical material will vary in its social and political openness 
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to re-interpretation.  This variability makes the hermeneutic process much more difficult 
to theorize, and will produce a much more complicated understanding of the hermeneutic 
citizen.  But, to the extent that could be a helpful tool in understanding the possibilities of 
contemporary citizenship, it is absolutely necessary.  While Alejandro’s work is 
instrumental in positing just what goes into the process of interpretation itself, and his 
elaboration of that understanding of citizenship is helpful in clarifying some of the 
oversights in Wolin’s own work, the fact that Alejandro ultimately theorizes his citizen as 
interpreting being largely outside the very conditions of political power makes its 
ultimate usefulness somewhat circumscribed and truncated.  A more successful 
understanding of hermeneutic citizenship is one that retains Wolin’s eye for citizenship’s 
relationship to structures of power as well as Paul Ricoeur’s linking of a hermeneutic 
process to “a critique of ideologies.  These begin by setting language, which 
hermeneutics seems to enclose itself within, into a much broader constellation, which 
also includes labor and domination.  Under the gaze of the materialist critique…the 
practice of language is revealed to be the place of those systematic distortions” (Ricoeur 
1988, 225).  A hermeneutics of citizenship must emerge from, and concern itself 
intimately with the very conditions that citizenship itself is located in, even if the hope is 
to re-interpret, and thus reimagine and reinvent those same conditions.    
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Chapter Three 
 
The imaginary is constitutive of our relation to the world 
- Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia 
 
 If we are to theorize a hermeneutic conception of citizenship, much less a 
hermeneutic conception of politics more generally, we first must endeavor to show a 
meaningful, relationship between two ideas or activities that are often held at great 
distance from one another: politics and interpretation.  If we are to hold to the idea that, 
“politics is the pragmatic domain par excellence, the site, enactment, and conflict of real 
and concrete interests, needs, and power” (W. Adams 1988, 51), how are we able to 
include within that domain the philosophical activity of interpretation?  Even Sheldon 
Wolin who, as I attempted to show in the first chapter, seems to leave significant room 
for a dynamic relationship between interpretation, citizenship, and politics, defines the 
primary purpose of political institutions as such: “through the decisions taken and 
enforced by public officials, scattered activities are brought together, endowed with a 
new coherence, and their future course shaped according to “public” considerations” (S. 
S. Wolin 2004, 8).  In both of these characterizations, politics appears at first blush to be 
a realm of decidedly un-interpretive activity.  How then, can we fashion a definition that 
would allow us to fashion meaningful links between it as a realm of human experience 
and interpretation as an activity?  In order to produce an understanding of politics, it may 
be helpful to begin from the other side of the equation, and attempt to offer an account of 
hermeneutics that seems to lend itself to an expressly political dimension. 
I. The Hermeneutics of the New Historians 
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As Adams points out, textual hermeneutics as a methodology was given serious 
consideration by the ‘new historians’ such as Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock, 
specifically (though not exclusively) with regard to how historians and philosophers 
approached texts within the history of political thought. Concerned that, “in too many 
instances…texts were subjected to fiercely a-historical, even anti-historical forms of 
analysis” (W. Adams 1988, 47), they proposed to treat the text, as well as the writer’s 
context in a hermeneutical manner. As such, for Skinner and the new historians, any 
understanding that abandons the attempt to situate the work and instead only focuses, “on 
the texts themselves…must necessarily remain a wholly inadequate methodology for the 
conduct of the history of ideas,” (Skinner 1969, 31). This approach to context meant a 
radical reshaping of exactly what the history of ideas would in fact look like. If the text 
itself were insufficiently understood outside of the confines of context, than the ideas 
under discussion must, by necessity, become tethered to the same context. Just as 
abstracting texts does a disservice to understanding their meaning, abstracting the ideas 
under discussion posed a similar problem. As Skinner explains, “there is no determinate 
idea of which various writers contributed, but only a variety of statements made with 
words by a variety of different agents…there is no history of ideas to be written, but only 
a history necessarily focused on the various agents who used the idea, and on their 
varying situations and intentions in using it” (Skinner 1969, 38). For Skinner, in order to 
understand with any accuracy the meaning of the words and ideas under discussion we 
must pay attention to their specific use. However, Skinner proposes a hermeneutical 
understanding, and a definition of context that goes simply beyond word usage. While 
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placing these texts within the specific context of language, “if we wish to understand a 
given idea, even within a given culture and at a given time, we cannot simply 
concentrate…on studying the forms of words involved” (Skinner 1969, 36). Instead, any 
application of context must engage as well in social conventions and mentalities in order 
to fashion a responsible and thorough textual hermeneutics. 
 Going beyond the text means two very important things for Skinner. The first is to 
“focus not just on the text to be interpreted, but on the prevailing conventions governing 
the treatment of the issues of themes with which the text is concerned” (Skinner 1972, 
406). These conventions are important when we realize that authors are not simply trying 
to convey information or ideas, but are trying to do so with in a particular linguistic and 
cultural setting. If the author wishes to be understood and if their arguments are to be 
recognized, those arguments must be deployed within, and make use of, those 
conventions. Thus, if we are to understand the true meaning within these texts, we can 
only do so by trying to understand the context within which the work is created. The 
second rule of Skinner’s hermeneutical method is to, “focus on the writer’s mental world, 
the world of his empirical beliefs. This rule derives from the logical connection between 
our capacity to ascribe particular intentions to agents and our knowledge of their 
empirical beliefs” (Skinner 1972, 407)21.  Both of these hermeneutical operations follow 
from Skinner’s understanding of, “the text as an object linked to its creator, and thus on 
                                                 
21 Although this seems to give some credibility to the criticism that Skinner’s interpretive aim is to 
somehow get inside the writer’s head, I am in agreement with Adams that this does not capture the true 
intent behind Skinner’s hermeneutics. The idea of the writer’s ‘mental world’ is simply an interpretive 
means to avoid the otherwise overwhelming force of context. Not only does it allow us to assign agency to 
the author (albeit within context and conventions) but allows us to separate context from the ‘utterance’ (or 
written words) themselves. 
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to the discussion of what its creator may have been doing in creating it” (Skinner 1972, 
408), and it is only by paying explicit attention to the cultural conventions and the mental 
world of the author that we can begin to understand this link, and the true meaning 
contained within these texts. 
 One of the important advances of this method is elaborating a connection between 
the history of political thought and larger social ideas. In this regard, “we can hardly 
claim to be concerned with the history of political theory unless we are prepared to write 
it as…the record of an actual activity, and in particular as the history of ideologies” 
(Skinner 1974, 280). However, just as the new historians reject the notion of the text as a 
completely self-sufficient entity, they also believed that, “to imagine context as a rigid 
and exhaustive explanatory framework is to abandon the text” (W. Adams 1988, 48). 
Thus, while the text is correctly understood as being situated within a context, the 
emphasis on the ‘mental world’ of the writer is an admission that an author can do things 
with a work even if it is embedded in a cultural setting. Though undeniably a creature of 
a context, an author can have the intention of challenging a context, or challenging an 
idea, or even transforming the very language within which the author is working.22 Thus, 
the hermeneutics of the new historians is a complex methodology that seeks to encourage 
what Adams calls a ‘strong form of interpretation’ that tries to forge a middle path 
between an a-historical and timeless abstraction of ideas and authors on the one hand, and 
the domination of texts by a rigid contextual framework on the other. The ultimate goal 
of this hermeneutic method is one that attempts to reassert the complexity not only of the 
process of interpretation but the object being interpreted. 
                                                 
22 See J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History.  
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 However much the charge for interpretation has been renewed by the new 
historians, there is an ironic consequence to this method, especially when it comes to the 
relationship between this interpretation of the history of political thought and politics 
more generally. This consequence is captured by Adams when he notes that, “the 
interpretive manifesto set forth by the new historians has undoubtedly altered prevailing 
notions of textual interpretation. But it has also…made the purposes of studying the 
history of political thought less apparent” (W. Adams 1988, 50). If this hermeneutics is 
one that is tied to cultural conventions and the mental world of the writer, does that 
necessarily, and irreversibly, sever the connection between the meanings and ideas of 
these texts, and ‘contemporary life and practice’? Does this hermeneutics force us to 
choose between historical understanding and contemporary engagement? To put the issue 
more clearly, “does the demand for interpretive integrity and rigor force us to choose 
between two forms of political theory, one which is faithful to the past because it is 
detached from the present and thus apolitical, and a second which is concerned with the 
present, critical and, precisely because of those commitments, anti-historical?” (W. 
Adams 1988, 50). 
 To some degree, this seems to be exactly what the new historians are advocating 
with their textual hermeneutics. As Skinner notes, “it will be found that what counts as an 
answer will usually look, in a different culture of period, so different in itself that it can 
hardly be in the least useful even to go on thinking of the relevant question as being “the 
same” in the required sense after all. More crudely: we must learn to do our own thinking 
for ourselves” (Skinner 1969, 52). In one sense, this is an understandable conclusion: if 
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there are no eternal ideas than the call for a renewed sense of ‘doing our own thinking’ is 
a necessary and welcome assertion. However, this does not quite explain the choice that 
Adams believes the new historians lay before us: an apolitical hermeneutics or an 
ahistorical political theory. In developing a rigorous hermeneutical method, the new 
historians have confined the idea of hermeneutics simply to a matter of methodology. 
Politics, the act of thinking for ourselves, seems to be entirely divorced from the activity 
of hermeneutics and the purity and rigor of hermeneutic interpretation is achieved only 
by sacrificing (or denying) its potential relation to politics itself: historical thinking and 
political thinking, if done properly, are distinct activities. 
II. Hermeneutics as Ontology 
 Adams wants to challenge the methodological limit that the new historians have 
placed upon their interpretative enterprise. In doing so, Adams hopes to take the activity 
of hermeneutics and expand it beyond process of textual interpretation and include within 
it the very act of ‘thinking for ourselves’. Rather than opting for an approach to political 
theory that is concerned solely with the historical specificity of texts and ideas and thus 
one that cannot turn its focus upon contemporary politics without altering its 
methodological commitments, Adams opts for a political theory that is hermeneutic, and 
interpretive, precisely because of its political commitments. He is interested in a political 
that is concerned with,  “questioning the immediate, contemporary and familiar world of 
political life might be understood and carried out as an interpretive enterprise” (W. 
Adams 1988, 51)23. This, however, does not completely divorce Adams from the work of 
                                                 
23 Adams is not making the case that ALL political theory should, or must, be interpretive. Adam’s 
suggestion of a hermeneutical political theory is, in his estimation, only one possible model or type of 
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the new historians.  Pocock’s strong insistence that writers work on a language as much 
as in it can be seen as an acknowledgement that the history of political theory (and the 
work of political theorists) engages in this type of questioning and challenging.  
Furthermore:  
One of the things that powerful and memorable political theorists have commonly done, 
and done well, is to intercept and describe the meanings embedded in, and constitutive of, 
the political practices around them…political theory thus conceived, is a hermeneutical 
form of criticism; it is the exposure…of the meaning-foundations of a particular range of 
collective activities (W. Adams 1988, 51). 
For Adams, the issue is not with the method of the new historians, but rather with an 
understanding of the method that, “does not take context far enough” (W. Adams 1988, 
64). To rescue a truly interpretive political theory, Adams believes that it is wholly 
sufficient to take the basic methodological premises of the new historian’s hermeneutics 
while not being content to “restrict the scope of hermeneutical reflection to the 
elucidation of the texts” (W. Adams 1988, 50). For Adams, it is not a methodological 
failing that is the cause of this seeming split between historical interpretation on the one 
hand and contemporary political analysis on the other. It is simply a refusal of the theorist 
to not take the hermeneutical project to its conclusion. 
 While I believe Adams points to a very important issue with this understanding of 
hermeneutics, and his desire to link political theory, hermeneutics, and political critique 
is a compelling project, what is left wanting is the way in which he conceives of his 
expanded hermeneutics. While he points out a certain lack of political engagement with 
the method of the new historians, in his rush to re-link hermeneutics with political 
critique, does he overlook a fundamental issue with that very method? While wanting to 
                                                                                                                                                 
political theory among many others, but it is his intention to make explicit what he believes is an 
underutilized strain of political theory. 
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avoid the popular critique of Skinner referenced above, that he is interested in 
understanding the subjective world of the author or to produce a hermeneutics that allows 
us to inhabit the original head space of the author in question, I would like to forward the 
idea that an expansion of the hermeneutical method that Adams desires, which would 
effectively link the two ‘worlds’ he is interested in, can only be done by significantly 
altering the method itself. For this I want to briefly turn to Gadamer and Ricoeur, 
specifically to elucidate an understanding of hermeneutics that is not simply a 
methodology, but more importantly, is an ontology. Only in this sense can the 
hermeneutic understanding truly have the reach that Adams believes it should have, and 
that will be instrumental for developing a hermeneutic theory of citizenship and politics. 
 In his essay “The Task of Hermeneutics”, Paul Ricoeur defines hermeneutics as 
“the theory of the operations of understanding in their relation to the interpretation of 
texts” (Ricoeur 1981, 43), which does not seem very far removed from the general 
working theory of textual work espoused by Skinner. However what is immediately 
present in Ricoeur’s project are two qualifying remarks that alter the scope of his 
understanding of hermeneutics. Ricoeur is adamant that part of hermeneutical reflection 
is the “realization of discourse as a text; and the elaboration of the categories of the text” 
(Ricoeur 1981, 43), which seems to transform hermeneutics itself into a slightly different 
(and more expanded) undertaking. This decisive transformation in Ricoeur’s account of 
the history of hermeneutics comes with the advent of Heidegger and Gadamer, and is 
only possible when the status of hermeneutics as simply a methodological commitment is 
questioned. As Ricoeur himself writes, “the decisive step was not to perfect the 
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epistemology of the human sciences but to question its fundamental postulated…that 
these sciences can compete with the sciences of nature by means of a methodology which 
would be their own” (Ricoeur 1981, 53). Rather than forwarding hermeneutics as solely a 
methodology or one type of theory of knowledge, the essential move made by Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics is to alter the basic level upon which hermeneutics is seen to operate. 
According to Ricoeur, “the presupposition of hermeneutics construed as epistemology is 
precisely what Heidegger and Gadamer place in question…it must be seen as an attempt 
to dig beneath the epistemological enterprise itself, in order to uncover its properly 
ontological conditions” (Ricoeur 1981, 53). This change, from a concern with 
epistemology and methodology to ontology means that the undertaking of hermeneutics 
poses an entirely different question. As formulated by Ricoeur, the change can be seen 
thusly, “instead of asking ‘how do we know?’ it will be asked ‘what is the mode of being 
of that being who exists only in understanding?’” (Ricoeur 1981, 54). As ontology, 
hermeneutics is no longer simply a reflection on a type of knowledge, or an entry into the 
realm of scientific methodology. Instead, is constitutes the very ground upon which 
scientific and political understanding can take place. 
 Only if hermeneutics is taken as ontology can Gadamer can assert that, “language 
has no independent life apart from the world that comes to language within it. Not only is 
the world world only insofar as it comes into language, but language, too, has its real 
being only in the fact that the world is presented in it” (Gadamer 2006, 440). `This 
expansive understanding of hermeneutics is not a rejection of the textual hermeneutics of 
the type advocated by Skinner and the new historians, but it is one that sets that textual 
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hermeneutical investigation within an understanding of our very ‘being-in-the-world’ that 
is itself fundamentally linguistic. The practice of textual interpretation thus becomes 
hermeneutic in two specific ways. First, we are engaged in an interpretation of the work 
in question, but second, and more important for Gadamer, that act of interpretation itself 
takes place through and in language, and thus becomes part of a larger or more 
encompassing ongoing hermeneutical process. This does not mean that the process of 
textual interpretation becomes impossible or groundless, but it does point to the 
impossibility of definitively separating the ‘act’ of interpretation from other, non-
interpretative ‘acts’. Gadamer stresses this essential inability to separate out this 
methodological process when he confronts the issue of ‘beginnings’ with regard to 
specific acts of interpretation. In Truth and Method, Gadamer asserts that, “it is true that 
interpretation has to start somewhere, but it does not start just anywhere. It is not really a 
beginning…the hermeneutical experience always includes the fact that the text to be 
understood speaks into a situation that is determined by previous opinions” (Gadamer 
2006, 467). Here, Gadamer is building his hermeneutical understanding at the expense of 
the methodological neatness that is the goal of the hermeneutical process espoused by the 
new historians. While the ‘turn to history’ that is fundamental to Skinner’s interpretive 
work and epistemological claims (focusing on prevailing conventions and understanding 
the writers mental world) serves to mark the works being interpreted as distinct products 
of a definable historical period, Gadamer’s recasting of the ‘beginnings’ of interpretive 
acts as always already situated within a linguistic context and hermeneutic world means 
that these interpretations as methods or means of understanding texts of events cannot 
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maintain such purity of beginnings, borders and completeness without denying some of 
the fundamental characteristics of the world itself.  
 These characteristics, for Gadamer, are not simply philosophical speculations or 
pleas to embark on a new methodology, but are indispensable for understanding not 
simply the complicated process of textual interpretation but for understanding how that 
interpretation is related to other acts of interpretation, how the context of the ‘text’ is 
fundamentally connected to other contexts, and how interpretation is related to our very 
existence in the world. But how does Gadamer’s method effectively demonstrate these 
connections and interrelated processes? How can we best begin to understand what 
Gadamer’s expanded sense of hermeneutics means with regard to both the interpretation 
of texts as well as the relationship between interpretation and political life (the major aim 
of this chapter)? What does hermeneutics as ontology mean for the relationship between 
hermeneutics and politics? I believe that we can begin to understand the full implications 
of this transition in the history of hermeneutics if we look Gadamer’s use of the slightly 
polemical, and often debated term tradition. 
 Of all the terms that Gadamer embraces in his discussion of general hermeneutics, 
tradition maybe one of the most vexing for commentators as well as one of the most 
seized upon. For many commentators, Gadamer’s use of the term tradition is not only 
fundamental to his entire hermeneutic enterprise, but shows that his project is one that is 
fundamentally conservative and, as such, renders it blind to certain possibilities and 
philosophical positions. Paul Ricoeur, a rather sympathetic critic notes that, “Gadamer 
inevitably turned hermeneutic philosophy towards the rehabilitation of prejudice and the 
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defense of tradition and authority, placing this philosophy in a conflictual relation to any 
critique of ideology” (Ricoeur 1981, 66). The link that Gadamer maintains between the 
terms, especially authority and tradition, and his deliberate use of hermeneutics to counter 
some of the methodological claims and positions of the enlightenment movement, which 
he saw as systematically distorting both the effects and characteristics of both tradition 
and authority. 
 Gadamer’s own work, when read selectively, does seem to confirm these 
suspicions. Gadamer’s magnum opus, Truth and Method, can easily be seen as a brilliant 
philosophical defense of the power of both authority and tradition, potentially mirroring 
some of the same ideas found in Hooker and English conservative thought more 
generally. Regarding the relationship between the individual actor and this notion of 
tradition, Gadamer writes, “the anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of 
a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the 
tradition” (Gadamer 2006, 293). If tradition is to be understood as something that 
functions at the expense of subjectivity, what does this say about the acting individual as 
such? Exactly how does tradition infringe upon subjectivity? What tradition seems to 
enable, at first glance, is the existence of a continuous presence of both authority and 
what Gadamer refers to as prejudices. It is only in relation to these ideas of tradition 
(authority) and prejudice that Gadamer sees the activity of interpretation playing out. As 
Gadamer writes, “thus the meaning of “belonging” – i.e. the element of tradition in our 
historical hermeneutical activity – is fulfilled in the commonality of fundamental, 
enabling principles” (Gadamer 2006, 295). Again, for those who see in Gadamer a 
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fundamentally conservative approach not only to interpretation but, through an extension 
of his work, politics more generally, draw from these acknowledgements of tradition that 
Gadamer places at a very crucial juncture in his hermeneutic theory. What needs to be 
determined is how this idea of tradition plays itself out in relation to the act of 
interpretation itself. If tradition plays such a powerful role, how plausible is it to talk 
about a critical form of hermeneutics? 
 While this is not the place to engage in an analysis of all facets of Gadamer’s 
supposed conservatism, what is important for our purposes is to establish a more robust 
understanding of his use of the idea of tradition. While not denying the possibility that 
there may be some elements to his understanding of tradition that (may) lend themselves 
to a certain conservative reading, it is important for our purposes to connect his use of the 
term tradition with the ‘ontological’ condition of hermeneutics that he establishes. The 
first important element to understand is that, in Gadamer’s reading, tradition is essentially 
a dynamic process. Tradition, understood hermeneutically, may in fact constitute a 
common ground of understanding, but “this commonality is constantly being formed in 
our relation to tradition. Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we 
produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, 
and hence further determine it ourselves.” (Gadamer 2006, 293). The ‘precondition’ of 
tradition, which was brought to our attention by Ricoeur, forms only a part of the total 
concept of tradition. Rather than it being a permanently established precondition, one that 
always serves as the background for our experiences (hermeneutical, political, and 
otherwise) it is something that we produce through participating in it. Through the 
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ongoing process of understanding and engaging with this precondition of tradition, 
specifically through hermeneutic practice that, we could speculate, is the most complete 
way we interact with tradition, we alter and determine it, and hence change the very 
preconditions of our interpretive activity. While this is certainly not an exercise in 
complete interpretive freedom – after all, we begin to interpret against a background of 
preconditions – the interpretive process results in a certain amount of freedom that 
impacts and alters those very preconditions themselves. In addition to tradition being a 
fundamentally dynamic process, there is, for our purposes, another very important 
component to it that is necessary if we are to take hermeneutics out of the narrowly 
methodological context and assert its ontological role. 
 When Gadamer, in Truth and Method, notes that our relation to tradition is 
essentially a linguistic one, he is forcing us to understand that not only is tradition 
something all encompassing (although constantly being produced) but hermeneutics itself 
is an all encompassing activity. Here he is moving from hermeneutics as a 
methodological activity to hermeneutics as the very ontological ground upon which 
methodologies can be enacted. In his essay, “On the Scope and Function of Reflection”, 
Gadamer writes, “language is not only an object in our hands, it is the reservoir of 
tradition and the medium in and through which we exist and perceive our world” 
(Gadamer 2008, 29). What this analysis of tradition forces us to understand is that there is 
a necessary link between the “very general recognition of the linguistic character of 
experience and the more technical definition of hermeneutics in terms of textual 
interpretation” (Ricoeur 2007, 17). What this means is that we cannot understand the 
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technical method of hermeneutics without acknowledging the fact that it takes place 
through a linguistic medium and through beings that have a fundamentally linguistic 
existence, hence the very conditions for hermeneutic activity (in the technical sense) are 
themselves inescapably hermeneutic (in the ontological sense). David Linge makes this 
relationship readily apparent when he writes, “the role of the past cannot be restricted 
meanly to supplying the texts or events that make up the “objects” of interpretation. As 
prejudice and tradition, the past also defines the ground the interpreter himself occupies 
when he understands” (Gadamer 2008, xv).  That is to say, we cannot successfully 
understand hermeneutics as any kind of social scientific method without understanding 
how that very method is also a means of moving us from the narrow hermeneutical 
relationship between the interpreter and the object being interpreted to the larger 
hermeneutic relationship, that being the one between the interpreter and the very word in 
which the interpreter lives and which makes the very act of interpretation possible. It is 
not coincidental that, in Truth and Method, Gadamer ends his reflections by speaking 
about ‘universal aspect of hermeneutics’ but begins the work discussing the question of 
hermeneutics and aesthetics and the experience of art. The way in which he presents the 
evolution of his ideas in the work is an illustration of one of the major points of the book, 
and his understanding of hermeneutics more generally: the object of hermeneutical 
investigation is at once both an object of study as well as a means to help us understand 
the hermeneutical relation between ourselves and the world at large.  
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 This expansion of the idea of hermeneutics24 allows us to address once again the 
question posed by William Adams: “Does the demand for interpretive integrity and rigor 
force us to choose between two forms of political theory, one which is faithful to the past 
because it is detached from the present and thus apolitical, and a second which is 
concerned with the present, critical and/ precisely because of those commitments, anti-
historical?” (W. Adams 1988, 50). Taking Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a starting point, 
the answer is, resoundingly, that we do not. Political theory can offer us both a method 
that is fully hermeneutical while at the same time is, in Adams’ words, ‘concerned with 
the present’. Using Gadamer’s understanding of tradition allows us to see how both of 
these operations are, or can be, interrelated. Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics does 
agree with part of Skinner’s contention that there are no ‘timeless’ questions in the 
history of political thought. However, what Gadamer does offer (contra Skinner) is a way 
of tying together Skinner’s assertion that ‘we must to our own thinking for ourselves’ 
with an engagement with historical texts and ideas. Whereas Skinner’s methodological 
hermeneutics offered such a precise encapsulation of the object within its own historical 
orbit (which can be interpreted but not appropriated via the hermeneutic method), an 
ontological understanding of hermeneutics allows us to see how the interpretation of 
those objects becomes part of the engagement that alters the historical ‘tradition’ within 
which hermeneutic beings find themselves.  It is not simply a matter of choosing between 
understanding an historical text and engaging with present politics, as if the two inhabited 
                                                 
24 Ricoeur refers to this process as ‘deregionalization’: the gradual consolidation of hermeneutics from 
multiple fields of study (religious hermeneutics, legal hermeneutics etc…) into one larger conception of 
hermeneutics and its relationship to the world. The final move from methodology to ontology signifies, for 
Ricoeur, that final moment of ‘deregionalization’.  
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completely distinct and unrelated dimensions. Instead, we see in an ontological 
hermeneutics a bringing together of the interpretation of the object with the 
understanding of our linguistic being. Although we can (and must) assert historical 
difference and specificity (Gadamer’s method is not one that levels historical fact or 
specificity) understanding historical meaning and understanding politics (or, for Adams, 
contemporary politics) are complimentary, and interrelated activities. 
III. Hermeneutics and the Imaginary 
 If an ontological hermeneutics allows us to combine interpretation with our being 
in the world, if the processes of interpretation and critical engagement with politics are 
not separate activities, exactly what does this activity entail? What this means, for 
Adams, is that a critical engagement in politics must be one that looks to interpret the 
meaning of political structures and the world of politics more generally. This means, 
“questioning the immediate, contemporary, and familiar world of political life might be 
understood and carried out as an interpretive enterprise, precisely to the degree that a 
writer is committed to articulating the meanings of political arrangements” (W. Adams 
1988, 51). Rather than understanding politics as merely a ‘pragmatic domain’, of means 
and ends, a hermeneutic approach reminds us that “the political is also an imagined 
world, a world constructed around and in terms of specific meanings” (W. Adams 1988, 
51). Rather than focusing simply on political practices, our investigations must be 
concerned with the meanings of those practices, they must help us to understand the 
‘imaginary’ realm of politics as an indispensable part of this ‘practical’ realm, as well as 
the relations that hold between the two and the ways in which they both, together, impact 
our self-understandings of citizenship, obligation and responsibility. We are interested in 
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understanding the way in which meaning is found within practice and the way in which 
political practice is also a process of “how in fact we go about defining ourselves…how 
we say who we are in the midst of everyday thought and action” (W. Adams 1988, 53).  
What needs to be investigated now is the way in which we can conceive of this imaginary 
level of politics and its relationship to the more ‘everyday’ understanding of political 
activity that is buttressed and legitimated by it. 
 One philosopher who offers a complex and rewarding take on the relationship 
between the functional organization of society and its ‘imaginary’ component is 
Cornelius Castoriadis. Castoriadis theorized that for us to understand society, we must 
first understand that a given society as historically ‘instituted’; that is, each society is 
produced and made meaningful through the emergence and interaction of specific 
institutions, all of which contain within them ‘imaginary significations’.  As he writes, 
“the institutions, and the imaginary significations borne by it and animating it, create a 
world. This is the world of the particular society” (Castoriadis 1991, 146). Although 
Castoriadis is ultimately interested in understanding a world of meaningful human action 
we will be able to discuss such a world, and put forward a worthwhile conception of 
meaningful action, only if we interrogate the relationship between society, individuals, 
and the presence of these various ‘institutions’ and ‘social imaginaries’. 
In his seminal work, The Imaginary Institution of Society, he further develops the 
notion of ‘the social imaginary’, this “creative core of the social-historical and psychic 
worlds…the element that creates ex nihilo the figures and forms rendering “this world” 
and “what is” possible” (Thompson 1982, 674). The idea of the imaginary is developed in 
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large part because Castoriadis felt that we needed to deepen our understanding of politics 
and society beyond the merely technical or rational and “he did not consider the goal-
oriented, planned moment as the primary component of action because it constitutes only 
the technical moment of an activity that requires the setting of conditions goals, and 
means” (Joas 1989, 1188). Rather than focusing on the means/end side of politics and 
society, he wanted to understand the ‘setting of conditions’ that makes such goal-oriented 
activity even possible. In this regard, the imaginary is indispensable, as it is, for 
Castoriadis, the component of the social/political world that “accounts for the orientation 
of social institutions, for the constitution of motives and needs” (Thompson 1982, 664). 
According to John B. Thompson, Castoriadis’ idea of the ‘social imaginary’ is not simply 
a philosophical addendum to politics or society, but instead it is something that “renders 
possible any relation of object and image…without which there could be no reflection of 
anything” (Thompson 1982, 664).  The shape that the political world takes in the realm of 
the ‘imaginary’ becomes one of the primary grounds upon which the ‘practical’ realm of 
politics gets established, it is what makes possible certain rationalities that enable the 
functioning of one political regime or another. 
More specifically, the social imaginary, once instituted, serves as this ground 
upon which the specific political and social institutions of society can be founded because 
the imaginary is what allows us to understand ourselves as individuals within a given 
society. For Castoriadis, it is not enough to understand that we are individuals, but we 
must understand that we are social and historical individuals; that is, individuals who are 
inseparable from our relations to other (historical) concepts, objects, and ideas. 
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Therefore, the ‘social imaginary institutions’ carry out two essential functions. First, the 
presence of these social institutions ‘creates’ the social individual. According to 
Castoriadis, “the social fabrication of the individual is the historical process by means of 
which the psyche is coerced…into investing (cathecting) socially instituted objects, rules, 
and the world…the social individual is thus constituted by means of the internalization of 
the world and the imaginary significations created by society” (Castoriadis 1991, 148-9).  
If we truly accept, as Castoriadis would have us, the notion that we are social and 
historical individuals, then the process of becoming a social individual is a process which 
must rely on, our bring profoundly shaped by the historical and social institutions within 
which we exist. 
The second function is intertwined with the first: in addition to creating the social 
individual, the social institutions are that which allow individuals to search for, and find, 
meaningful actions and beliefs within a given society. In order for the social institutions 
to fabricate the social individual, “the institution must offer to the psyche meaning for its 
waking life” (Castoriadis 1991, 144. Italics are in the original.).  That is to say, it is not 
enough for institutions to ‘create’ us as social individuals, these institutions must also 
provide individuals with certain relations to other social institutions, from family 
relations, to law, to political structures. As Castoriadis notes, “Society must define its 
‘identity’, its articulation, the world, its relation to the world and to the objects is 
contains, its needs and its desires. Without the ‘answer’ to these ‘questions, without these 
‘definitions’, there can be no human world, no society, no culture…the role of imaginary 
significations is to provide an answer to these questions” (Castoriadis 1998, 147).  This 
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leads Castoriadis to the idea that the social world exists, fundamentally, as a ‘system of 
significations’ and that these significations are brought into being as a way for us to 
understand, not just ourselves, but our relations to the world around us. 
All of this leads us to Castoriadis’ major assertion about society and the 
relationships that hold between a given society and the individuals within it. Each 
individual society, as a particular social and historical construction (or what Castoriadis 
terms the socio-historical) is an ‘instituted’ society: any society is an historical creation 
that is held in place and made livable and open to human understanding and experience 
due to the presence of social institutions. For Castoriadis, an institution “is a socially 
sanctioned, symbolic network in which a functional component and an imaginary 
component are combined in variable proportions and relations” (Castoriadis 1998, 132). 
It is the presence of these institutions, with their combination of the functional and the 
imaginary, or more presicely, the functional that is predicated upon the imaginary, that 
both create the social individual, and provide the social individual with purpose and an 
understanding of social relations, and answers to social questions concerning purpose and 
desires.  
 In addition to providing answers to these questions, another invaluable function 
that the social imaginary institution is involved in is the production of the relations 
between people in society. “Relations between individuals and groups, behavior, 
motivations are not simply incomprehensible for us, they are impossible in themselves 
outside of this imaginary” (Castoriadis 1998, 161). Why is it then, that the imaginary is 
so important to the literal production of all of these relationships and ideas?  It is due to 
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the fact that the imaginary resolves a fundamental element of arbitrariness that 
accompanies all networks of social relations, and thus produces a certain amount of social 
stability. To understand the essential nature of the social imaginary institution, we must 
understand that “the institution of society attempt to cover over that chaos, at creating a 
world for society” (Castoriadis 2007, 80) Castoriadis notes this arbitrary element when he 
writes, “the articulation of society into technique, economy, law, politics, religion, art etc. 
which seems self-evident to us, is only one mode of social institution, particular to a 
series of societies to which our own belongs” (Castoriadis 1998, 181). What these 
imaginary institutions provide is a social answer, or a resolution to that idea of 
arbitrariness. While it does not eliminate the issue that “there is not articulation of social 
life that is given once and for all…this articulation…is at every instance the creation of 
the society in question” (Castoriadis 1998, 180), what it does offer, in the form of social 
answers to social and political questions, is a self understanding that allows an individual, 
or a society, to avoid the issue (fear) of arbitrariness by providing an instituted social 
framework upon which people and groups can understand the social and political 
institutions as meaningful and purposeful; as part of a society that “operates as if it 
always were” (Naranch 2002, 69).  This connection is indispensable for understanding 
one of Castoriadis’ major contentions: not just that the political world is ‘rational’ as well 
as ‘symbolic’ but that the very ‘rationality’ of any given political world is predicated 
upon a shared and understood ‘symbolic’ nature. Or as Castoriadis himself writes, 
“society can exist concretely only through the fragmentary and complementary 
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incarnation and incorporation of its institution and its imaginary significations in the 
living, talking, and active individuals of that society” (Castoriadis 1991, 145).  
In Castoriadis’ estimation, the imaginary institutions that work to ‘produce’ the 
instituted society in question allow individuals to not only understand themselves 
‘within’ that society, but to understand the relations, ideas, and norms that govern it, and 
that further allow individuals to engage in socially meaningful action: only by 
‘understanding’ society can you act within it. Additionally, these institutions (and the 
imaginary that underpins them) lessen the sense of arbitrariness that Castoriadis sees 
fundamental to every instituted society. As John Thompson notes, the social imaginary 
provides for “the projection of an “imaginary community” by means of which “real” 
distinctions are portrayed as “natural,” the particular is disguised in the universal” 
(Thompson 1982, 666). This naturalization of norms, laws, and beliefs is crucial; the 
imaginary is important, if not fundamental, in this regard simply because those answers 
provide the very means with which the questions of arbitrariness can be skirted and the 
questions of purpose can be answered.  
 What ultimately, and intimately, ties the social imaginary to hermeneutics, and 
why it is helpful in developing our hermeneutic project can be found in the connection 
that Castoriadis makes between the imaginary and language. Regarding this intimate 
association, he writes, “a large part of the significations of a society – those that are, or 
can be made, explicit – are also instituted, directly or indirectly, through its language” 
(Castoriadis 1998, 238). Although elsewhere Castoriadis refers to language as a ‘second 
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order institution’,25 he asserts that “these second-order institutions…woven together, 
produce the concrete texture of society” (Castoriadis 2007, 100) If the imaginary is the 
means by which social institutions solidify themselves, language is the most prominent 
way in which that framework and its symbolic representation is constructed and 
dissipated through society. For Castoriadis, the social institutions of a society cannot be 
effective if they lack the ability to become internalized. Further, the ‘naturalization’ of 
each set of social institutions is impossible without this internalization, and language, as 
that which can connect these ideas with individual thought, provides the most effective 
means of allowing the social imaginary to become an internalized element of individual, 
and social, life. Or, as Dilip Gaonkar notes, “Each society derives its unity and identity 
by representing itself in symbols, myths, legends, and other collectively shared 
significations. Language is the medium par excellence in which these social imaginary 
significations become manifest and do their constitutive work” (Gaonkar 2002, 7). 
Therefore, if we are to concern ourselves with the creation and maintenance of a ‘social 
imaginary’ as part of our understanding of politics and citizenship, we must pay further 
attention to the relationship between the use of language and the deployment of this 
social imaginary.  
Castoriadis work allows us to understand that within, or perhaps beneath whatever 
practical purposes we attach to various social and political practices, there lies a more 
                                                 
25 Here, Castoriadis’ terminology is slightly misleading. ‘Second order institutions’ are contrasted with 
what Castoriadis calls the ‘primal institution of society which is nothing more than the brute facts that all 
societies use specific ‘social imaginary significations’ to ‘create’ themselves. Hence, for Castoriadis, 
‘second order institutions’ are in fact quite important, and include language, an understanding of the 
individual, an understanding of the family, and business enterprises. Essentially, ‘second order institutions’ 
are institutions specific to each society to implement (in its own historically specific way) the ‘primal 
institution of society’.  
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fundamental one: the production and re-production of the ‘social imaginary’. In order to 
understand this dual function of political practices – being at once both ‘pragmatic’ and 
‘imaginary’ – I would like to offer an interpretation of Pericles’ funeral oration, with 
specific focus on how we can see this speech not only serving a certain ‘pragmatic’ 
political function but also serving to create, and re-create a specific set of social 
imaginary institutions that I, borrowing a term from Nicole Loraux, will refer to as the 
‘Athenian imaginary’.  
IV. The Funeral Oration 
 Pericles’ Funeral Oration, from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, is 
the second of three major speeches given by Pericles and ‘recorded’26 by Thucydides, and 
is perhaps one of the most famous passages from the entire work; with historians and 
philosophers alike attributing significant importance to it in terms of understanding 
Athenian political and social life of the period. Typical of this type of importance, 
Castoriadis asserts that, “the attitude of the classical Greek polis in relation to culture is 
best expressed in an extraordinary text, the “Funeral Speech of Pericles” in the Second 
book of Thucydides’ History” (Castoriadis 1991, 235). However, just what about the 
speech is truly important, and what it tells us about Athenian politics, and Athenian life 
more generally, can be a major point of contention. As a preliminary means of 
comparison, I would like to assert that many of the prominent interpretations of Pericles’ 
Funeral Oration can be understood most easily by looking the primary context in which 
                                                 
26 I qualify the idea of recording the speeches because, as Thucydides himself notes, “my habit has been to 
make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course 
adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said” (Thucydides 1982, 13). 
Although his method can be confounding when it comes to establishing the truth of individual speeches, we 
should acknowledge from the outset that the funeral oration, as both a ceremony and rhetorical practice, is 
one that had a long tradition in Athens (See Loraux, 2006), so even if the exact speech attributed to Pericles 
by Thucydides is inaccurate to some degree, Pericles was largely constrained  by tradition and expectation. 
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the author locates the oration itself. Two of the most common contexts are either the 
immediate political context of Athens at the time of the speech, or the place the oration 
occupies within Thucydides’ larger work as a whole. As a way of building off of these 
contexts, and the insights that they provide, many of which are quite helpful and thought 
provoking, I would like to offer a further option. I wish to assert that some of the 
dominant interpretations of the speech, and the relations between the speech and Athens, 
understate, or leave out entirely, a key dimension, which can be clarified if we situate this 
speech, following Loraux (2006), within the context of the tradition of the funeral oration 
itself, as well but within the context of Castoriadis’ ‘imagined institutions’ and ‘social 
imaginary’. 
In her discussion of the Funeral Oration, Lorna Hardwick states the case for 
interpreting Pericles’ Funeral Oration through its immediate political context when she 
writes, “much recent work inspired by concepts drawn from anthropology has diverted 
attention from detailed study of historical context. This discussion seeks in a small way to 
redress that balance” (Hardwick 1993, 149). That is to say, if we are to understand not 
only what he said, but more importantly, why it was said, and for what reasons, we must 
understand that this speech took place at a particular moment when, “the war was official 
and that it was affecting Attica itself. The countryside of Attica had been evacuated and 
Thucydides refers to overcrowding in Athens” (Hardwick 1993, 150). If we take 
seriously the explicit political and social context as the motivation for the Funeral 
Oration, the speech it is seen largely as a brilliant bit of rhetorical/political strategy, 
tactically designed to placate the worries and concerns of the Athenian citizens, and 
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serves as an illustration of the power that Pericles has over the Athenian demos. In this 
interpretation, Hardwick is interested in explaining the particular language that Pericles 
employs, why it seems that this speech differs from other examples of the oration. Again, 
the immediate context provides answers to those questions if we remember that leading 
up to the Funeral Oration, “there was anxiety about the ravaging of the countryside” 
(Hardwick 1993, 151), that was resulting from Pericles’ war strategy, which was leading 
to certain political discontents within certain segments of the Athenian polis, most 
notably that, “it was likely that the rich and the citizens of the countryside took the view 
that, whether or not they had wanted war in the first place, they nevertheless wanted their 
land to be defended” (Hardwick 1993, 151). It is also claimed that the Athenian cavalry, 
an aristocratic institution, was used as ‘Pericles’ main defensive weapon’ against the 
Spartans, and that at least some of the dead were “from prosperous families and perhaps 
young” (Hardwick 1993, 152). Hardwick uses this context in order to understand the 
purpose and goals of the speech itself. These goals can only be understood if we focus on 
the Athenian anxiety over the ravaging of Athenian land, the political and economic 
discontent that must have been spreading particularly throughout the well to do of Athens 
due to the loss of life in the ranks of the aristocratic Athenian cavalry, but also, likely 
throughout the rest of Athens due to a general anxiety over the efficacy of current 
military tactics and further loss of life.27  
If we focus our attention upon these given political realities that, understandably, 
Pericles would need to respond to, we see the Funeral Oration primarily as a speech of 
                                                 
27 Hardwick notes that the Athenians sued the Spartans for peace in 430, which suggests to her that there 
was, from the beginning, at least an unease over Pericles’ policies and military strategy. Again, this is the 
context within which we must situate the oration. 
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strategy. The particulars of the speech stem from the immediate political needs of the 
situation, and Pericles the orator is supplemented by the image of Pericles the political 
strategist, using the speech to respond to, and hopefully reassure, the elements of 
Athenian society that threatened his position at that moment. For Hardwick, this means 
that we should see the speech (and the larger funeral itself) as: 
Highlight[ing] both the discontents over his policy and the bereavement caused by the 
action he had taken. The ordinary citizens might be placated by the public honors, but the 
upper class…had yet to be convinced that the democracy did not operate against their 
interests. Thus the speech had as far as possible to placade those whose loss of 
exclusivity and elite status was exposed by the nature of the ritual, yet at the same time 
civic unity and balance had to be preserved (Hardwick 1993, 160). 
Given these constraints and political concerns that form the context of the speech, it is no 
surprise that Hardwick reads the speech as a means of strategically defending his position 
of leadership within Athens from challenges by politically discontent forces, as well as a 
means to attempt to unify the city once again behind his military strategy. As Hardwick 
notes, “Pericles was neither the first nor the last politician in history to wrap political 
convenience in the cloak of an appeal to honour” (Hardwick 1993, 160).  It is a funeral 
speech, yes, but it is a political speech even more, and Pericles there is a politician above 
all. 
 The second contextual school of thought for the Funeral Oration builds off of the 
interpretation of the oration as political strategy, but this interpretation often has far 
reaching consequences not just for the Funeral Oration itself, but also for the whole of 
Thucydides’ work, as it is the whole of The Peloponnesian War that serves as the primary 
context here. Here, it is not just that we need to see Pericles as a political strategist, but 
rather, we need to pay attention to “Pericles’ ability to contain the ‘passions’ of the 
crowds” (Bedford and Workman 2001, 56) as a general, yet important, characteristic. In 
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this case, the Funeral Oration simply plays a specific, albeit important, role in 
illuminating Pericles’ general ability, not just as a political strategist, but instead as a 
political leader and shaper of opinions, or as John Zumbrunnen notes, “it must be part of 
the speakers’ attempts to shape how the audience understands the situation” 
(Zumbrunnen 2008, 82). Whether Pericles accomplishes this more through overt 
manipulative appeals (as Hardwick seems to suggest) or through “a skill in interacting 
with, rather than managing, the demos” (Zumbrunnen 2008, 98), we see the speech as an 
example of shaping opinion.  
In this contextual setting, rather than seeing Pericles as simply responding to 
political needs through oratory, the very oration itself, and whatever qualities or traits 
Pericles displays, illuminates what I would refer to as a ‘Periclean moment’ in the 
trajectory of Athens within the whole of The Peloponnesian War, which helps us make 
sense of the work as a whole. This type of contextual understanding is quite common and 
leads to many provocative interpretations of Pericles, the speech itself, and The 
Peloponnesian War as a work of history, philosophy, and politics. Bedford and Workman 
see Thucydides’ characterization of the Periclean control of Athenian passions as 
explicitly contrasted with Cleon’s “propensity to inflame the crowd” (Bedford and 
Workman 2001, 56). They further develop this into a theme that tracks the arc of The 
Peloponnesian War: the contrast between reason and passion, and that as passion (Cleon) 
takes the place of passion (Pericles), human conduct escapes the bounds of moderation 
and restraint. Thus, this transition draws our attention to “the deterioration of the 
Athenian polis…symbolized by the succession of increasingly impassioned post-
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Periclean leaders” (Bedford and Workman 2001, 58). Here we see a perfect example of 
an interpretation based on that shift in context: from the immediate political context, to 
the entirety of Thucydides’ work.  
If we understand Pericles’ speech as a shining example of reason and logos in 
democratic Athens, James Boyd White offers a similar type of interpretation. White is 
concerned with the existence of such speeches within the context of a Hellenic world 
(and work) full of specific episodes where words lose their meaning (Athens during the 
plague for example), as well as the political and social consequences of that loss of 
meaning. As White himself states, “when Thucydides wishes to explore his sense of the 
internal chaos brought upon the cities of Greece by the civil wars that arose during the 
time of the Peloponnesian war, he tells us, among other things, that words themselves lost 
their meaning” (White 1984, 3). Here, Pericles’ speech becomes one example of how 
language serves as a means to create a type of identity and stability for a political society. 
As White notes, “the speeches define the conditions imposed on the actors by the 
language that constitutes their community.28 This language defines a culture…of which it 
is Thucydides’ object to tell the history” (White 1984, 67). The relationship between 
language, community, and culture is paired with examples where a language, and hence a 
community, breaks down. Thus we can interpret Pericles’ Funeral Oration as an example 
not only of how language can define a culture, or create a community, but also by paring 
it specifically with examples of ‘meaninglessness’ it serves as an example of how fragile 
that construction truly is. 
                                                 
28 For White, the relationship between speaker and language is mutually constitutive. He notes in the 
preface to the book that language is ‘remade by its speakers’ while simultaneously, the speakers are 
‘themselves remade’ in and through what they say. 
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This type of interpretation, through contextual paring within Thucydides’ work is 
fruitful, and quite logical givcn Thucydides’ propensity to himself pair speeches 
throughout his work.29 Simon Stow gives us perhaps the most nuanced and original of 
this type of interpretation: by analyzing Thucydides’ method and (what Stow sees as) the 
very deliberate pairing of the Oration with the plague, Thucydides provides us with two 
distinct Pericles: one in the history and one of the history. This interpretation allows him 
to simultaneous offer a critical evaluation of the Periclean speech itself, while using the 
speech in context to offer an insightful account of Thucydides’ design and purpose. 
While the first is an example of what Stow calls an uncritical patriotism, the second 
example is a theoretical/pedagogical one specifically deployed by Thucydides where, 
“the virtues of Athens are thrown into sharp relief and problematized by the context in 
which they are presented” (Stow 2007, 200). Stow’s contention is that while the Funeral 
Oration itself is designed “solely to blind the citizens to the city in a way that dulls their 
critical faculties…offers an idealized view of Athens and demands little of its audience” 
(Stow 2007, 197, 200), Thucydides himself subverts the uncritical patriotic spectacle of 
the speech with the plague, where, “the very virtues of which he (Pericles) boasts are 
undercut by the actions of her citizens in a time of crisis” (Stow 2007, 200); and 
Thucydides is teaching his audience what Pericles of the Oration was unable to teach his 
audience: the need for a critical form of patriotism that about “the dangers of failing to 
engage in critical reflection themselves” (Stow 2007, 201). Ultimately, Stow’s contextual 
reading of the Oration leaves us with a Thucydides who refashions the ‘Periclean 
                                                 
29 Of course, in this regard, Pericles is an odd figure, because he is the one speaker whose speeches are not 
directly paired with another. This leaves quite a bit of room for interpretation of the critical element: just 
‘what’ or ‘who’ are we supposed to pair Pericles with? 
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moment’ into a tragic moment, or one important moment in a larger tragedy, and uses it 
to appeal, “over the head of his character to his readers, teaching them a lesson that this 
Pericles could never learn” (Stow 2007, 201). Stow, while not denying the plausibility of 
the first mode of interpretation, leaves us with the firm understanding that to truly 
comprehend the meaning of the Funeral Oration, we must read it as ‘Thucydides’ oration, 
and to keep in mind that, “as the long agony wore on, as crime led to crime and madness 
to ruin, it was only from a distance that the artist who was no longer an actor could 
discern the large outlines shaping all that misery and suffering into the thing of beauty 
and awe which we call Tragedy” (Cornford 1907, 200). Here, what is important is not 
simply (or even primarily) the place of the oration within the politics of Athens, but the 
place of the oration in flow of events and ideas recorded by Thucydides.  
I believe that our understanding of the Funeral Oration is doubtlessly enhanced 
through both types of interpretations. Through the first, we can begin to understand just 
what Pericles was responding to, and how he needed to incorporate immediate political 
concerns within his civic responsibility. From the second mode of interpretation, we can 
see how the oration itself can help point to long terms changes within Athens or Hellas 
more generally, whether it be the effect of civil war, the relation between reason and 
passion, or the difficulty of upholding civic ideals. However, I believe that both of these 
types of interpretations leave out an important issue: they both tend to be primarily 
concerned with the relationship between the meaning of the speech and the intent of the 
author. For advocates of the first mode of interpretation, to understand the purpose of the 
speech we need to be fully cognizant of Pericles’ political needs, and we need to see the 
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speech as, primarily, a piece or oratory deliberately constructed to respond to those 
immediate concerns. For us to accept the second mode of interpretation, we need to look 
more closely at Thucydides’ own intention: for us to understand the oration, we need to 
see how Thucydides shaped the oration in both structure and relation to other elements in 
order to fit it into his tragic (Cornford) or critical patriotic (Stow) historical narrative-
form. What is missing to a larger degree is a sustained analysis of the oration as an 
iteration of a specific genre of public display and political speech, that, as a genre, carries 
with it fundamental social and political importance. Stow does make mention the oration 
as institutional tradition when he notes that, “For the Greeks, the annual wintertime 
funeral and oration for the war dead was an inextricable political affair…the Athenian 
funeral oration was then an occasion for the glorification of the city. It sought to reaffirm 
social ties, community values, and an established political identity” (Stow 2007, 196, 
197), however, his further analysis is predicated on a continued distancing of the oration 
within Thucydides’ work from the institutional oration itself; that is, the more we focus 
on the institution, the more difficult it becomes to see the full important of this specific 
oration. 
I believe that by drawing further attention to the institutional and historical 
elements of the oration, our analysis can accomplish several important things. Firstly, it 
allows us to look at a specific oration as a unique and individual speech while at the same 
time drawing connections between the individual speech and the institution of the speech. 
This allows us to comment with more care upon just what roles these speeches played in 
Athenian life. Whether the speech is, as Stow asserts, an example of uncritical patriotism, 
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or whether, following Orwin, it is an example of “that noblest of all visions of political 
life” (Orwin 1988, 844) is a debate that will most likely never be settled, and is well 
beyond the scope of this investigation. What is important for our purposes, however, is 
that by addressing the oration as an institution, it allows us to interpret the effects that the 
speech has on a level that goes beyond mere description of ‘political life’ or ‘patriotism’. 
Rather, it allows us to see how the funeral oration, “functioned as one of the privileged 
voices of the city’s imaginary” (Loraux 2006, 28) and to assert ways in which the oration 
itself is a part of the ongoing constitution of Athens, the Athenian people, and the 
political and civic world that they were inhabiting. 
V. The Funeral Oration and the Athenian Imaginary 
Approaching the oration in this way is not to obviate or preclude the interpretative 
schemes laid out above. In fact, I would contend that they are each valuable parts of any 
attempt to understand the place of the funeral oration as a part of Athenian politics as 
well as Thucydidean philosophy. As such, it is not incorrect for us to see the Funeral 
Oration as an example of an Athenian orator addressing (at least in part) the Athenian 
demos.30 However, for us to capture the true measure of the place and importance of the 
oration, we would do well to keep in mind, as Victoria Wohl writes, “I take ‘demos’ not 
as a transcendental subject, but as a discursive formation, a compendium of things the 
Athenians said (and did not say) about themselves as citizens” (Wohl 2002, IX). That is 
to say we need to think of the Athenian ‘demos’ (and by extension, any political 
                                                 
30 Of course, not every member of the demos was present, and in addition, foreigners, metics and other 
individuals mostly likely were also in attendance, but that does not alter the fundamental premise of the 
‘imaginary’. For the questions that the ‘imaginary’ poses and answers are important to those people 
‘within’ a given society, but also have a function to serve regarding those people who are, to one degree or 
another, ‘external’ to that society. 
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collectivity – democratic or not) as a constructed object. In this regard, the funeral oration 
that Pericles delivers is not only an address to the assembled Athenians (and foreigners) 
but is also, simultaneously, a construction of the demos itself: a reiteration of the 
imaginary institution of Athenian society. Victoria Wohl offers a succinct description of 
the constructive nature of the oration when she writes that, “the audience arrives at the 
funeral as individuals; it leaves as the Athenian demos” (Wohl 2002, 39). Although this 
may be a slightly over-simplified explanation of the dynamics inherent in the oration (and 
the institution of the public funeral more generally), it does capture an important element 
of the civic proceedings. As a civic institution, “the funeral oration has its place in 
Athenian paideia, that vast educative complex comprising institutions and cultural 
models that from childhood to death took charge of the citizen, molding him by 
constantly reminding him of his civic values” (Loraux 2006, 204-05). More than a 
strategic speech or political oratory during a time of individual and collective mourning, 
the funeral oration is simultaneously honorific, educative, and creative. 
To substantiate this interpretation we need to move away from the notion of the 
Funeral Oration of Pericles as simply a stand-alone strategic speech, and focus more on 
the idea of the oration as a tradition and a practice. While it is useful to compare the 
unique aspects of his speech to the particular political context in which it is delivered, we 
would do well to remember that despite whatever exigencies Pericles may be facing, “the 
funeral oration was an institution – an institution of speech in which the symbolic 
constantly encroached in the functional” (Loraux 2006, 27). Thus, we first need to look at 
what the funeral oration as a civic institution was designed to do, and just how the 
   111 
 
symbolic nature of the speech fit within the fabric of Athenian life. In the civic funeral 
oration genre, to borrow from Nicole Loraux, “the orators have a double aim: to instruct 
the young and to console the adults” (Loraux 2006, 84). The pragmatic aim of the 
oration, to provide comfort to the bereaved and to inspire the city in a time of defeat, is, 
at almost every turn, shot through with the second aim, to ‘instruct the young’. Thus, in 
the end, the oration becomes “at once a eulogy of working men, an honor accorded the 
dead, and a stock of instructive examples, the funeral oration is…a lesson in civic 
morality intended for the living” (Loraux 2006, 145). Furthermore, the oration discusses 
seemingly mundane things such as laws and public obligations, but is does so in such a 
way that, in Philip Manville’s words, “it portrays laws not as purely negative preventions 
but as guidelines with moral purpose that ultimately reflect and define shared values of 
the members of the political community” (Manville 1994, 25). Thus, the discussion 
within the oration is not simply one of description, but one that describes and 
disseminates a specific moral, social and cultural identity and shared identification. This 
allows for the production of the ‘Athenian imaginary’, and throughout the speech we see 
the continual linguistic ‘construction’ of Athens. Again pointing to one of the social 
consequences of the oration, Wohl writes that, “the fantasies and desires that emerge 
within this text belong not only to its author but also to the Athenian psyche” (Wohl 
2002, 32). For our purposes, Wohl’s use of the word ‘psyche’ is quite important. If, as 
Castoriadis contends, one of the most important roles of the imaginary institution is to 
offer meaning to the psyche in order to create a social individual (an individual as a 
member of a specific social/historical manifestation), can we see the elements of the 
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funeral oration fulfilling that very purpose? Is the funeral oration a manifestation of the 
imaginary institution?  Does it, and Pericles, offer to the assembled individuals not 
simply a rhetorical display, or words of consolation and encouragement, but more 
fundamentally, does it offer a construction of Athens as an imaginary institution designed 
to create the world of the Athenians, and the Athenians themselves? 
Although the funeral oration was traditionally designated as a panegyric for those 
soldiers who have fallen in battle, at the very outset Pericles states that his speech will 
take a specific (strategic) detour: "but by what road we reached our position, under what 
form of government our greatness grew, out of what national habits it sprang – these are 
subjects which I may pursue before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men" 
(Thucydides 1982, 108). These subjects inform Pericles' tension-ridden attempt to 
understand Athenian citizenship within the context of the city and in doing so, begins to 
build our first Athenian imaginary.  This tension is most evident in the context of 
Pericles' contention that "we trust less in system and policy than in the native spirit of our 
citizens" (Thucydides 1982, 109).  However, this trust in the 'native spirit' of the 
Athenians is far from a prefigured nature and spirit, but is the result of robust tendencies 
asserting themselves within the demos.  For this claim to native spirit is made 
immediately after he explicitly tempers the spirit of private relations (which he praises as 
being robust and ubiquitous) with recourse to 'system and policy'.  In this, Pericles notes, 
"but all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens.  Against 
this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the 
laws…whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, 
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although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace." (Thucydides 
1982, 108)  Thus, the power of private relations and individuality (freedom from 
government and ability to do what one likes), which Pericles sees as fundamental to the 
health of Athens is tempered by law and government, in order that they do not become 
'lawless as citizens'.  
 Pericles' Athenian imaginary is one with which he attempts to fuse the seemingly 
dirempted person (and by extension Athens) by allowing the citizen (political relations) 
and the individual (private relations) come together, and in doing so also bringing 
together into a coherent whole the relations between the citizen and the city.  Clifford 
Orwin makes note of this dynamic when he writes:  
Pericles sketches a society in which the fullest development of the citizens is compatible 
with the greatest devotion to the city…Pericles may have succeeded in harmonizing (at 
least in speech) the happiness of the individual with the good of the society, by showing 
how the citizen comes fully into his own only in this most demanding and fulfilling of 
cities.” (Orwin, The Humanity of Thucydides 1994, 16-18).   
I would argue, however, that the ultimate aim of the oration is even grander than what 
Orwin asserts. It is instead an attempt not to assert that individual development and 
Athenian development are compatible, but that they are inseparable. That is to say, 
Pericles is re-presenting this ‘Athenian imaginary’ to assert a complete identification of 
one with the other. Castoriadis makes a similar claim with regard to the oration when he 
writes that.  
In the funeral speech, Pericles implicitly shows the futility of the false dilemmas that 
plague modern political philosophy and the modern mentality in general: the ‘individual’ 
versus ‘society,’ or ‘civil society’ versus ‘the State’. The object of the institution of the 
polis is for him the creation of a human being, the Athenian citizen, who exists and lives 
in and through the unity of these three. (Castoriadis 1991, 123) 
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Leaving aside for the moment Castoriadis’ own concerns about philosophy and the 
modern world31, we see him making an important point about the oration itself. Its large 
goal (one might say the ‘primal institution’) is the creation of the social-historical 
individual known as the Athenian citizen, but its secondary goal (or ‘secondary 
institution’) is to prove the Athenian institution with an understanding of itself in relation 
to the larger society: a self who exists in and through the flowering and power of the city 
of Athens more generally. A question remains, however. In what ways does the funeral 
oration enforce this understanding (or self-understanding) of Athenian citizenship?  
 For Pericles, Athens the city is a direct result of its heroes: "the Athens that I have 
celebrated is only what the heroism of these and their like have made her" (Thucydides 
1982, 111), and the manner in which the idea of heroes functions in the construction of 
this imaginary institution is important in two respects. The first is that heroism is a 
means to cloak the 'shortcomings' of individuality.  According to Pericles, "there is 
justice in the claim that steadfastness in his country's battles should be as a cloak to cover 
a man's other imperfections; for the good action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as 
a citizen more that outweighed his demerits as an individual" (Thucydides 1982, 111).  
The heroism that Pericles demands as being constitutive of the idealist Athens brings 
citizenship in concert with individuality, ostensibly using the heroism of citizenship to 
cure the ills of individuality but it is important to remember that Pericles never renounces 
individuality, but instead it remains an important part of the Athenian character.  It is 
simply to be understood that heroic service for Athens brings them both together in a 
complimentary manner. 
                                                 
31 Again, this will enter into the discussion with a look at Castoriadis’ understanding of democracy. 
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 The second way in which heroism enters into this Athenian imaginary can best be 
understood by examining a seeming paradox that emerges toward the end of the funeral 
oration.  Regarding the burial of the dead, Pericles notes that their resting places will be 
"the noblest of shrines wherein their glory is to be laid up to be eternally remembered 
upon every occasion on which deed or story shall call for its commemoration." 
(Thucydides 1982, 112)  However, shortly after Pericles' claim about the fallen, he seems 
to make a strange rhetorical move when “in addressing the bereaved parents Pericles 
urged them to have more children” (Hardwick 1993, 152). Moreover, this urging is not 
done for any immediately strategic reasons but instead he seems to offer the hope of new 
children as some type of palliative with the claim that,  "you who are still of an age to 
beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead; not only will they 
help you to forget those whom you have lost, but will be to the state at once a 
reinforcement and a security; for never can a fair or just policy be expected of a citizen 
who does not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and apprehensions of a 
father" (Thucydides 1982, 113). This passage raises several important issues; the first is 
the explicit connection of citizenship to individuality in the sense that the just policy of a 
citizen requires the interests of 'a father'.  Thus, true heroic action as a citizen requires 
and draws upon individuality to be effective; a good citizen will be able to contribute to 
‘fair and just policy’ only if he embraces his own individual concerns and subjective 
qualities (his ‘interests and apprehensions’) that define his unique standpoint as an 
individual citizen. The second important issue involves the relationship between that 
individuality and the needs of the city itself, and this can best be understood through an 
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analysis of this process of remembering and forgetting that, I believe, works to secure the 
Athenian ‘imagined institution’.   
If the birth of new citizens (and new individuals) is to be a means to forget those 
who have died, in what sense will they be 'eternally remembered'?  I believe that we can 
resolve this dual remembrance/forgetting that emerges in this speech only if we 
understand that what the funeral oration is primarily doing is constituting (or re-
constituting) an ‘Athenian’ imaginary institution. In this sense, we can claim that they 
will be remembered as a strategic part of the Athenian imaginary, as ‘constructed’ 
Athenians (much the same way that the city itself is constructed within the speech).  
Their sacrifice and citizen action will become part of the inter-generational historical 
remembrance that Pericles uses to begin the oration, and, “everything is in place for the 
dead to become merely a link on the endless chain of the Athenian generations” (Loraux 
2006, 179). Here, it is useful to illustrate exactly how the war-dead are remembered in 
this public funeral procession. As Thucydides explains, the dead are ‘privately mourned’ 
by family for two days, after which point “the dead become public property” (Stow 
2007, 196), and the public funeral begins, at which point the individual soldiers begin to 
transform into something more public, and more symbolically and politically ‘Athenian’. 
During the funeral procession, “cypress coffins are borne on wagons, one for each tribe, 
the bones of the deceased being placed in the coffin of their tribe” until, “the dead are 
laid in the public sepulcher in the most beautiful suburb of the city” (Thucydides 1982, 
106). This single tomb for all of the war dead of that year listed the names of the 
individuals, divided by tribe, but given no other marker other than “hoi enthade keimenoi 
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(those who rest here)” (Loraux 2006, 51). Furthermore, the listing of the names adds an 
even greater element of strategic anonymity. According to Loraux, “Freed from everyday 
attachments to social life, the dead man was now simply an Athenian. Thus the lists of 
the dead mention neither patronymic nor demotic: freed forever from the bonds to father 
or family, the warrior was in effect entrusted with an official mission” (Loraux 2006, 
52). The fallen soldiers, while being honored through a beautiful burial and public 
mourning are rendered slightly more anonymous, or at the very least are stripped away of 
the markers that differentiate themselves from one another, and they become identified 
simply as war heroes related only to the city itself.  What mission is it that they are now 
entrusted with: to serve as a constant reminder of the essential and irreplaceable 
connection between citizen and city.  
There are two important ways in which the presence of this ‘anonymous dead’ 
informs Athenian ideas of citizenship, and fits into the larger idea of Athens as an 
‘imagined institution’? The first is that the praise of the anonymous dead mixes with the 
discussion of the ‘Athenian’ character until the two become two facets of the same ideal. 
As Loraux notes, "in the funeral oration, the Athenians, interchangeable and anonymous, 
are so many replicas of a single, implicit model, that of the hoplite, whose constricting 
ethic they observe” (Loraux 2006, 349). While I take some issue with how Loraux 
simply and universally attributes ‘a single ethic’ to the whole of Athens, the general 
point is essential. If the funeral oration is, in large part, a story that Athens is telling itself 
(or hearing about itself), then the way in which these newly anonymous war dead (and 
the ethic they are said to embody) serve as something of a guide-post for an 
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understanding of Athenian citizenship cannot really be overstated. Again, while I argue 
that Pericles, in the oration, does point to the necessity of some level of individuality, the 
heroism that is demonstrated, mourned and then rendered anonymous, and therefore, 
becomes universally Athenian in its lack of specificity, serves as a filter or a prism 
through which Athenian individuality is seen, manufactured and shaped. Secondly, the 
relative anonymity of the war dead is a process by which Athens attempts, “to absorb 
multiplicity in unity” (Loraux 2006, 350). While Loraux notes that the anonymity of the 
war dead, or the lack of differentiation, is in one sense democratic (erasing class status 
for example), there is a way in which the suppression of difference might be seen as 
serving to temper the (potential) democratic energies of Athenian citizens. Loraux 
elsewhere claims that, “the symbolic satisfaction that they derive from the evocation of 
the city saves the Athenians from actually having to think of the city as a community or 
even as a collection of heterogeneous human groups” (Loraux 2006, 347) and further, 
that we can in one sense see “the denial of conflict as the law of politics and the life of 
the city. Anything is preferable to recognizing that in the city power rests in the hands of 
one group” (Loraux 2006, 70). Taken together, this allows us to see the way in which the 
elaboration of an Athenian ethic or Athenian identity that is (largely) independent of any 
identifications other than the one between the citizen and the city, serves not only as a 
‘universality’ that tempers individuality within the city, but serves as an identity that 
conceals and suppresses difference, conflict and (potentially) the political realities of 
injustice, inequality and disagreement. All of those elements are smoothed over through 
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the operation of the imaginary institution of Athens, which is produced and promulgated 
through civic institutions including the funeral oration. 
Thus the dead, as part of this heroic Athenian imaginary form, I would claim, a 
large part of that 'unwritten code that cannot be broken without disgrace' that prevents 
people from becoming 'lawless citizens'.  It serves as both primary identifier of citizen 
identity as well as an active suppression of conflict and disunity. Furthermore, by setting 
forth this ideal as a civic and patriotic measure of citizenship, it produces a standard of 
judgment and commitment by which Athenian citizens are supposed to conduct their 
lives and see themselves through. This means that this heroic imagery and identity that 
flourishes within the funeral oration is not just an ideal, but it is (for Athenian citizens) 
an inheritance). Pericles’ Funeral Oration uses the glory of the dead, and the glory of the 
departed as a means to bind the Athenians to a standard and path that has been laid out 
already, one that the oration itself makes clear to all in attendance. It is as if, by the end 
of the oration, “Pericles invited the living to confirm the glorious present by their future 
actions, so that the city may survive in all its brilliance” (Loraux 2006, 176). It is true 
that in this sense, Pericles seems to be elevating the present generation, but it is not an 
elevation without a strong historical attachment: all of this political possibility that is 
open to the present generation is only understandable if we see “the ancestors as having 
handed down the land of Attica to Pericles’s contemporaries” (Loraux 2006, 175) As 
Pericles notes in his first (strategy) speech, "We must not fall behind them" (Thucydides 
1982, 86), ‘them’ referring to the ancestors of the Athenians.  Thus we see the full 
measure of exactly how the construction of idealized citizens and heroic generations, as 
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part of the Athenian imaginary, serves as instructive devices and guideposts for the 
individual citizens of the present generation of Athenians. 
Ultimately, the power and heroism that is/constructs Athens finds its ultimate 
expression, within the funeral oration, in powerful erotic love, or as Orwin notes, “the 
speech culminates in the astonishing injunction that the Athenians become lovers 
(erastai) of their city” (Orwin 1994, 23).  In one of the most impassioned sections of the 
speech, Pericles implores Athenians to "realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes 
upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then when all her 
greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, 
and a keen feeling of honour in action that men were enabled to win all this" 
(Thucydides 1982, 112). This is Pericles' ultimate attempt to bond citizenship with 
individuality: a folding of erotic individual love into a collective entity requiring 
collective action; a display of citizenship as emotional engagement. Wohl makes note of 
this transformation when she writes that, “in the Funeral Oration, Pericles constructs an 
idealized Athenian subject as lover of the city” (Wohl 2002, 30) Here we see the 
Athenian imaginary at its fullest conception: Athens as an erotic love of individuals, 
dependent upon and created by heroic actions that must be informed by individual 
‘interests and apprehensions’ but filtered through a collective understanding of 
individuality that is tempered and made lawful through the unwritten but ever-present 
guideposts of the deceased who are forgotten in one sense as they are 'replaced' by new 
individuals, but are eternally remembered as the citizen imaginary, the unwritten code 
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that serves as the chief safeguard in the bonding together, albeit imperfectly, of 
individual and citizen. 
 There is one last important element to help us understand the funeral oration as 
constructive of the imaginary institution of Athens, and this gets us back to one of 
Castoriadis’s major points about the imaginary institution: that it naturalizes the 
particular. Again quoting John Thompson, the social imaginary provides for “the 
projection of an “imaginary community” by means of which “real” distinctions are 
portrayed as “natural,” the particular is disguised in the universal” (Thompson 1982, 
666). In what way does the Athenian imaginary not only suppress difference within the 
city, or create a model identification for Athenian citizens, but also work to present that 
identification or (lack) of differentiation as natural and unassailable. This is accomplished 
through the Athenian practices of autochthony, which, in addition to being a major civic 
component of Athenian life (and much of the Hellenic world more generally), forms a 
component of the funeral oration genre and finishes off the picture of the Athenian 
imaginary institution. 
 According to Loraux, “When it concerns a people, autochthony characterizes the 
strict relationship which, from the beginning and uninterruptedly, attaches them to their 
land” (Loraux 2000, 15), and this claim of ‘uninterruptedness’ is just as important to the 
Athenian identity as the ‘universalizing’ ideal of the heroic citizen. From the very 
beginning of the funeral oration, Pericles makes reference to this idea, and uses it to 
structure all that follows. When he begins to speak of ‘our ancestors’ he claims that 
“They dwelt in the country without break in succession from generation to generation, 
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and handed it down free to the present time by their valour” (Thucydides 1982, 107). 
This claim of Athenian autochthony, is important in understanding the full political and 
social ambition of the funeral oration. The Athenian myth of autochthony allowed for 
“the ability to glorify in all serenity the enduring stability of Athens, and its vitality 
continuously renewed from generation to generation" (Loraux 2000, 17). Moreover, this 
uninterrupted historical connection between and among Athenians, “extended to the 
community as a whole, cementing internal cohesion” (Loraux 2006, 349). Just as the 
Athenian people sprang, fully formed, from the soil of Athens, so to, the character of the 
Athenian polis and its citizens was similarly fully formed and “Athenians can 
forget…that their democratic regime is a historically dated conquest” (Loraux 2000, 23), 
which takes issues of contingency out of the master narrative of the Athenian imaginary. 
Thus we see the full reach of the imagined institution. It not only provides the Athenian 
citizens with an identity that situates their relations to one another, to the city more 
generally, and to aspect of political life such as law, but it sets itself within a narrative 
form that, owning to the claim of autochthony, presents these relations as universal, 
consistent, unchanging and essential. 
VI. Democracy, The Imaginary, Hermeneutics 
 This extended elaboration of the Athenian imaginary institution, and the role it 
plays in creating, and normalizing a conception of politics and political self-identity 
seems to leave untouched important questions: what is the relationship between these 
imagined institutions and hermeneutics as a (potentially) democratic practice? If, within 
the institutions of society, the psyche is coerced into a certain mode, and our standards 
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are created for us, what type of ‘self-creation’ or ‘self-institution’ is even possible? If the 
‘imaginary institution’ seems to provide answers to questions for us and make choices 
about identity and political relations for us, what room is left for us to ‘judge and choose’ 
as Castoriadis hopes? These questions bring us back full circle to our discussions of 
democracy and the relationship between interpretation and politics. Castoriadis argues 
that, for us to truly comprehend the meaning of democracy, and the scope of democratic 
potential, we must first understand that, “beneath the established social imaginary, the 
flow of the radical imaginary continues steadily” (Castoriadis 1991, 153), and it is this 
‘radical imagination’ (or imaginary) that he wants to invest with democratic potential. 
However, for Castoriadis, both his strengths as well as his one glaring weakness come 
from his understanding of this relationship, one that I believe can be overcome by 
bringing the goals that he has for the ‘radical imagination’ into a hermeneutic project. 
  For Castoriadis, the strength of the imagined institution is most prevalent in what 
he calls ‘heteronomous societies’. A society that is ‘heteronomous’ is one that involves,  
“the creation of true to form individuals, whose thought and life are dominated by 
repetition…whose radical imagination is bridled to the utmost degree possible” 
(Castoriadis 1991, 163). In these societies, the norms of the institutions already created 
are a powerful deterrent to creative activity carried out in part by citizens of that society. 
This is largely based on the extra-social authority that is given over to social institutions 
in a heteronomous society. As Jeff Klooger writes, in heteronomous societies, “we find, 
institutionally established and sanctioned, the representation of a source of the instituting 
of society that only can be found outside of this society: among the gods, in God, among 
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the ancestors, in the laws of nature, in the laws of Reason, in the laws of History” 
(Klooger 2004, 11). In this sense, it helps to think of the Athenian example of ‘ancestor 
heroes’ and the ‘autochthonous’ understanding of society as two such external sources of 
legitimacy and power. 
 Democracy, on the other hand, is for Castoriadis the emergence of a project in 
which “explicit and unlimited interrogation explodes on the scene – an interrogation that 
has bearing not on ‘facts’ but on the social imaginary signification and their possible 
grounding” (Castoriadis 1991, 163). He refers to this as the emergence of a system of 
radical ‘autonomy’ and this interrogation is due to the displacement of legitimacy from 
existing outside of the society itself to a situation where all sources of legitimacy for all 
social institutions is brought within society itself. Society is then seen as truly self-
creating when, “autonomy…is the unlimited self-questioning about the law and its 
foundations as well as the capacity, in light of this interrogation, to make, to do, and to 
institute” (Castoriadis 1991, 164). The autonomous person that accompanies this society 
it is one that is not a ‘pure and passive’ product of preexisting institutions but through the 
formation of what Castoriadis calls a ‘true subjectivity’ “frees the radical 
imagination…as source of creation and alteration and allows this being to attain an 
effective freedom” (Castoriadis 1991, 165). This radical imagination, as the core of 
individual and social creativity, is at the heart of his understanding of democracy: a 
regime that, “explicitly, continually, institutes itself” (Castoriadis 2007, 123) and only 
accepts limits that it imposes upon itself. That is, a democratic, fully autonomous society 
is one that reinvents itself in accordance only with the limits (law, rights etc…) that it sets 
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for itself. A democratic society is self-creating, self-justifying, and self-limiting. What is 
important to our investigation is the notion of democracy as a project, as well as linking 
democracy to an idea of self-creation. There are, however, two limitations that hinder 
Castoriadis’ project that I would like to illuminate, for they point, I believe, to the 
necessity of a more explicitly hermeneutical conception.   
 The first of these issues is the too easy classification of societies into either a 
heteronomous or autonomous society. In fact, this type of binary language pervades much 
of Castoriadis’ own writing, and is often times less helpful than a more nuanced 
treatment could be. Again, according to Klooger, “to speak…in the context of an 
autonomous society merely in terms of the starkly opposed categories of ‘closure’ and 
‘opening’ as Castoriadis has a tendency to do, seems rather too simplistic” (Klooger 
2004, 30-31). Although in places Castoriadis does talk about heteronomous and 
autonomous elements, the way he posits autonomy and heteronomy as essential opposites 
can be less than helpful at understanding how a democratic project might operate within a 
given society or how the dynamics of democratic movements themselves operate. After 
all, if a society simply ‘is’ autonomous, there doesn’t seem to be, by definition, much of a 
need to think through the specifics of democratic movements. In addition, this form of 
thinking runs the risk of a periodization of autonomy/heteronomy that, I believe, can be 
very dangerous for a clear understanding of the inherent fragility of democratic politics. 
This fragility is inherent to Sheldon Wolin’s conception of ‘fugitive democracy’ as “a 
mode of being…doomed to succeed only temporarily” (S. S. Wolin 1996, 43), but also 
appears, at times, to be an element of Castoriadis’ own conception of democracy as a 
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movement that he claims must be ‘restarted’ or otherwise protected from encroachment. 
This forces us to see democracy not as coterminous with society (we have ‘a’ democratic 
society or ‘a’ non-democratic society), but instead we need to see how democracy and 
anti-democracy are forces ‘within’ societies. However, his categories of analysis interfere 
with his ability to capture the nature of his democratic project. By setting up these 
categories as alternatives, it would seem that the cultural ‘switch’ from heteronomy to 
autonomy simply produces a culture in which democracy and democratic concerns are 
enacted and preserved. 
 Lastly, and this is where I think hermeneutics offers us much more insight into the 
dynamics of a democratic project, we need to look at the nature of creation itself, for on 
this point, Castoriadis is quite insistent. Radical imagination, and democratic creation is 
nothing more (and nothing less) than “this coming to be out of nothing, and from 
nowhere…essentially creation means that there is no coming from our out of in any of 
the accepted senses of the term” (Klooger 2004, 39), and this poses a question: where 
does creation ‘come from’? The hermeneutic conception that I will develop throughout 
this project asserts that creation, understood as a democratic engagement with inherited 
conditions is the very material that generates creative responses. For Castoriadis, that 
type of relationship is, at least in many of his writings, too deterministic for him. The 
radical imagination, to truly be a creative act of imagination must emerge ex nihilo, as not 
dependent upon any prior institutions, or, more importantly for this project, separate from 
past experience. Suzi Adams elaborates this questions very concisely when she writes, 
“Castoriadis, moreover, curtails the creative aspect of interpretation, such that it becomes 
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creation of the world, ex nihilo, for interpretation as such is possible only with 
experience…and inclusion of the experiential aspect of the world as the transcultural and 
external horizon of meaning is absent” (S. Adams 2011, 113). Thus, Castoriadis seems to 
erect an unbridgeable divide between creation on one hand, and experience on the other, 
which I would argue sits in contradistinction to Wolin’s idea of democracy as “a mode of 
being conditioned by bitter experience” (S. S. Wolin 1996), that seems to rely entirely on 
the joining together of creation with experience. While I would like to maintain 
Castoriadis’ insistence on the linking together of the democratic project with the basic 
idea of creation, I would like to assert that a critical (democratic) hermeneutics is one that 
would need to link creativity to the act of (re)interpretation rather than simply products of 
a creative imagination divorced from experience. To help illuminate the welding together 
of these dual facets (innovation and interpretation) I would like to first turn to the 
political thought of Niccolo Macciavelli who helps us surmount what I would consider 
the double autochthony of the preceding analysis, the historical autochthony of the 
Athenian imaginary, and the political autochthony of Castioradis’ imaginary institutions. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Republic is considered here as a mnemonic structure, a type of regime erected up on 
an injunction: remember 
- Bruce James Smith, Politics and Remembrance 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that politics could be understood 
hermeneutically. To illustrate this, I analyzed Pericles’ Funeral Oration as an example of 
political speech that produces what I, following Nicole Loraux, call an Athenian 
Imaginary, which “establishes an official history that confirms that community in the 
direction that it has chosen” (Loraux 2006, 187). The Imaginary produces a narrative that 
the community chooses to tell itself about itself. I believe that we can place Sheldon 
Wolin’s analysis of politics very near to this orbit, and much of contemporary politics 
more generally. Writing about the American Bicentennial, he notes, “Bicentennials are by 
nature civic rather than scholarly events. They are rituals organized to promote a mythic 
history…A bicentennial might be thought of as an official story that narrates a past to 
support an image of collective identity that confirms a certain conception of the present” 
(S. S. Wolin 1989, 2-3). It is this notion of politics as the settling on and telling of stories, 
this ‘mythistorical’ component, that allows us to see politics as a directly hermeneutical 
activity. But what are the consequences for our conceptions of politics and political 
activity? Within a world of politics comprised of ‘imaginaries’ and ‘mythistorically’ 
created and perpetuated identities, how are we to ‘imagine’ political activity, never mind 
engage in it? 
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 The last chapter concluded with a promising inroad into this type of political 
activity through the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, who provides us with a theory the 
importance of these ‘imaginary’ elements of politics.  
Society must define its ‘identity’, its articulation, the world, its relations to the world and 
to the objects it contains, its needs and its desires. Without the ‘answer’ to these 
‘questions’, without these ‘definitions’, there can be no human world, no society, no 
culture…The role of imaginary significations is to provide an answer to these questions 
(Castoriadis 1998, 147). 
These answers are, for Castoriadis, the very ‘imaginary institutions’ that, once instituted 
within society, produce and re-produce society and politics for us, and within us. These 
institutions “provide the psyche with meaning…the social individual is thus constituted 
by means of the internalization of the world and the imaginary significations created by 
society” (Castoriadis 1991, 149). They structure society, our relationship to it, our 
relations with others, and our understanding of ourselves as individuals and as 
collectivities. We become individuals, only to the degree that we become individuals 
within a certain social/historical setting and by internalizing the institutions particular to 
it. Parameshwar Gaonkar notes that these social imaginaries serve as, “ways of 
understanding the social that become social entities themselves, mediating collective 
life…first person subjectivities that build upon implicit understandings and underlie and 
make possible common practices” (Gaonkar 2002, 4). It would seem then, that these 
institutions fully determine the individual. If the social individual is fully constructed by 
these institutions, and the individual can only re-create the society and institutions that 
first produced the individual, does this negate to possibility of change? If these 
institutions, or ‘imaginaries’, answer all of these questions for us, what type of political 
possibilities does that leave us with? 
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 For Castoriadis, the solution is what he calls the ‘radical imaginary, which he 
contrasts to the ‘imagined’ or the ‘instituted’. He writes, “The radical imaginary emerges 
as otherness and as the perpetual orientation of otherness, which figures and figures itself, 
exists in figuring and in figuring itself” (Castoriadis 1998, 369). By positing the ‘radical 
imaginary’ as being in direct contrast with the ‘imagined’, or perhaps in a more easily 
digestible paring, the instituting society with the instituted society, Castoriadis stakes his 
claim on what he sees as the democratic potential of creation or political imagination. For 
Castoriadis, a democratic regime is one of ‘self-institution’, which can only happen when 
a democratic society, “explicitly, continuously, institutes itself” (Castoriadis 2007, 123). 
This ability to ‘re-imagine’ the answers that society tells itself about itself is, for 
Castoriadis, the very essence of social autonomy, and to the very existence of democracy.  
 However promising this radical imagination, it presents us with some difficulties. 
Most notably, what is the source of the radical imaginary? Here Castoriadis entirely 
divorces the radical imaginary from the already instituted imaginary. The radical 
imaginary is the ‘perpetual otherness’ which seems to indicate some relationship, but 
Castoriadis seems insistent on a complete separation, For if the radical did in fact come 
from the instituted, could that really meet the standard of autonomy that Castoriadis sets 
forth? I argue that Castoriadis, in this insistence on separation between the imaginary and 
the imagined inadvertently reintroduces an Athenian problem into his analysis: the thorny 
issue of autochthony. Whereas the Athenians were limited by the idea of an historical 
autochthony, Castoriadis leaves us with a matter of political autochthony, which produces 
different, but equally difficult problems to overcome. To resolve the issue of political 
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autochthony while remaining within the orbit of Castoriadis’ insistence on autonomy, 
self-creation, and self-limitation, I want to turn to the work of Niccolò Machiavelli, 
whose political writings I believe help us navigate the tricky waters of history and 
political autochthony. 
I.  Historical and Political Autochthony 
 In Born of the Earth, Nicole Loraux describes the Greek idea of autochthony as 
one in which the origins of a city, and its people, are distinctly non-human in origin, 
where cities “put forward an autochthonous hero, born from the earth itself which he 
civilized…the Athenians [had] Erichthonios, born from the soil of Attica” (Loraux 2000, 
14). In the Greek sense, this means that the city is literally from nowhere, their origin is 
perfect, unconnected to any other people. This unspoiled line of decent, “was basically 
political, proclaiming for internal Athenian use the original singularity of the 
polis…Athens instantly became a part of history, civilized from the start” (Loraux 2000, 
44). But of course, this means that Athens becomes a part of history precisely by residing 
outside of history. Not only does an unbridgeable gulf exist between Athens and other 
(non-autochthonous) cities, but one also exists between Athens and any non-Athenian 
history. If the Athenians ‘emerged’ as civilized, they emerged as ‘citizens’, they needed 
to go through no period of growth, change or maturity. For its identity, Athens is in debt 
to no people but only the unbroken line of Athenians who replicate the ‘virgin birth’ of 
the city32. This also means that this pure, uninterrupted line of descent, also produces a 
                                                 
32 According to Loraux, the idea of a ‘virgin birth’ here is remarkable prescient. In Greek mythology, 
Erichthonios (the first Athenian) was born of the earth when Hephaistos (the craftsman god) pursued 
Athena and managed to spill his semen on Athena’s leg. She wiped it off with some wool, which she threw 
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pure, uninterrupted Athenian identity. Again, Loraux notes, “the essential gain from the 
elaboration of autochthony was the ability to glorify in all serenity the enduring stability 
of Athens, and its vitality continuously renewed from generation to generation…through 
the celebration of autochthony, time is annulled in a perpetual recreation of origin” 
(Loraux 2000, 17). Taken outside of time and history, Athenian identity is similarly no 
longer subject to the vagaries of time and the messy unfolding of history. The idea of 
being ‘born of the earth’ demonstrated, “the desire to rescue both origin and the present 
from the passage of time, through the timeless renewal of generations of autochthonies” 
(Loraux 2000, 17). The notion of a pure origin contributed to the idea of a pure identity, 
one that nothing could complicate or dilute. For our purposes here, the most important 
element of the Athenian belief in historical autochthony had to do with its relationship to 
idea of the other within the Athenian polis. 
 Simply put, the myth of autochthony works to suppress if not erase internal 
otherness and difference. “In the funeral oration the Athenian community unconsciously 
abandons the collective democratic initiative that gave it its originality” (Loraux 2006, 
347). For Loraux, that democratic initiative involves seeing the political community as “a 
collection of heterogeneous human groups” (Loraux 2006, 347), that is, rather than 
seeing Athenians, it sees, and perpetuates a repetition of ‘the’ Athenian: the idealized 
image of the Athenian (male) citizen, and the resulting image of Athens as populated by 
this man produces a city devoid of internal difference. As a myth, autochthony serves a 
precisely ideological function, “to conceal the internal divisions of a society…the funeral 
                                                                                                                                                 
to the ground, which fertilized the spot where Erichthonios emerged from. So the first Athenian is literally 
the product of the earth and the semen of a god that was cast off of Athena, the virgin goddess. 
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oration is trying to deny the existence of any division within the city” (Loraux 2006, 410-
11). Thus, the role of the myth of autochthony, not just the glorification of the past, but 
the repetition of it, produced an ideological image and an ideological identity, not just of 
Athens writ large, but of homogenized Athenians, and their relationship to the city and to 
each other.  
It is precisely this type of homogenization, this denial of difference, of internal 
conflict, that Castoriadis is concerned with in his extended discussion of the ‘instituted 
society’. For Castoriadis, a society whose imaginary institutions are already in place is a 
society wherein difference and otherness are not considered, but are suppressed through 
those very social institutions. This would seem to be the primary reason why Castoriadis 
develops such a strong definition of the ‘radical imaginary’ as the ‘perpetual orientation 
of otherness’. Moreover, otherness as a concept, identity, and as a potential force for 
political and social change, needs to be able to recognize and assert itself within the 
confines of the society in question. As Castoriadis writes, “the denial of time and 
otherness (which, in actual fact, is unceasingly translated into the continuous self-
destruction of creativity in society and in human beings themselves) is itself an 
institution, a dimension and a mode of the institution of society as it had existed up to 
now” (Castoriadis 1998, 214). It is worth noting the fact that Castoriadis repeatedly links 
together of the denial of time with the denial of otherness. “The denial of time displays a 
necessity inherent in the institution as such…the institution in the profound sense of the 
term can exist only by posing itself outside of time, by refusing to be altered by time, by  
posing the norm of its immutable identity, and by posing itself as this norm of immutable 
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identity” (Castoriadis 1998, 214). The denial of its historicity is a denial of the created, or 
historical nature of society, of institutions, and of the meanings those institutions impart; 
precisely one of the elements that Wolin takes issue with in his discussion of the 
‘misplaced biblicism’ or ‘archaism’ of originalism. Instead, for Castoriadis, linking 
creativity and otherness is key to developing the idea of the radical imaginary: the denial 
of otherness by a strongly instituted society is a denial of the possibility of human 
creativity, a creativity that would form the basis of an autonomous (democratic) society, 
or as Gaonkar notes, “Castoriadis’ account of the social imaginary as the matrix of 
innovation and change is linked to his central political project of promoting autonomy” 
(Gaonkar 2002, 8). For Castoriadis, the possibility of change, the possibility of 
democracy is absolutely dependent upon the encouragement of creativity and otherness. 
It is not without a bit of irony that Castoriadis claims that it is in ancient Greece 
that we see for the first time, “a collective activity whose object is the institution of 
society as such. In Greece we have the first instance of a community explicitly 
deliberating about its laws and changing those laws” (Castoriadis 1991, 102). For as 
much as Castoriadis is offering us a way to traverse a world of politics as hermeneutics, I 
believe that his idea of the ‘radical imaginary’ manages to smuggle back into his analysis 
the very thing that Nicole Loraux says was instrumental in the ability of the funeral 
oration genre to function so well as an ideological instrument (an instituted imaginary, to 
use Castoriadis’ terminology): the notion of autochthony. This time, however, the 
autochthony in question emphasizes the political rather than the historical. 
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In putting forward the theory of the radical imaginary, “Castoriadis sought to 
identify the creative force in the making of social-historical worlds” (Gaonkar 2002, 1). 
While Castoriadis is insistent that the ‘already instituted’ shapes individuals, and that the 
‘social fabrication’ of the individual, in which “the psyche is coerced…into investing 
(cathecting) socially instituted objects, rules, and the world” (Castoriadis 1991, 148), is a 
powerful process, it is not all-embracing. In contradistinction to the force of the already 
instituted, Castoriadis proposes what Gaonkar calls an ‘ontology of creation’, which leads 
Castoriadis to posit the ‘radical imaginary’ as that process which allows difference, 
otherness, and creativity to become active parts of society. “It is only insofar as the 
radical imagination of the psyche seeps through the successive layers of the social armor, 
which cover and penetrate it up to an unfathomable limit-point, and which constitute the 
individual, that the singular human being can have, in return, an independent action on 
society” (Castoriadis 1991, 146). Here, Castoriatis seems, through the concept of the 
radical imaginary, to negate his earlier assertion that the social individual can only 
reproduce the existing society. According to Anthony Elliott, “Castoriadis’s theory of the 
social imaginary suggests that the interplay between subjectivity and social regulation is 
far more heterogeneous than he has allowed in the foregoing speculations, which treat 
cultural productions as derivative from degraded social conditions” (Elliot 2002, 161). 
The radical imaginary allows us to see the world as not completely determined by the 
existing conditions, but allowing for change and otherness to emerge as forces within 
society. What is most important for our analysis that rather than bring trapped within a 
symbolically instituted society that is completely consuming, the radical imaginary posits 
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a symbolic society that, “can be reflexively interrogated and hermeneutically 
reappropriated” (Gaonkar 2002, 8). Thus, the radical imaginary emerges as a key concept 
for Castoriadis, and potentially for us, in our attempt to understand politics as a 
hermeneutical activity. The radical imaginary seems to allow for political and social 
change through a process whereby society as it is received is open to the intrusion of 
otherness and difference. But this forces us to ask an important question: What is the 
source of this radical imaginary, and how is this creative process nourished? The answer 
that Castoriadis gives is beset by serious limitations. What he gives us, in a sense, is an 
autochthony of political creativity. 
In the same way that Loraux explains the historical notion of autochthony in the 
Greek sense, Castoriadis provides us with an understanding of the radical imaginary as 
similarly ‘born of the earth’. The moment of creation inspired by the radical imaginary is 
radically disconnected from the society within which it emerges. “A social-historical 
world is created ex nihilo in a burst of imaginative praxis…by anonymous masses who 
constitute themselves as a people in the very act of founding” (Gaonkar 2002, 6). 
Pointing to the emergence of democracy and philosophy in ancient Greece, Castoriadis 
asserts that it “cannot be explained in terms of the antecedent conditions. It was a rupture, 
a break in historical time” (Gaonkar 2002, 6), and understandable only as “the emergence 
of radical otherness, immanent creation, non-trivial novelty” (Castoriadis 1998, 184). But 
what, exactly, does he mean by ‘imminent creation’? 
 For Castoriadis, “what is essential to creation is not ‘discovery’ but constitution 
the new: art does not discover, it constitutions; and the relation between what it 
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constitutes and the ‘real’…is not a relation of verification…the emergence of new 
institutions and of new ways of living is not a discovery either but an active constitution” 
(Castoriadis 1998, 133). Thus, we get a clear sense of what the radical imaginary is: it is a 
complete break. Just as the social individual is constructed (up to a limit point) by the 
instituted society, the radical imaginary is that thing that escapes the ‘limit point’ of the 
instituted society and thus  is in no way shaped by it. Because it escapes any type of 
determination, by the already instituted, it emerges from nothing. The radical imaginary 
itself is non-historical. This, however, leads to some fundamental weaknesses in his 
theory that warrant exploration.  
The first is that this process seems to force Castoriadis to see the world of 
societies in a binary manner. For Castoriadis, the autochthony of the radical imaginary 
places a seemingly unbridgeable gulf between societies wherein political creativity has 
emerged and societies where it has not. “It leads Castoriadis to dichotomize societies as if 
they could be subsumed under the ideal types of heteronomous and autonomous instead 
of recognizing that all social formations, at least the modern ones, differentially 
incorporate aspects of both” (Gaonkar 2002, 9). This dynamic is captured by Castoriadis 
himself when he writes, “things are different in the rare case of societies where the 
bursting of complete heteronomy makes a true individuation of the individual possible 
and thus allows the radical imagination…to contribute perceptibly to the self-alteration of 
the social world” (Castoriadis 1991, 146). While there are instances where he talks about 
the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy, this type of analysis is much more often 
than not eschewed for extended discussions of ‘the autonomous society’ or ‘the 
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heteronomous society’. Likewise, his discussions of democracy are similarly totalizing. 
Rather than thinking of democracy (or politics, or autonomy) as specific moments within 
society, as Sheldon Wolin’s notion of ‘fugitive democracy’ allows us to do, democracy, 
autonomy (as well as its opposite, heteronomy) is seen as society itself.  
 This also means that Castoriadis “skirts issues concerned with institutions, 
ideology, and power” (Elliot 2002, 145) that might contribute to a more nuanced analysis 
of autonomous and heteronomous elements within society. In constructing such a 
detailed, and all consuming, psychological theory, he distances himself from meaningful 
political applications of it. Without being able to discuss clearly the interplay between 
autonomous forces and heteronomous forces at work in the same social realm, “his 
reflections on cultural conformity and homogeneity seem to contradict the social-
theoretical emphasis on human creation elsewhere in his writings” (Elliot 2002, 160). 
This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for his consistent political motivations (a 
critique of contemporary conditions and their enforced homogeneity) and his theoretical 
writings (emphasizing the radical imagination and creativity) to find a meaningful 
dialogue. While the interplay between forces of autonomy and forces of heteronomy 
within a society would be a fruitful exploration, Castoriadis is left with very poor 
resources for doing so. He strives for a sort of theoretical elaboration of human creativity 
as entirely a matter of human imagination, ideas, and novelty. However, this theoretical 
purity seems to come at the expense of political purchase and, “at the cost of displacing 
ideology and politics” (Elliot 2002, 166).  
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 Rather than pursing a project where whole societies are seen as either autonomous 
or heteronomous, it would be much more advantageous to see those as specific dynamics 
at work within a society and to analyze how those dynamics struggle with each other. 
One way in which I think this more nuanced project can be advanced is not by assigning 
the radical imaginary to the realm of autochthony, but to investigate how the unfolding of 
autonomy, and self-creation emerges out of the historical nature of society itself. Rather 
than thinking that self-creation is somehow sullied or lessened by linking it to the already 
instituted, place self-creation within the very instituted and historical realm in which the 
events of self-creation emerge?  
 To begin this section of the investigation, I want to turn to the writings of Niccolò 
Machiavelli. I am not making the assertion that Machiavelli is either a democrat or a 
hermeneutist. Rather, I turn to Machiavelli because he, unlike Castoriadis, is vigorously 
concerned with an analysis of institutions, ideology, and power. Additionally, I believe 
that Machiavelli avoids the trap of autochthony that was discussed above, both politically 
and historically. Even though Machiavelli is also interested in discussions of origins and 
original institutions, I argue that in his writings, we can see a theorization of politics that 
brings history and self-creation together in a fruitful manner. 
II. A Politics and History of Decay 
 There is a certain trope that catches, perhaps even commands Machiavelli’s 
attention, and serves as a prism though which he observes and writes about both politics 
and history. Writing under the influence of the idea of Fortuna33, “a malignant goddess, 
                                                 
33 With regard to Fortuna, Leo Strauss presents us with a picture of Machiavelli who, as the founder of 
modern political thought, has moved away from this notion of Fortuna as a force in the life of politics, 
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or at least a goddess indifferent to human well-being” (Parel 1992, 65), Machiavelli’s 
writing are insistent on the idea of the natural decay of the political body and the 
withering away of earthly vitality. At the beginning of Book III of The Discourses on 
Livy, he writes, “it is very true that all the things of this world have a limited existence, 
but those which go through the entire cycle of life ordained for them by heaven are 
generally those which do not allow their bodies to fall into disorder but maintain them in 
an orderly way” (Machiavelli 2008, 246). And though Machiavelli is insistent, in The 
Prince, that fortune only controls half of our actions, and that humans are not completely 
at the whim and mercy of the destructive force of Fortuna, “it follows that we cannot 
explain human destiny solely in terms of human autonomy” (Parel 1992, 63). Though 
wise rulers and headstrong actors may force her to submit, and may also take 
‘precautions to resist her34, Fortuna, “determines the limiting conditions of achieving 
success…the times of birth and death, the humour and the temperament with which one 
is both, and the quality of the times through which one’s life passes” (Parel 1992, 66). 
The unceasing presence and power of Fortuna forces Machiavelli to confront what he 
sees as one of the fundamental truths about human societies (Principalities and Republics 
both): the inevitability of decline. Especially in The Discourses, his frequent invocation 
of the decline of cities and states, including his exemplar of a city of virtù, the Roman 
Republic, makes it clear that political and social decline is as inescapable a force as any 
                                                                                                                                                 
cities, and men. Strauss’ Machiavelli uses Fortuna, as Parel notes, ‘for the benefit of the vulgar’. However, 
both Parel and de Grazia offer convincing interpretations of Machiavelli that situate him well with the more 
tradition notion of Fortuna, as well as emphasize its importance in his work. 
34 See chapter 25 of The Prince. In describing Fortuna as a river, Machiavelli notes that prudent rulers can 
build banks and barriers to redirect the onrush of Fortuna. This doesn’t mean that you can stop the river 
from running (he makes no mention of dams) but you can be strategic about the direction. 
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other found in nature. Though The Discourses does seem to avoid the type of mechanical, 
immediate decay that Anthony Parel sees, the phenomenon of political decay is one that 
commands much of Machiavelli’s attention and theoretical elaboration. 
 I believe that there is another, equally strong force that compels Machiavelli to 
grapple with the reality and complexity of decay, as well as his attributing a ‘life cycle’ to 
politics more generally: Machiavelli is theorizing political communities (principalities, 
republics, cities) as entities that are thoroughly and resolutely historical. They cannot be 
understood outside of their coming into to the world historically. Robert Orr notes this 
connection when he claims that, “man, as Machiavelli sees him, is pulled neither by 
Fortune, nor by himself, but by time” (Orr 1972, 188) While, as we shall discuss below, 
Machiavelli is largely a theorist of origins and all that come with them (founders, 
institutions, laws, etc…), it could be argued that his theorization of origins stems from a 
concomitant concern for endings. That is, if all societies come into being historically, it 
stands to reason that they will also come to an ending historically. J.G.A. Pocock sums 
this up when he writes, “to assert the particularity of the republic to this extent was to 
assert that it existed in time, not eternity, and was therefore transitory and doomed to 
impermanence, for this was the condition of particular being…the one thing most clearly 
known about republics, was that they came to an end in time” (Pocock 2003, 53). This 
Machiavellian vision centered on these two specific aspects, historicity and decay, force 
Machiavelli to plunge headlong into his varied discussions of origins, founding, and 
original institutions. His concern with looking backward, not simply as an historian, but 
importantly as a political thinker and (potentially) political advisor, stems from what he 
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believes looking forward forces one to contend with: the withering and degrading of all 
forms of political association. If autochthony is concerned with ‘obscuring origins’ by 
placing them in an impenetrable mythic past, Machiavelli’s theoretical outlook that 
places society immediately within the course of history, creates a political vision that is 
not able to obscure origins, but rather, is forced to contend with origins. This vision 
“must both offer an account of how that beginning had been possible and acknowledge 
that, since it must in theory have an end, its maintenance was no less problematic than its 
foundation” (Pocock 2003, 185). Our question, however, is: what specific dynamic(s) 
suddenly becomes so important within this new field of political vision that draws so 
much of Machiavelli’s attention to the issue of origins? 
 For Machiavelli, it is not just the society itself that is an historical creation, but 
citizenship itself, as an achievement of the people is also historical. It is created, and it 
‘comes into being’ in time. Thus, by concentrating so highly on the notion of social and 
political origins, “it looks as if Machiavelli was in search of social means whereby men’s 
natures might be transformed to the point where they became capable of citizenship” 
(Pocock 2003, 192). It is something that is produced in a body of people that transforms 
them into a civilization, into a community of citizens. In order to understand how that 
happens, Machiavelli looks not simply at the founding origins of a society, but the types 
of institutions that are similarly founded. 
III. Decay and Institutions 
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It is in this context that I would like to explore his interest in Roman religion. 
Among the numerous qualities Machiavelli assigns it35, there is one that stands out, and it 
has to do with this idea of citizenship as a means to produce citizens who see themselves 
as actors. Writing about Numa Pompilius, the ‘founder’ of Roman religion, Machiavelli 
claims that, “having found a very fierce people and wishing to bring them to civil 
obedience with the arts of piece, he turned to religion as something absolutely necessary 
for maintaining a civilized society” (Machiavelli 2008, 50). The idea that Machiavelli is 
putting forward here, that religion helped to render people obedient and civil has led to a 
widespread interpretation that “presents Machiavelli’s religion as a belief system whose 
value is determined by its functional utility to the state” (Fontana 1999, 639). This type of 
interpretation is developed most succinctly and notably by D.E.S. Muir who writes, “to 
Machiavelli, religion was of most importance in reinforcing the political power of 
authority” (Muir 1936, 159), but I believe it would seem a rather simple reading of such a 
complex thinker to make the claim that religion simply serves to buttress authority. This 
is not to say that Machiavelli does not address this issue. His insistence that religion will 
keep soldiers from deserting because of their fear of violating a religious oath, as well as 
his assertion that, “it was necessary for Numa, who pretended to have a close relationship 
with a nymph who advised him about how he should advise the people…because Numa 
wanted to establish new and unusual institutions in the city, and he doubted that his own 
authority was sufficient” (Machiavelli 2008, 51-52), point in this direction. However, that 
                                                 
35 Notably, that it produced bravery, and make people more interested in worldly glory. 
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does not seem to capture the entirety of Machiavelli’s understanding of the purposes and 
goals of religion, nor the functioning of political institutions more generally. 
 Instead, I would like to temper the claim that religion should be seem as simply an 
instrument of the ruling power and forward the more expansive idea that religion, for 
Machiavelli, is one of the institutions that work develop and maintain a civic and political 
spirit that can potentially ward off the ravages of time and decay. Pocock notes that, “by 
the institutionalization of civic virtue, the republic or polis maintains its own stability in 
time” (Pocock 2003, 183). Beyond the merely coercive, religion, as a civic institution 
fulfills quite a few roles for Machiavelli. “For Machiavelli, religion was an institution 
that educated men” (Hale 1961, 177), and this education, rather than simply servicing an 
additive function in men’s social-psychologies, played a much greater, even constitutive 
role.  
With keen attention being paid to problem of the historical construction of 
citizenship, Maurizio Viroli writes, “religious worship educates the manners and customs 
of the people” (Viroli 2010, 22), and it is this attention to ‘customs’ that I argue is very 
important for Machiavelli. Without sound customs, as a foundational component of the 
social make-up of the body of citizens, the entire structure of institutions that make up a 
political body will be for naught: “Just as good customs require laws in order to be 
maintained, so laws require good customs in order to be observed” (Machiavelli 2008, 
68). It is not that Machiavelli offers us a simple equation along the lines of ‘good customs 
create good laws’, his thinking is much too complex for that. Rather, he seems to offer 
the claim that laws and customs as co-constitutive of each other. Religion is necessary for 
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a certain culture to emerge among the people of a city that allows them to understand and 
observe laws, and laws emerge as a means to ‘maintain’ customs and manners36. It is in 
this context that we can understand Machiavelli’s discussion corrupts cities that wish to 
remain free, from Book I of The Discourses. Here, Machiavelli strenuously calls not just 
for the passage of new laws, but also the creation of new institutions. He notes that, “The 
institutions and laws established in a republic at the time of its birth, when men were 
good, are no longer suitable later, once men have become evil…this means that new laws 
are insufficient, because the institutions that remain in place corrupt them” (Machiavelli 
2008, 68). Here, we see several themes that are central to Machiavelli’s political 
philosophy. First, the concern for previously good republics becoming bad brings us back 
to the seemingly insurmountable problem of political decay. But it is the desire to fight 
against that decay that leads us to the second theme: the relationship between customs, 
institutions, and laws.  
For Machiavelli, it is not enough to have a certain set of laws, those laws must be 
reinforced by a certain set of civic and political customs and institutions that exist within 
a mutually beneficial relationship to one another. Without one, it would be impossible for 
the others to have any ameliorative effects on the corruption of the city. Laws that are, 
‘good’ will not function as such outside of a set of customs and institutions that are 
corrupted. Likewise, ‘good’ customs and institutions will fall pretty to the corruption of 
time and Fortuna if the laws that govern them are not adequate to the task.  In addition to 
the construction of ‘customs’ generally speaking, there is one in particular that 
                                                 
36 In Viroli’s terminology, manners is a much more political and encompassing term. Rather than a term 
denoting political behavior, manners is much more concerned with how people interact with one another in 
a public and political way. 
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Machiavelli is concerned with as a civic goal and one that he sees as having a clear and 
intimate connection to the role of religion in a political society: the construction and 
perpetuation of virtù. 
If half of our actions (more or less) are controlled by Fortuna, and the other half 
are controlled by human effort and activity, what is it about human behavior that will 
allow us to successfully build the banks and barriers that will divert the raging river of 
Fortuna? For Machiavelli, that human quality is virtù. This term denotes a great many 
specific qualities in Machiavelli’s writings: the ability to have foresight, to undertake 
strong actions, the ability to change actions, “as the character of the times changes” 
(Machiavelli 1994, 75), prudence, boldness, and great skill. Hannah Arendt give a 
concise definition of the term when she claims that, “Virtù is the response, summoned up 
by man, to the world, or rather to the constellation for fortuna in which the world opens 
up, presents and offers itself to him” (Arendt 1968, 137). Arendt’s definition is helpful 
not only because it ties virtù directly to fortuna, but because, in referring to virtù as a 
response, she makes it very clear that virtù is an activity, rather than simply a thing 
possessed.   
The terms itself dominates the pages of The Prince, and while the term is more 
absent in The Discourses, the specific qualities that are embodied in the idea of virtù 
recur throughout.  It is important, however, to make note of a very specific change that 
occurs in The Discourses with respect to this term. Unlike in Machiavelli’s famous 
treatise The Prince, where virtù is seen embodied in specific rulers (princes, kings, 
etc…), in The Discourses we seem to see a ‘democratizing’ of the term, and its attendant 
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qualities. No longer is virtù, or the qualities of virtù simply those of great leaders and 
individual princes. Instead, these terms can be applied to the entire political body: rulers 
and citizens alike. So rather than just talking about the virtù of a prince, Machiavelli 
believes that we can talk about the virtù of a society, and it is in this context that religion 
again plays an important role.  
Religion, as a founding institution of society has, is concerned with, “the 
development of virtù” (Gilbert 1984, 185), and the health of religion is itself a key 
barometer to the presence or absence of virtù within the body politic. This connecting 
between religion as a civic institution and political vitality would seem to contradict Leo 
Strauss’ claim that “In Machiavelli’s presentation the Roman polity as the model is 
characterized by the unqualified supremacy of political authority proper as distinguished 
from any religious authority” (Strauss 1978, 184). For Machiavelli, such a simple split 
between the presence of religious authority and political authority is theoretically 
nonsensical, and as Ronald Beiner notes, “Religion lies at the heart of Machiavellian 
politics” (Beiner 1993, 622). For Machiavelli, the political well-being of a community 
cannot be divorced from the civic functions of religion, what Anthony Parel calls “a form 
of political ‘education’” (Parel 1992, 52). Rather than seeing politics as reigning supreme 
over religion, as Strauss claims, religion is one of the ways in which citizens are educated 
to become political actors. If religion as a civic institution is one of the major factors in 
the successful functioning of politics, politics and religion, are much more mutually 
constitutive and work to buttress one another.  In fact, one could argue that the ‘health’ of 
the body politic (its ability to fight against historical decay) can be measured by looking 
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at how strong the assorted founding institutions (religion, law, and customs) are, and that 
the continued health of religion is dependent upon strong political actors and actions. 
This multi-faceted (overdetermined?) conception of politics is essential for understanding 
just how Machiavelli believes politics operates in, especially, a Republican community. 
Maurizio Viroli reminds us, “The word politicus was used to denote…the concrete 
collective life of the city, the customs, the habits, and the passions of the citizens” (Viroli 
1993, 157). The intricate connections that Machiavelli draws between religion (as well as 
other institutions) and politics forces us to see his conception of politics as something that 
involves nearly the entire social fabric of a community. It is expressive of, and 
constituted by, the customs, passions, and habits that are exhibited by the community. 
In The Discourses we see a very deliberate and clear connection between history, 
political and cultural institutions, and the health of the political society. Good founding 
institutions both inspire a type of civic virtù that pervades the polity as well as create the 
conditions for the emergence of virtuous citizenship. Given that it is only through the 
presence of this type of citizenship infused with virtù, that a given political society might 
stave off, even for a time, the ravages of historical decay, it seems self-evident that, for 
Machiavelli, the primary concern of the political thinker is HOW to ensure that the 
institutions and culture of the society in question continue to produce these conditions.  
If these institutions are themselves historical, and if the defining feature of all 
historical things are their being subject to decay, would it not stand to reason that those 
very institutions themselves are also subject to decay, corruption, and collapse? After all, 
if political communities are universally subject to the ravages of time and decay, as well 
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as the loss of virtù and virility – the very qualities that are created (and maintained) by 
these institutions – it would stand to reason that the primary cause of that decay would 
have to be the decay of those institutions themselves. The case in point, for Machiavelli, 
would be his extended discussion of Christianity and its role in the corruption of the 
Italian city states. Here, we see an explicit treatment by Machiavelli of the corruption of 
founding institutions and how that corruption is immediately and dramatically reflected 
in the larger corruption of political life. 
This theme of a corrupt Italy is one that runs through Machiavelli’s entire political 
corpus, a theme neatly captured by James Atkinson’s conception of Machiavelli’s, 
“desperate concern over Italy’s suffering and the yearning for a redeemer” (Atkinson 
2010, 23). At the end of The Prince, when he is exhorting for a political hero to arise and 
redeem Italy, Machiavelli laments, “For see the conditions to which Italy has been 
reduced…She is beaten, robbed, wounded, put to fight: She has experienced every sort of 
injury” (Machiavelli 1994, 77). This redeemer, or ‘new ruler’, would be one who can 
“take control of events…while benefiting everyone who lives here” (Machiavelli 1994, 
77). Clearly, this new ruler would need to be a person full of virtù to make up for the 
clear absence of civic virtù anywhere else in Italy. In The Discourses, Machiavelli 
continues on this theme of corruption but here he ties it specifically to the issue of 
religion.  
In considering, therefore, why all the peoples of ancient times were greater lovers of 
liberty than those of our own day, I believe this arises from the same cause that today 
makes men less strong, which I believe lies in the difference between our education and 
that of antiquity, based upon the difference between our religion and that of antiquity. 
(Machiavelli 2008, 158) 
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Now this claim needs to be parsed carefully, for while on the surface of it, it seems as 
though Machiavelli is making the blanket claim that Christianity is a corrupt religion that 
has led to the political corruption (or at least weakening) that he is bearing witness to. Or 
as Strauss writes, “According to Machiavelli Christianity has led the world into weakness 
and the failure to imitate the ancients properly is due to some extent to Christianity” 
(Strauss 1978, 177). While Strauss is correct in one respect, that there is an important 
connection between Christianity and corruption, the simple claim that Christianity itself 
is somehow essentially corrupted (or corrupting of people), is misleading. The reality of 
Machiavelli’s claim is more nuanced than that. 
 Almost immediately after making this comparison between the ‘religion of 
antiquity’ and religion of his own time, Machiavelli asserts that, “while our religion has 
shown us truth and the true path, it also makes us place a lower value on worldly honour, 
whereas the pagans, who greatly valued honor and considered it their highest good, were 
more ferocious in their actions” (Machiavelli 2008, 158-159. My italics). This would 
seem to demonstrate that, for Machiavelli, there is not necessarily a connection between 
the theological soundness of Christianity (whether it is the ‘true’ religion or not) and the 
impact that it can or does have on the political community (whether it promotes virtù or 
not). This leads Sebastian de Grazia to note that rather than Christianity as the target of 
Machiavelli’s critique, we see that “The Prince and Discourses criticize the Church for its 
corrupting of Italians and its foreign policy” (deGrazia 1994, 89). This distinction 
between Christianity and The Church is important because it places the corrupting 
influence on a specific manifestation of Christianity that has emerged historically.  
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While Machiavelli does continue to contrast Christianity with the Roman religion 
of ‘the pagans’ he fails to locate that corruption at the heart of some essence of 
Christianity. Instead, there almost seems to be the distinct possibility that, for 
Machiavelli, “rightly interpreted, Christianity teaches that it is permitted to ‘exalt and 
defend the fatherland’” (Beiner 1993, 623), and in fact, a Christianity ‘properly 
interpreted’ would be able to embrace the very qualities of worldly glory, love of liberty, 
and strength, that Machiavelli admires about the Roman pagan religion. For our purposes, 
this means that whether we see Machiavelli as a Christian37, or as a strategic rhetorician, 
is largely irrelevant. The important issue concerning religion is how the institution itself 
has been interpreted, how it has evolved historically; the way in which the institution has 
been interpreted historically is thrust into the spotlight and takes precedence over the 
‘true’ nature of the institution itself. We see this most clearly when Machiavelli argues 
that the softness of the modern (Christian) world as comes, “more from the cowardice of 
when who have interpreted our religion according to an ideal of freedom from earthly toil 
and not according to one of exception ability…these false interpretations that explain 
why we no longer find…as much love of liberty among the peoples as there was then” 
(Machiavelli 2008, 159. My italics).  Because religion is practiced, carried out, and 
therefore interpreted by humans, who are flawed and imperfect creatures, there is a 
distinct possibility that the institution of religion, like any other institution overseen by 
humans, can, over time, become corrupt and be subject to the ravages of decay and 
decline. 
                                                 
37 As De Grazia does, for example. 
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So if, for Machiavelli, the historical nature of these institutions (religion included) 
is a key component to understanding his larger political concerns over the seemingly 
unending conflict between vitality and decay, we have to ask a simple question: what 
forces does Machiavelli feel can be marshalled against this fear of degeneration? That is 
to say, if history is the process of decay and corruption, is there anything that can be done 
to thwart what seems like an inevitable and universal process. The answer, it turns out, is 
to look in the very same place that we find the cause of the decay. History itself is both 
the source of this concern and the potential source of its remedy. 
IV. Life-Giving Origins 
John Najemy argues that Machiavelli stresses, “The need for societies to renew 
contact with their life-giving origins and first principles” (Najemy 2012, 9). If time 
corrupts institutions, then it would seem that, for Machiavelli, returning to their origin, or 
returning them to their original state restores them, and allows society to fight off the 
ravages of decay. As Machiavelli writes, “the beginnings of religions, republics, and 
kingdoms must always contain in themselves some goodness through which they may 
regain their earthly prestige and their early expansion” (Machiavelli 2008, 246). To fight 
off decay, Machiavelli seems to be insisting that by returning to one’s beginnings can 
allow an institution to reclaim what was ‘good’ at its beginning as a means to resist the 
corruption imparted through historical development and age.  
This dynamic accounts for the use of the specific vocabulary that Machiavelli 
employs when he describes the nature of (actual or potential) powerful and beneficial 
political action. In these cases, Machiavelli writes of his longing for the ‘redemption’ of 
   153 
 
corrupt and enslaved Italy,38the revival of corrupt institutions, and the ‘rebirth’ of a 
powerful city. What does this language mean? For Machiavelli, it seems quite 
straightforward, “Rebirth comes only from returning to the beginnings and rediscovering 
– at the cost of great effort – one’s own true nature” (Viroli 2010, 38). Thus, the fact that 
institutions are historical in nature, and subject to decay and corruption does not, for 
Machiavelli, only cause despair. Rather, because these institutions can be located in 
history, it stands to reason that their origins can be understood and returned to as a means 
of redeeming and restoring these now corrupted institutions and political communities. 
The strongest manifestation of this dynamic in Machiavelli’s work can be found 
at the beginning of Book III of The Discourses. In the first chapter, Machiavelli brings 
together the strands that we have been analyzing: the threat of decay and disorder, and the 
restoration of civic virtù through a return to historical origins of institutions. In order for 
institutions to be maintained, “In an orderly way…changes which bring such bodies back 
to their beginnings are healthy. The ones that have the best organization and the longest 
lives are, however, those that can renew39 themselves often through their own 
institutions” (Machiavelli 2008, 246). For Machiavelli, this means that a society will be 
most successful at warding off decay if it contains within it, “some law, which obliges the 
men who belong to that body to examining their affairs with some frequency, or, indeed, 
from one good man who is born among them and who, by his exemplary deeds and his 
exceptional works, produces the same effect as the regulation” (Machiavelli 2008, 247). 
Whether relying on the presence of laws or the emergence of a singular ‘great man’, the 
                                                 
38 In the last chapter of The Prince, he uses the word ‘redeem’ or ‘redeemer’ 4 times. 
39 Immediately after this statement, he reminds us that ‘renewal means ‘to bring them back to their 
beginnings’.  
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purpose seems to be the same: a society can extend its healthy life if it regularly examines 
itself for signs of corruption and it repairs itself back to its beginnings to rejuvenate those 
institutions. 
It may seem paradoxical that Machiavelli is calling for the construction of 
institutions that force re-examination. How can you institutionalize that type of dynamic? 
For an answer to that, we may again turn to the specific institution of religion. 
Remembering that Machiavelli held the Roman pagan religion in such high regard, it 
might be worth asking whether or not we can see how that institution was able to 
‘institutionalize’ such a dynamic. Although most commentary typically focuses on 
Machiavelli’s insistence on pagan religion as creating a strong love of liberty, and how it 
exalted worldly glory more than the Christianity that he was criticizing, there is perhaps 
another key aspect to the Roman religion that speaks to the concern over re-evaluation. 
Again turning to Arendt, Roman paganism, “literally meant re-ligare: to be tied back, 
obligated to the enormous, almost superhuman and hence always legendary effort to lay 
the foundations, to build the cornerstone, to found for eternity. To be religious meant to 
be tied to the past” (Arendt 1968, 121). While this is the key to Arendt’s understanding of 
the Roman religion, it goes far beyond that, and becomes also a political and social 
consideration. For Arendt, this conception of religion is itself a direct expression of what 
she sees as the ‘heart of Roman politics’, which is nothing less than, “The conviction of 
the sacredness of foundations…to be engaged in politics meant first and foremost to 
preserve the founding of the city of Rome” (Arendt 1968, 120). If Roman political life is 
truly about the ‘return to foundations’, religion serves as the purest form of a political and 
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social institution that allows for that type of politics to emerge and sustain itself: a 
politics that renews itself by returning to its origins, its founding, and its beginnings.  
Although Machiavelli does not specify exactly how these self-returning 
institutions work, he repeatedly draws the reader’s attention to the importance of such a 
procedure, either by, “the exceptional ability of a single man or through the special 
excellence of a single regulation” (Machiavelli 2008, 247). Regarding ‘single regulations’ 
Machiavelli refers to “the tribunes of the plebeians, the censors, and all the other laws 
that were passed against the ambition and insolence of men” (Machiavelli 2008, 247-48). 
In Machiavelli’s estimation, these regulations all, in their own ways, “made men move 
back toward their proper limits” (Machiavelli 2008, 248), and when those regulations 
stopped being observed with regularity, it allowed citizens to become corrupt and 
dangerous. Without that regular return to the beginnings, corruption and decay become 
unavoidable tendencies within the community. Because of this, Machiavelli insists that, 
“Not more than ten years should pass between one of these applications of the law and 
another, because after such a period of time has passed, men begin to change their habits 
and break the laws” (Machiavelli 2008, 248). Thus, Machiavelli seems to give us a clear 
example of what he thinks constitutes the core of a strong and successful community:40 
the ability, whether through law or the actions of a single political actor, for the 
community to constantly have recourse to its origins, to the beginnings of its institutions, 
in order to revive the community, and to prevent decay.  
                                                 
40 At this specific place in The Discourses he brings together religions, kingdoms, and republics under the 
same heading of communities, or communal life. 
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Thus, we come back to the assertion made above. History is the source of concern 
for Machiavelli as well as the remedy of this concern. It is a cause of decay, but within 
history itself we find the very practices and ideals that can re-energize communal life, 
promote virtù, and ward off the degeneration that is inherent in the nature of historical 
communities. Because the threat of decay is always an ever-present possibility, this 
process of revitalization through a return to origins, is something that Machiavelli 
believes has to happen over and over again. It is a process that must itself be 
institutionalized, as the threat of political decay can never be permanently ‘won’, it can 
only be held at bay. 
 In Fortune is a Woman, Hannah Pitkin writes, “The renovation of a state or 
religion that has become corrupted, the restoration of right order and virtù, also seems to 
be a kind of founding” (Pitkin 1999, 53). While she clearly connects the issue of reviving 
a corrupted state with the idea of origins, her use of the term ‘founding’ forces us to raise 
some important issues surrounding the nature of what Machiavelli sees as effective 
political action. If what this ‘return to origins’ truly is a process of ‘re-founding’ a 
community, it would seem to imply a fair amount of political sovereignty on the part of 
the agents engaged in this process. Pitkin notes this herself when she writes, “unlimited 
trust is to be placed in the great founder. But the price of that trust is something like 
solipsism: the founder is the only person, the only free agent among objects…autonomy 
becomes singularity” (Pitkin 1999, 63). Yet, elsewhere, Pitkin notes that, “the Citizen is 
Machiavelli’s most profound and promising vision…for the Citizen, by contrast, virtù is 
sharing in a collective autonomy” (Pitkin 1999, 80-81). How can we resolve these 
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seemingly contradictory ideas of political sovereignty? How do the Citizen and the 
Founder co-exist? For Pitkin, the conflict resolves itself through a process of emergence: 
the act of founding paves the way for the emergence of a community wherein the Citizen 
can emerge and partake in autonomy. She writes, “The founder himself is only a means 
to Machiavelli’s real goal: the new uncorrupted society to be created. The vision of that 
society provides yet a third model of true manhood...Call it the image of the fraternal 
Citizen” (Pitkin 1999, 80). In this schema, the work of the founder produces a 
(uncorrupted) society wherein Citizens are able to share in virtù and autonomy.  
However, if, as we have seen above, the process of corruption is ever present due 
to the historical nature of all communal existence, can a Founder actually produce an 
uncorrupted society? This leads to the second, more substantive issue. If citizenship 
flourishes in the absence of corruption, which I believe both Pitkin and Machiavelli 
would agree on, but corruption is an ever present possibility then we must have recourse 
to a process to ward off corruption41. This process, as we have already seen, involves a 
return to origins. Thus, it would seem to imply a continual ‘re-founding’ as we must 
continually return to our origins in order to stave off political decay. If Pitkin is right that 
‘founding’ is a process that abrogates autonomy to the singular founder, what does that 
say about the political autonomy of Citizens who, in order to escape corruption, must 
constantly be engaged in this process of returning? Is the result of this a process where 
citizens, by constantly being reminded of the founding institutions and origins, and by 
constantly returning to those original political ideals, deprived of political autonomy? 
According to Maurizio Viroli, “rebirth meant returning to the ideal, pure form” (Viroli 
                                                 
41 Rather than rely on the creation of an uncorrupted society. 
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2010, 76), if this is true, then what kind of true political autonomy do Citizens possess, 
other than to reassert the ‘pure form’ of the institutions within which they live? To 
answer this requires examining exactly what this ‘return’ signifies, and what exactly is so 
‘life-giving’ about these origins. 
V.  Origins as Autonomy 
When questions of autonomy, especially the autonomy of citizens are added to the 
equation, it compels us to look all the more closely at this process of ‘returning to our 
origins’ to try and understand just how this process impacts the ability of citizens to be 
engaged in actions of ‘collective autonomy’. If this return to origins, this polis-wide re-
ligare is a process which ‘binds’ citizens back to the pure forms of their institutions as 
they were originally instituted, would that not short circuit any meaningful claim to 
autonomy? This is especially true if we are to understand autonomy in a way similar to 
Castoriadis’ definition: the ability for the political community to create and re-create the 
conditions, within which it exists. In addition, if returning to origins is a return to the 
founding, to the moment when those institutions first took on that ‘pure form’, does this 
return to the origins not simply reproduce the autonomy of the founder at the expense of 
the potential autonomy of the citizen body? It seems that we might be left with a very 
stark choice: either autonomy (which acts in the present) is accompanied by inevitable 
decay (by not returning to our origins) or civic rebirth (by returning to our origins) 
accompanied by a loss of autonomy (a lack of creative potential in the present)? For 
Machiavelli, is the choice really that stark? Does he simply produce a theoretical project 
that is designed to radically reduce (if not eliminate) the amount of political autonomy 
   159 
 
that should be exercised by a body of citizens? Is a healthy political community one in 
which political actors are presented with very tightly bound parameters within which they 
can act? I argue that we should see Machiavelli’s theoretical sensitivity to this issue of 
origins and the historical nature of communities as a means to avoid just such a 
dichotomy; providing us instead with a relationship to origins that is far more dynamic. 
His call for a ‘return to original institutions’, rather than shutting down the potential for 
autonomy, is actually productive of it. For Machiavelli, the rebirth and revitalization of 
the community that is associated with this return is primarily the rebirth and revitalization 
of the possibilities for meaningful political autonomy. 
 In Politics and Remembrance, Bruce Smith initially offers a description of that 
funnuanced conception of Machiavelli by noting that, “to be a citizen, to act politically, 
meant quite literally to preserve that which was laid in the beginning…one can read 
almost any of Machiavelli’s works and discover an injunction to imitate the ancients” 
(Smith 1985, 27-30). This seems to confirm the fears over political autonomy expressed 
above: politics becomes imitation, autonomy becomes preservation (rather than creation), 
and the sphere of autonomy for citizens seems diminished. As evidence of this 
conception of citizenship we can look at the Preface to The Discourses. In it, Machiavelli 
writes that though people today attribute honor to antiquity when it comes to statues and 
art, and that artists of his day often strive, “with great diligence to represent it in all their 
works” (Machiavelli 2008, 15), he is amazed and saddened that the generals, lawgivers, 
and kingdoms of antiquity are “admired rather than imitated” (Machiavelli 2008, 15). 
Additionally, Machiavelli asserts that one of the reasons why Italy has fallen to such a 
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state of disarray has to do with the fact that he can find no military or political leader who 
“has recourse to the examples of the ancients” (Machiavelli 2008, 16). Presumably for 
Machiavelli, a kingdom or republic that did have recourse to the ancient models to 
imitate would become a strengthened a vital community. This would seem to lend quite a 
bit of credibility to the idea that, for Machiavelli, effective political activity is one that 
imitates the past: action as imitation, autonomy as replication.  
Building on this analysis, Jim Grote draws our attention to the importance that 
Machiavelli places on the imitation of ‘great men’. According to Grote, “the reader is 
urged to imitate the ‘paths beaten by great men,’ specifically four excellent princes: 
Moses, the liberator of the Hebrews from Egypt and the founder of Israel; Romulus, the 
founder of Rome; Cyrus, the liberator of the Persians from the Medes; and Theseus, the 
founder of Athens…Chapter seven is devoted to the imitation of Cesare Borgia” (Grote 
1998, 127). To Grote’s analysis of The Prince, we could just as easily add his reverence 
for Numa in The Discourses as another example of the ‘great man’ that Machiavelli 
would have prudent political actors imitate. However, it would seem that a conflict 
(Grote calls it a contradiction) arises in this conception of imitation. As Harvey Mansfield 
states, “when imitating great men, one follows the beaten track, and thus does not truly 
imitate their innovation” (Mansfield 1981, 297). Mansfield and Grote both seem to offer 
the same claim about Machiavelli’s ‘imitation’. They both seem to argue that in 
encouraging the imitation of ‘great men’, Machiavelli is simply encouraging the imitation 
of actions, which, as Mansfield clearly points out, is not what made these historical 
examples the ‘great men’ of antiquity. It was not the specific content of the actions that 
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truly made them great (though the actions may have been, though not necessarily always, 
successful), but rather, it was that their actions were, properly speaking, innovations. 
Their actions were the result of creativity, vision, and novelty, any political actor who 
simply strives to recreate the actions taken by these men are undertaking steps that, by the 
simple fact of their being imitations, must therefore be devoid of creativity, vision, and 
novelty. Rather than encouraging autonomy and innovation, is Machiavelli simply 
interested in the ability of political actors, “to apply ancient history to modern events and 
to encourage the present day imitation of ancient models” (deGrazia 1994, 197) How is 
Machiavelli concerned at all with innovation and autonomy if his fundamental premise 
(imitation of the great men of antiquity) seems to dismiss those very possibilities out of 
hand? In making that claim, however, Mansfield assumes that what Machiavelli is 
interested in with regard to history and imitation are in fact the specific actions taken. He 
is sure that history as ‘models’ to be imitated is the true measure of Machiavelli’s interest 
and focus.  But what if Mansfield’s understanding of what Machiavelli sees as the true 
value of history is pushes him to see a contradiction where one really does not exist?42  
I believe that the position that Grote and Mansfield both forward, overlooks a key 
component of Machiavelli’s political theory that Smith wants to draw our attention to, 
and which I believe is essential for understanding Machiavelli on this issue. What we are 
forced to see is that, “there is another Machiavelli – the brash innovator” (Smith 1985, 
31). But how can Machiavelli simultaneously be a theorist of imitation, while also being 
a theorist of political innovation? The answer to this question rests on just what we 
understand the idea of ‘imitation’ to mean. While one reading might suggest that 
                                                 
42 Or perhaps, does not exist as starkly as he would suggest. 
   162 
 
imitation involves simple replication or the faithful reproduction of certain acts, Smith 
suggests that, “in teaching what men had done, Machiavellian history sought to teach 
men what they might do. This history was less a science of correction actin than the 
origin of action itself” (Smith 1985, 38). This distinction is important. Does Machiavelli 
offer a conception of ‘imitation’ that involves more than a return to, or restoration of the 
‘pure form’ of that institution? How and when can imitation, and a return to origins be 
about the production of political activity and autonomy in the present? 
  I want to claim that Machiavelli is drawing our attention to the past in order to 
confront his reader with the political vision and boldness that accompany those political 
actors and political institutions. After all, the people that Machiavelli is calling forward to 
restore Italy or the Italian city states are, in his estimation, great men. Viroli makes the 
claim that, for Machiavelli, “the need to use extraordinary means also arises for the civil 
man who pursues the goals of the restoration of political life (vivere politico) in a corrupt 
city” (Viroli 1993, 169). If we simply think of political action as imitation, this seems to 
be almost a contradiction. Why would Machiavelli need ‘great men’ (like the leader he 
calls for at the end of The Prince), or believe that ‘extrordinary means’ were necessary to 
restore political life, if all that is needed is simple imitation. No, the idea of imitation here 
is much more complicated than that. While for Machiavelli, knowledge of the specific 
historical actions are important, what is of the utmost importance is that the readers 
recognize the boldness of action, and the great political innovation that each and every 
new institution represented at the time of its origin. To support this reading of 
Machiavelli, we can return again to the preface to The Discourses. Shortly after the 
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passage discussed above, where Machiavelli seems to be lamenting the lack of imitation 
of political history in his contemporary world, he notes that his contemporaries lack an 
ability to understand the histories that they read. He notes that: 
In reading them, we fail to draw out of them that sense or to taste that flavour they 
intrinsically possess. As a result, it happens that countless people who read them take 
pleasure in hearing about the variety of incidents they contain without otherwise thinking 
about imitating them, since they believe that imitation is not only difficult but impossible, 
as if the sky, the sun, the elements, or human beings had changed in their motions, order, 
and power from what they were in antiquity (Machiavelli 2008, 16) 
While he does again make use of the idea of imitation again in this passage, the context 
within which he places the idea is important. Instead of claiming that an inability to 
properly understand histories means that we are not drawing the proper lessons from 
them, or that we are not able to extract the correct information, he asserts that readers are 
not able to ‘taste’ what history is, or what it possesses. He does not talk about the lessons 
of history, but the ‘flavor’. In fact, he notes that reading history in order to simply take 
pleasure from hearing about the specific incidents of the past is the key element in this 
historical misunderstanding that he is so concerned about.  
 The passage from The Discourses is important as well not simply because it can 
help to refocus what we understand Machiavelli to mean by historical imitation, but 
because it draws our attention back to one of Machiavelli’s guiding concerns: the lack of 
effective and powerful political action in the present. Here Machiavelli asserts that even 
though people read (and are amused by) historical accounts, they cannot bring themselves 
to think of imitating them. Bruce Smith is making reference to this specific claim when 
he writes, “men continue to admire the past, but cannot imagine acting in similar 
ways…modern politics appear so different from Ancient politics that imitation is judged 
impossible” (Smith 1985, 34). But just as Machiavelli asserts that human beings have not 
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changed, he seems to be using these many histories in order the assure the readers that 
there is an essence to politics that hasn’t changed and that to imitate the ‘flavor’ of 
history is not only possible, but necessary. What would it mean, then, for us to shift our 
concern to the ‘flavour’ of history? Or, more directly, what would a political project look 
like that attempts to ‘imitate’ the ‘flavour’ of history? 
 In order to elaborate what it might mean to imitate the ‘flavour’ of history it is 
important to remember that, for Machiavelli, most (though not all) of the ‘great men’ that 
he is insistent on utilizing as historical examples are founders of cities or communities. 
Romulus and Numa are, each in their own way, seen as founders of Rome, Moses is both 
a liberator and founder. So what is it then, about this notion of ‘founding’ that interests 
Machiavelli to such a degree? This is an especially important question to ask when we 
remember that his earlier concern seemed to be more focused on notions of ‘rebirth’, 
‘revitalization’, and ‘renewal’, and nowhere does he make the specific assertion that what 
is called for is the founding of a ‘new’ community. Instead, he gives his attention entirely 
over to the problem of revitalizing an already existing community. What then, is the 
theoretical relationship that he is trying to establish between ‘foundings’ and 
‘revitalizations’? How can attention to the actions of political and religious founders help 
political actors who are concerned with renewal? 
 To some degree, it would seem that, by focusing so intently upon the role of the 
founder in the life of the political community, Machiavelli is in fact setting up the very 
political divide between the politics of the past and the politics of today that he refers to 
in the preface to The Discourses. As Hannah Pitkin notes, “a founder, as Machiavelli 
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pictures him, is a male figure of super human or mythical proportions, who introduces 
among men something new, good, and sufficiently powerful so that it continues beyond 
his lifetime on the course he has set” (Pitkin 1999, 52). In assigning such massive, almost 
super human political power and skill to these founders, by ‘mythologizing’ the role they 
play in the life of the community, Machiavelli seems to forego any possibility of any 
political action in the present except for possibly pale imitation. Identifying the founders 
as ‘unmoved movers43’ who act entirely on their own. Again, Pitkin notes that “the true 
Founder must not only be a foundling, independent of the past and self made in his 
origins, but he must also be ruthless toward the future” (Pitkin 1999, 60). This would 
seem to render political action on the level of the founder impossible. Founders must be, 
by their nature, independent of history, while all contemporary political actors are 
members of an historical community, they cannot be independent of their history any 
more than the community itself can. However, even after seeming to put so much 
distance between founders and mere citizens, Pitkin argues that, “the Founder must also 
serve as a model for imitation” (Pitkin 1999, 77). 
 So if founders must serve as a model for imitation, does that mean that 
Machiavelli is calling for a process of ‘re-founding’? Elena Guarani asserts that a basic 
interpretation of The Discourses considers the work, “to be not a theoretical work, but 
rather a concrete political proposal, a sort of manifesto for refounding the Italian 
republics in a political situation in which it was not yet clear what the final outcome 
would be” (Guarani 1993, 17). Leaving aside the problematic division that Guarani 
                                                 
43 This term describing founders is used by Pitkin repeatedly to illustrate the epic amount of political will 
and vitality they possess. 
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makes between a theoretical work and a political proposal and note that her claim about 
The Discourses seems to resonate with Pitkin’s claim about the imitation of the founders. 
The prolonged focus on the work of the founders serves as a ‘call to imitation’ and a plea 
for a ‘re-founding’ of the Italian city-states. Thus, Machiavelli’s preoccupation with 
history is directly related to the political needs that he sees as animating the present day.  
Importantly though, I would like to stake the claim that a ‘re-founding’ is quite a different 
thing in Machiavelli’s thought from founding a new community altogether, and this is 
linked to his injunction to remember and imitate the original founders that he writes 
about. There is something about the connection to the past that must animate this type of 
political activity. The type of political activity that Machiavelli is calling for is action that 
is connected quite clearly to the past; it is a type of activity that would be ineffective 
without that very connection. This brings us back, hopefully with a bit more illumination, 
to the question posed above: if political action is about imitation, if political corruption 
can only be fought through the process of ‘re-founding’ or ‘renewal’, what exactly is it 
that Machiavelli wants imitated?  
When Machiavelli is drawing our attention to the ‘great men’ and founders of the 
past, he is very consciously drawing our attention to the freedom and autonomy that each 
of them had and that each of them used, in their own distinctive ways, to act boldly and 
create laws, institutions, and practices that benefitted the community that was formed. In 
his description of Numa as the founder of the Roman religion he notes that he found ‘a 
very fierce people’ and that he used religion to ‘maintain a civilized society’ and helped 
to establish institutions and practices that improved upon those that were created by 
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Romulus. The point is that Numa used his political autonomy and skill to create these 
new institutions, to offer solutions to pressing political issues and problems within the 
community, and to found a stable and strong political order. It is this that I believe 
Machiavelli is interested in when he speaks of ‘imitating’ the ancients and the great 
founders of history. As Martin Fleischer argues, “a people who have not been corrupted 
beyond the point of no return can revitalize their political existence and regain control of 
their fate through acts of political intelligence and energy inspired by bold leadership” 
(Fleischer 1972, 116). While Fleischer primarily argues that the bold leadership that 
inspires a people are the present political leaders of the community (a prince or the heads 
of the republic), I believe that there is a larger sense in which this scheme makes sense 
for Machiavelli. The bold leadership that can inspire intelligent and intrepid activity are 
those historic founders that Machiavelli constantly draws us back to. They serve as a 
reminder that bold political activity is not only possible, but it is perhaps a requirement of 
any lasting political community. 
In this sense, the past is imitated not as a template to be copied. Instead, the past 
serves as something of a reservoir of energy and inspiration, as, “images that drive 
[citizens] to take up the burdens of public liberty” (Smith 1985, 264). The past, and the 
memories of the great founders are ideals, perhaps not of content, but of form, a form of 
action and autonomy that Machiavelli wants his contemporaries to reconnect to. Again, 
Fleischer notes that, “[Machiavelli] turned to the past for the practical political purposes 
of working out the guidelines to action and inspiring his contemporaries to undertake the 
necessary political acts” (Fleischer 1972, 118). While the term ‘guidelines’ may bring us 
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a little too close to the definition of ‘imitation’ that Mansfield puts forward, I would like 
to focus here on the idea of turning to the past as a means of inspiration. Thinking of the 
past as inspiration means that Machiavelli is using the past as a reminder of the very 
possibility of freedom and free political action in the present. So, like Castoriadis, 
Machiavelli sees autonomous political action as a necessary component to any healthy 
community, but unlike Castoriadis, who attaches autonomy to free creation ex nihilo, 
unconnected to anything that has come before, Machiavelli ties the very possibility of 
autonomous political action to a clear reference to the past. The past serves as the very 
animating force for autonomous political activity in the present, by returning us to those 
very historical dynamics.  
In addition to drawing our attention to the memory of great men and founders, 
Machiavelli draws our attention to the potential power and force inherent in the political 
memory that a community has for freedom, specifically the memory that a community 
has for its own historical freedom. In The Prince, Machiavelli claims that one of the most 
difficult cities to rule is one that is used to living under its own free rule. He writes, “he 
who becomes the ruler of a city that is used to living under its own laws and does now 
knock it down, must expect to be knocked down by it. Whenever it rebels, it will find 
strength in the language of liberty and will seek to restore its ancient constitution” 
(Machiavelli 1994, 17). In The Discourses, his concern with a history and memory of 
freedom forms the very basis of his entire undertaking. In the first chapter of the first 
book, Machiavelli claims that, “since these cities do not have free origins, it rarely 
happens that they make great advances and can be numbered among the chief cities of 
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kingdoms” (Machiavelli 2008, 20). Why is Machiavelli so immediately despairing 
toward cities without a free founding? Possibly because, for Machiavelli, a city without a 
free founding will not have that memory of freedom as a reservoir of inspiration upon 
which to draw for bold political action.  
In Book II of The Discourses, he writes that, “nothing made it more difficult for 
the Romans to overcome the surrounding people and parts of the more distant provinces 
than the love many peoples in those times had for liberty” (Machiavelli 2008, 156). That 
is to say, a continuous history of freedom and liberty strengthened these communities and 
allowed them to defend themselves ‘so stubbornly’ against the Roman Empire. The 
presence of institutions that tied communities back to their history of freedom and liberty 
were communities that engaged in very decisive and powerful political actions and went 
to great lengths to defend themselves. For Machiavelli, could it be that a lack of strong 
connection to the past means that the potential reservoir of political strength, that memory 
of freedom, is to some degree unavailable, and hence will weaken that communities 
ability to act in its own defense or for its own benefit? 
Bringing together two of Machiavelli’s major theoretical concerns, the memory of 
freedom and the memory of the great founders of the past, offers us insight into how 
Machiavelli wants to navigate the dynamics of history and politics. Rather than calling 
for a pale imitation of the great founders, we can see, in the image of the founder, another 
possibility. In the image of the founder resides the memory not of specific laws and 
institutions that must be returned to, but instead, we see a memory of the political will 
and vitality that produced those laws and institutions in the first place. It is the memory of 
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political judgments made and political actions taken to solve the issues and concerns that 
were immediately present at that time. This is what Machiavelli is interested in 
‘imitating’, and this is the lesson that he is trying to teach through his political writings, 
that “in the memory of the past lay a spring that would enable men to act for a future” 
(Smith 1985, 42). Just as the founders of the past were able to create institutions and 
structures that worked to produce a free community, so Machiavelli wishes for political 
actors today to undertake the same type of activity: a type of political reevaluation of the 
conditions of freedom and the search for political innovations that would foster its 
emergence. 
We can now offer a slight re-interpretation of the famous passage from the 
preface to The Discourses wherein Machiavelli laments the existence of the attitude that 
today, imitation of the great political actors of the past is impossible. Immediately after 
making this statement, Machiavelli notes that he wants to “extricate men from this error” 
(Machiavelli 2008, 16), and we can see the entirety of The Discourses as an extended 
engagement in this process of extrication44. I would argue that what Machiavelli is 
lamenting in this passage is not that political actors today are unwilling to copy what the 
‘ancients’ did, but that there has been an emptying out of political energy in the republics 
that Machiavelli sees around him, this is what he means by a failure to imitate the 
ancients. It is, instead, a failure to remember that, “in republics there is great energy; that 
this activity is related to the remembrance of an ancient liberty; and that this memory has 
a compelling quality which almost forbids citizens to rest” (Smith 1985, 57). The fate to 
                                                 
44 In this sense I believe we can see Machiavelli’s work as both a theoretical text and a political proposal, 
thus negating the either/or analysis that Guarani offers. 
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which Machiavelli sees contemporary politics resigned to is that, as sure as there is a 
belief that ‘the sky, the sun, the elements, or human beings’ have fundamentally changed 
from the way they were in antiquity, that type of political energy and activity, creative 
and bold, is ‘not only difficult but impossible’ today. In order to ‘extricate men’ from this 
error Machiavelli is trying to draw back our attention to those founders so that we might 
see what it is that was inherited by the communities of today. What was inherited from 
those founders were not specific laws, institutions, or customs, but the very energy at the 
heart of republics that was responsible for such creations in the first place. To extricate 
his contemporaries is to give them the ability to recapture that energy and political 
boldness. This is the imitation that Machiavelli is calling for. 
VI. Origins & Autonomy as Hermeneutics 
So we can see that, for Machiavelli, the conditions of political autonomy, that is 
to say, powerful creative political activity in the present, is fueled by these memories, and 
the past more generally. Memories not just of founders, but memories of freedom, of 
political potential and power, and those elements are what Machiavelli hopes to see 
recovered by political actors. Another question needs to be asked in the context of our 
overall argument, however. If Machiavelli’s commitment to the past is about recovering a 
vital sense of political autonomy, how does the idea of a ‘public hermeneutics’ play into 
this conception? While authors like Bruce Smith, John Najemy, and Martin Fleischer all 
seem interested in recovering this notion of political autonomy, or illustrate how, for 
Machiavelli, a recourse to the past serves as some type of inspiration for political action 
in the present, their descriptions of this process remain somewhat vague and suffer for 
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that lack of clear engagement. Whereas Fleischer seems to tie inspiration to a notion of 
‘guidelines’ for action, thus perhaps recreating to some degree that notion of imitation we 
see in Mansfield, others, like Smith, settle for vague ideas such as the past as helping 
political actors to ‘recapture the energy’ inherent in the community. While I do not want 
to deny the importance of what Smith and others are saying in this regard, I believe that a 
question still remains. How exactly is that ‘energy’ captured or directed? That is, if we 
assume the first part of this argument, that Machiavelli is interested in re-capturing the 
vital energy and political possibility inherent in the past (the models of ‘great men’ and 
‘founders’) how does that translate into political activity in the present? Is there 
something more to Machiavelli’s repeated insistence on the lessons of the past other than 
it serving as some type of amorphous inspiration? How does the inspiration translate into 
political judgment and political action? 
For someone who is seemingly as enamored with the past as Machiavelli is, the 
Preface to Book II of The Discourses seems a bit odd and out of place. At the beginning 
of the Preface, he writes, “men always praise ancient times and condemn the present, but 
not always with good reason, and they are such partisans of the past that they celebrate 
not only those eras they have come to know…but also those that they…remember having 
seen in their younger days” (Machiavelli 2008, 149). Given everything we have looked as 
so far,  it seems odd for him to talk so forcefully about how people can misremember the 
past and assign to it too much glory, “even though, in reality, present affairs may be 
much more deserving of glory and fame” (Machiavelli 2008, 149). I believe, however, 
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that this is a very strategic intervention on Machiavelli’s part, and it gets back to the 
question of imitation, and just what, and how, people are to ‘imitate’ the past.  
By distancing, in a sense, his political readers from the past, and from the 
possibility of a blanket admiration for the past, he is giving us a critical lens through 
which to evaluate the very material that he is presenting. I believe that this is done to 
further separate Machiavelli from that facile understanding of imitation that Mansfield 
proposes. The danger inherent in such overflowing admiration for the past is the 
possibility that the original institutions, structures, religions, etc., may exert such a strong 
pull of the political imagination that to deviate from them becomes a dangerous 
proposition. This warning or distancing serves a similar function as Wolin’s claim about 
the Constitution of 1787 when he writes, “a constitution is not a revelation and the 
Philadelphia convention was not an epiphanic moment” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 3). In both 
cases what you are seeing is a presentation of historical material as important, but not as 
the ‘pure form’ that our political allegiances must never deviate from. Wolin refers to this 
type of allegiance to a specific political form as a ‘misplaced biblicism’ and I would 
argue that Machiavelli is drawing our attention to nearly the same potential pitfall that, if 
left unacknowledged, would actually produce more harm than good for the community. 
In order to understand this importance, we need to look at the conditions that 
surround the finest achievements of Machiavelli’s ‘great founders’ – the institutions and 
laws that they produce.  While Machiavelli heaps great praise upon them there is very 
important way in which he is qualifying their greatness and present applicability, which 
has to do with the historical nature of these communities and the degeneration of those 
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institutions in time. Pocock has an insightful description of this process of degeneration 
and its consequences. In The Machiavellian Moment, he writes, “what happens as 
corruption develops, we are told, is that the material itself undergoes change, and the 
reason why old laws lose their efficacy when this happens is that the same form cannot be 
imposed up, or educed from, different matter” (Pocock 2003, 207). By ‘material’ here, 
Pocock is referring to the community itself. While we tend to associate Machiavelli with 
the idea of an unchanging human nature, there is a difference between human nature and 
specific human communities: communities which are made up of laws, customs, and 
habits. Machiavelli himself clearly demonstrates this understanding of decay and the 
effect that it has on the community when he writes, “institutions and laws established in a 
republic at the time of its birth, when men were good, are no longer suitable later, once 
men have become evil…this means that new laws are insufficient, because the 
institutions that remain in place corrupt them” (Machiavelli 2008, 68). What Machiavelli 
is imparting to his readers is that decay and corruption change the nature of those 
institutions, and if one wants to reform a community it needs to be remembered that, 
“since the institutions of the state, which were no longer good amidst the corruption, 
remained fixed, those laws, which were renewed were not sufficient to keep men good, 
but they would have been very useful if, along with the innovations in the laws, the 
institutions had been changed once again” (Machiavelli 2008, 68). Even if we want to 
avoid, to some degree, the terms of good and evil, we can say that, for Machiavelli, the 
passage of time and the effect that it has on a communities’ institutions and political 
structures eventually produces an incompatibility. This eventual incompatibility tells us 
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something about the nature of refounding, that Machiavelli sees as fundamental to the 
health of the community. 
Machiavelli seems to be claiming that if one wants to revitalize the political 
health of a community it is not enough to simply return to the ‘pure form’ of the original 
institutions, for the corruption that occurs over time makes those institutions, which at 
one time fit the conditions of the community, no longer compatible with political health. 
Revitalization here calls for not simply the passage of new laws, but the creation of, or 
perhaps radical restructuring of, the fundamental institutions that help configure the 
community. A refounding needs to be a process of ongoing negotiation between 
institutional structure, the conditions of the community, and the prospects for political 
freedom. John Najemy describes this dynamic as the recognition that, “founding requires 
constant revision, evolution and many lawgivers: founding is a long historical process 
that is never quite complete” (Najemy 2010, 100). While I think this does capture fairly 
accurately Machiavelli’s argument, it does not quite go far enough. Rather than the claim 
that re-founding requires multiple lawgivers, Machiavelli insists that it is not simply new 
laws that need to be considered, but the very fundamental institutions of the community 
need to be reconsidered, revised, or replaced if the need arises.  
This helps us to flesh out why, for Machiavelli, this historical material is so 
important to refounding. Not only is the historical material supposed to serve as a 
reservoir of inspiration and energy for those acting in the present, but it is also serves as 
material for political actors to use in formulating their political judgments and goals in 
the present. By looking at the successful laws and institutions created by the ‘founders’, 
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political actors are able to see how those institutions fit with the conditions to produce a 
healthy and vital political community. This then encourages political actors to confront 
the present conditions of the community and see how those institutions would need to be 
changed, replaced, or dropped, in order to best meet the needs of the community as it is 
presently constituted.  As Machiavelli writes in Book III of The Discourses, “an 
individual comes to make fewer mistakes and to enjoy a favorable fortune…when his 
methods fit the times” (Machiavelli 2008, 281). Simply replicating the institutions of the 
past is an exercise in futility, because the changed character of the community would be 
incompatible with them. Instead, this historical material is to be understood and re-
interpreted in light of the needs and conditions of the contemporary communities in 
which the actors are engaged. 
Where can we find a clear example of Machiavelli’s interpretive innovation in 
action? For Machiavelli, we actually need to look no further than the Catholic Church 
itself. While we have seen that Machiavelli seems to be no great fan of Catholicism, as he 
repeatedly ties it to the degradation of Italy, the lack of a love of freedom among his 
contemporaries, and a denigration of the pursuit of worldly glory, it does offer a 
surprisingly illustrative example of this very process of revitalization. In Book III of The 
Discourses, Machiavelli talks about the process of ‘revival’ that re-energized, at least to 
some degree, Catholicism as an historical institution. Machiavelli writes: 
These revivals are necessary through the example of our own religion which, had it not 
been brought back to its beginnings by Saints Francis and Dominic, would have died out 
completely; for these men, with their poverty and the example of Christ’s life, restored 
religion to the minds of men where it had been extinguished; and their new institutions 
were powerful enough to prevent the dishonesty of the priests and leaders of this religion 
from ruining it (Machiavelli 2008, 249). 
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I believe this encapsulates to a great degree Machiavelli’s understanding of revitalization 
and re-founding. The Catholic faith was simultaneously brought back to its ‘beginnings’ 
in the sense that Francis and Dominic took their inspiration from ‘the example of Christ’s 
life’ but that example was interpreted in a way that allowed them to create new religious 
institutions that revived the religion and prevented it from dying out. This also allows us 
to get at the heart of Machiavelli’s criticism of the Catholic faith more generally among 
his contemporaries. 
 Moreover, Machiavelli insists that the primary reason why Catholicism has had 
such a negative effect on the power of the Italian city states does not have to do with the 
truth content of the religion, or something about its essential nature, but rather, in how it 
has been interpreted. In The Discourses, Machiavelli writes that the negative effects of 
Catholicism “arises more from the cowardice of men who have interpreted our 
religion…it is…these false interpretations that explain why we no longer find as many 
republics in the world as existed in ancient times” (Machiavelli 2008, 159). Setting aside 
the thorny issue of ‘true’ and ‘false’ interpretations, what is most important here is that 
Machiavelli is making the point that the power (or weakness) of an institution rests 
primarily in how the institution is interpreted in a contemporary setting. Rather than 
concerning himself with a debate over the a-historical or theological truth content of 
Catholicism, “Machiavelli’s attention here is concentrated…more on how this ‘truth’ has 
been implemented, institutionalized, practiced, and lived” (Najemy 1999, 668).  
 Thus, for Machiavelli, we can see the process of imitation as one that is 
inextricably bound not simply to the past or to recreating the past, but one that is 
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concerned with political autonomy as well as creation through interpretation of the past. 
That is to say, autonomy for Machiavelli involved bold and powerful political action, but 
that action is not divorced from the past, but must use the past as its starting point. Bold 
reinterpretations of the inherited institutions and laws of a community is the primary way 
in which Machiavelli believes those communities can stave off, if only for a time, the 
degeneration and corruption that is a necessary corollary of being a community that exists 
in time, a community that is historical to its very core. 
VII.  Conclusion 
A familiar interpretation of Machiavelli’s intention as an author, sees him as a 
teacher of both politics and history not simply because there is value in knowing history, 
but that history provides one with lessons that can be imitated, a thinker who sees “the 
didactic value of the past” (deGrazia 1994, 27). As Jim Grote observes, “the reader is 
urged to imitate the ‘paths beaten by great men’…history teaches the imitation of great 
men” (Grote 1998, 127). History, according to this interpretation of Machiavelli, is 
something of a playbook that we can have access to in order to best align our actions with 
when our circumstances require. All is we need for this strategy to be successful, is to 
understand what our current circumstances require and the ability to discern what 
historical actors have done in similar circumstances, and simply apply the lessons of 
history to our own situation. Machiavelli seems to offer this general advice when, in The 
Discourses, he writes, “Prudent men are in the habit of saying…that anyone wishing to 
see what is to be must consider what has been; all the things of this work in every era 
have their counterparts in ancient times” (Machiavelli 2008, 351). To make this assertion, 
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that present events have ‘counterparts’ in past events seems to be moving in the direction 
of a general claim about history: that it is to a large degree repeatable, or that, in terms of 
actions to be taken and circumstances in which we might need to act, there is ‘nothing 
new under the sun’.  
Reinhart Koselleck clearly ties this conception of history to what he sees as 
Machiavelli’s own goals. In Futures Past, Koselleck observes that, “This experience of 
history, founded as it was on repeatability, bound prospective futures to the past” 
(Koselleck 2004, 21), and as such, to imitate the examples of history provides us with a 
continual template of political experience. “Machiavelli’s call, not only to admire the 
ancients but also to imitate them, gave an edge to the resolution that one should 
continually draw benefit from history because of the unique manner in which it united 
exemplary and empirical thought” (Koselleck 2004, 29). This understanding of history 
unites history and praxis (for us specifically, political praxis), because historical 
knowledge here becomes a collection of examples45 that can be utilized by political 
actors in the present. Machiavelli seems to make just such a claim himself in the opening 
to book II of The Discourses when he offers a very clear description of what he himself is 
attempting to do in this book as well as what he hopes the reader will be able to do with 
it. He writes, “I shall boldly proclaim in an open way what I understand of ancient times 
and of our own, so that the minds of the young men who will read these writings of mine 
can avoid the errors of the present and be prepared to imitate the past whenever fortune 
provides them with the proper occasion” (Machiavelli 2008, 152). This seems to be a 
very clear encapsulation of Koselleck’s conception of history instructing life. Machiavelli 
                                                 
45 This is Koselleck’s description of the method. 
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appears to be offering historical descriptions as well as commentary on the present and 
offering this historical knowledge as examples to be emulated by actors (Machiavelli’s 
‘young men’) in the present, provided that they have enough skill to be able to discern 
what historical examples truly parallel with the situation they themselves are facing in the 
present. Given that ability, history then becomes a set of actions to emulate or avoid (if 
the historical outcome was less than desirable).  
In this chapter, I attempted to argue for another conception of Machiavelli, one 
where Machiavelli’s concern with history is much more complicated. To say that, for 
Machiavelli, history instructs life would be to really broaden what that term means. 
History is not simply a collection of examples to be followed, or rules to abide by. 
Instead, history performs two vital functions. First, it is the source of political motivation 
and inspiration in the present. The repeated analysis of the great founders played a very 
specific role for Machiavelli. It was designed to show his Italian readers that, “in their 
Italic hearts the ancient bravery is not yet dead” (deGrazia 1994, 154), and that these 
historic examples would serve as a reminder that innovation, rather than pale imitation, is 
the true legacy of historical inheritance. Secondly, and just as important, is the idea that 
history serves as the material for re-evaluation and reinterpretation. In fact, for 
Machiavelli, reinterpretation and rebirth are inseparable ideas. Powerful political action 
must be linked to existing laws, structures, and institutions through the ongoing act of 
reinterpretation. So just as John Najemy notes that founding is a continual process that is 
never finished, the act of interpretation of that historical material is similarly one that is 
always unfinished, but also always necessary. Machiavelli is, as Pitkin insightfully notes, 
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a theorist of autonomy, but that autonomy receives its motive force in and through the 
historical material and institutions that political actors must constantly work to revitalize 
by reinterpreting them and reconfiguring them to meet the needs and changed 
circumstances of the community as it is currently configured. 
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Chapter Five 
 
A political community is a historical phenomenon. It is a cumulative process which 
reclaims something of its past and anticipates something of its future 
- Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that Niccolò Machiavelli offers an illuminating 
theoretical framework within which to combine a concern for history with a desire for 
political autonomy. This framework culminates in Machiavelli’s insistence on the 
importance of the ‘memory of freedom’ as a motive force with regard to the active and 
creative nature of citizens. The seemingly religious regard that he has for historical 
material, serves as the very material to inspire and ensure autonomous political action in 
the present. Sara VanderHaagen describes this type of project as one wherein, “memories 
transmit certain visions of agency that perpetuate new actions” (VanderHaagen 2013, 
190). As such, I believe that he is an important additive to the thought of Cornelius 
Castoriadis, who, while illuminating the symbolic nature of politics, so important for any 
hermeneutic project of politics, divorced his idea of autonomy from history, thus leaving 
us with a metaphysical project of autonomy that emerges ex nihilo. 
The move to Machiavelli, I believe, offers us a way around the difficulties that 
Castoriadis’ theories present, and allows us to forward a rigorous project of political 
autonomy that utilizes historical memory in a way that draws on the active process of 
reinterpretation. The interpretive engagement with this material allows a space where 
citizens do not simply see their position as one of preservation, but as a more active form 
of engagement. One important aspect, however, that Machiavelli seems to leave under 
theorized is just what this type of political community might look like? If a healthy 
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community is to be characterized by political autonomy (or we might say ‘autonomous 
actors’) that are acting on present concerns using the past as a hermeneutic and political 
guide, who exactly are these actors? Moreover, it leads us to a question of political 
judgment and responsibility that for Machiavelli is difficult to resolve. In The Discourses, 
this issue of judgment becomes quite important, because how issues of judgment are 
theorized will go a long way toward defining the type of responsibility that political 
actors will have to take, as well as who those very actors are. That is to say, who are the 
hermeneuticians?  While The Discourses certainly place citizens at the center of the 
political community, Machiavelli seems to offer, within the same work, contrasting 
claims about who he is entrusting with this judgment. On the one hand, it cannot escape 
notice that all of the particular examples he gives of powerful action in the past are the 
result of singular individuals. From Numa, to Brutus, to Cesar Borgia, his historical 
exemplars are all, what we might call, political aristocrats: elite actors who are able to act 
decisively, and in most cases successfully, thanks to their own individual virtù that leads 
them down this course of action. This open up the possible interpretation that was 
Machiavelli is looking for are contemporary ‘political aristocrats’ to follow in the 
footsteps laid before them.  It is this strong assertion of the dynamic and isolated acting 
individual that leads Sebastian de Grazia to the conclusion that, for Machiavelli, the 
cultivation of great men is an absolute necessity, especially for states in decline.  
On this issue, de Grazia writes, “some men, those who create laws or fiats or 
similar restraints, may have to make moral choices of greater consequences than the rest” 
(deGrazia 1994, 110). While de Grazia does make note of Machiavelli’s republicanism, 
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his repeated analysis of Machiavelli’s call for ‘great men’ and for the ‘Prince new’ as the 
centerpieces of Machiavelli’s theories of political renewal and salvation lead one to the 
conclusion that what Machiavelli is truly interested in is the presence of a sort of political 
aristocracy: the great and usually singular men who will be able to reform and remold the 
community through their strength and virtù. Hannah Pitkin also picks up on this theme in 
Machiavelli when she claims that, “the insistence on princely self-reliance becomes, in 
The Discourses, the theme of the solitary founder” (Pitkin 1999, 20). While Pitkin 
believes that the presence of The Founder will eventually give way to the rule by The 
Citizen, the issue of renewal and ‘refounding’ that was discussed in the previous chapter 
magnifies the issue that Pitkin draws out attention to. If founding (and, by extension, 
refounding) will, by necessity, require the presence of, and actions by, the great solitary 
founders, can we really deny the enduring presence of this political aristocracy?  
Perhaps we can. Machiavelli himself qualifies this aristocratic interpretation in his 
own detailed discussion of political judgment. Rather than positing the need for a 
contemporary ‘political aristocracy’, he instead seems to offer a fairly compelling 
argument in favor of the political judgment of the many. John McCormick persuasively 
argues this point when he writes, “Machiavelli’s prescription for a widely inclusive and 
popularly empowered form of government rests on a remarkably favorable assessment of 
the common people’s abilities, especially their capacity for political judgment” 
(McCormick 2011, 65). To make this argument, McCormick is drawing upon 
Machiavelli’s discussion in Book I of The Discourses in which Machiavelli makes a very 
impassioned argument in favor of the collective wisdom of the people. When comparing 
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the virtues of the people to those of a prince, Machiavelli writes, “in goodness and in 
glory, the people are by far superior…people are so much superior in maintaining the 
things established that, without any doubt, they add to the glory of those who established 
them” (Machiavelli 2008, 144). In addition, Machiavelli asserts that when the people 
exercise power in a well-organized community, they will be “stable, prudent, and grateful 
no differently than a prince, or better than a prince, and will even be considered wise” 
(Machiavelli 2008, 142). In McCormick’s vision, it is not that all political power should 
be ceded to the people (understood here as the common people and not the elite), but that 
Machiavelli wants to maintain an “antagonistic political culture” (McCormick 2001, 297) 
where political action on the part of the people acts as a counterweight to the drives and 
machinations of the elite. To do otherwise, to leave the political/social/economic elite 
without an adequate political adversary would be to weaken a republic and leave the 
community open to political corruption and (perhaps) collapse.   
In fact, this tension between the elite and the people opens up an interesting 
tension that McCormick seizes on and formulates a conception of political action that has 
some parallels to what I have been discussing. With regard to the motive force for the 
political activity and interests of the people, McCormick specifically addresses the issue 
of historical memory. He writes, “In particular, collective memory among the people of 
formal inequalities from the past seem to inspire within them a sensitivity to informal 
inequalities that persist in the present” (McCormick 2011, 14). This seems to replicate, to 
some degree, the very dynamic that we have been discussing: the way that attention to 
history seems to offer an opening for political action and awareness. However, the very 
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chapter in which Machiavelli seems to be offering this very spirited defense of the 
political acumen of the people qualifies itself a little bit, and brings us back, somewhat, to 
the initial claim of political aristocracy, thus forcing us to re-negotiate this issue. In an 
important sentence in the chapter, Machiavelli argues that, while the people may be better 
at maintaining laws, “princes are superior to the people in enacting laws, forming civil 
societies, establishing statues and new institutions” (Machiavelli 2008, 144). This 
seeming vacillation, between an idea of actors in an aristocratic sense and actors in a 
more democratic sense, is a tension that Machiavelli presents us with, but fails to 
adequately think through. 
No doubt, some of this is due in part to the nature of public memory itself. As 
Wulf Kansteiner notes, “memory is a collective phenomenon, but it only manifests itself 
in the actions and statements of individuals” (Kansteiner 2002, 180). Other theorists of 
collective memory similarly wrestle with this issue: to what degree is the use of memory 
a collective undertaking, or the product of individual action. Sara VanderHaggen writes 
that, “The struggle for balance can be seen clearly among rhetorical scholars studying 
public memory, many of whom have noted its simultaneously collective and individual 
nature” (VanderHaagen 2013, 186). While in this chapter I hope to argue that this 
methodological consideration should not be seen as an either/or proposition, what is 
needed is a frame in which both collective and individualistic claims can exist and 
configure each other. I would argue that Machiavelli’s engagement with these issues does 
not offer us that successful frame. His vacillation between a seemingly aristocratic 
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understanding of autonomy and more collective (democratic?) understanding simply 
means that the tension was one his theory could not deal with in a productive manner. 
In searching for a remedy to this difficulty, I will argue that the thought of Max 
Weber, the eminent German Sociologist, can be quite helpful. More specifically, his ideas 
on the modern phenomenon of ‘nationalism’ actually offers us a useful framework and a 
compelling narrative. Most important for our purposes is the way in which he will 
ultimately define the nation as a ‘memory community’, and how this community 
positions citizens within it to engage in principled political action that is motivated 
largely through their recognition of themselves as part of this memory community. This 
chapter will also involve a fair amount of what I would call ‘theoretical recovery’. 
Because Weber never set forth his ideas on nationalism in a systematic way, my 
argument will not be resting on an analysis of a single theoretical work of Weber’s, but 
rather, it will be, to some degree, a theoretical reconstruction that is built on the scattered 
threads that appear throughout several works. By bringing those threads together and 
seeing how they might inform each other, I hope create a larger, more systemic picture 
than Weber himself produces. I believe that as a theoretical constellation, it illuminates 
the central problematic of the dynamic of memory and history in a compelling and 
helpful way. While Machiavelli points out the central historical dynamics of the political 
community, it is Weber, and his conception of nationalism that helps us give a shape to 
that community itself. 
I. Max Weber’s Nationalism 
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 There is a growing body of literature that has begun to examine both the role that 
nationalism plays in the work of Max Weber. Much of this work seems to demonstrate 
how nationalism serves as a main undercurrent in Weber's academic work, informing his 
analysis in a significant, though largely unspecified manner.  Beyond Weber's academic 
work, the issue of – and concern with – nationalism clearly has a very large presence in 
many of his political writings, most notably “Between Two Laws” and his Freiburg 
inaugural address, “The Nation State and Economic Policy”.    However, beyond some 
scattered and unfinished fragments from Economy and Society on ethnicity and nations, 
which he never fully developed,46 Weber himself did not ever theorize nationalism in a 
systematic way; beyond these fragments, it is impossible to find an extensive treatment of 
the concept itself.  Thus, for Weber, nationalism seems to have a spectral presence in his 
writings, important yet bewilderingly under-investigated as an idea.  This situation led 
Perry Anderson to note that "Weber was so bewitched by the spell of nationalism that he 
was never able to theorize it" (Anderson 1992, 205). What Anderson is perceptive to 
note, and what is bewildering to those scholars interested in Weber's position regarding 
the issue and idea of nationalism, is that while nationalism seems to intersect with many 
other ideas of profound importance in Weber's corpus, such as status, power and history, 
this theoretical constellation never illuminates nationalism very clearly, and the specter 
remains quite hidden. 
The two most prominent places where Weber deals with the issue of nationalism, 
the Freiburg lecture (1895) and the fragmentary chapters in Economy and Society (1910-
1915), were written at least 15 years apart.  This distance requires us to consider whether 
                                                 
46 At the time of his death, he had not prepared this work for publication.  
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or not Weber's concepts of nationalism and nation actually change and develop 
throughout the body of his work.  Or more precisely, because he began his scholarly 
'theorization' of the nation much later than his first 'politicization' of the nation, should we 
expect a significant change from one to the other, which would complicate any attempt to 
locate continuity in Weber's ideas on nationalism?  Mommsen believes that we do see a 
significant change in Weber's conception of nationalism.  According to Abraham, 
"Mommsen has argued that, after the Freiburg address, a basic reversal in his position on 
Poland' can be found in Weber's writings.  This occurred, according to Mommsen, 
because Weber became more and more committed to the Machstaat and German 
imperialism, at the expense of his early commitment to the Kulturstaat" (Abraham 1991).  
Mommsen sees a significant change, a development that almost signals a complete break 
in conceptual understanding, toward the imperialist power-state, which would render an 
idea of strong continuity on the issue of nationalism quite moot.  Norkus goes a bit 
further than Mommsen and offers two completely separate conceptions of nationalism 
that he believes can be found in Weber's writings.  Norkus assigns to the 'early Weber' a 
conception of nationalism referred to as the 'political economic' model, while the late 
Weber develops a 'political sociology' model of the nation.47  More importantly for 
Norkus is the claim that, "[Weber's] caustic 'deconstructive' analysis in Economy and 
Society can be considered (at least in part) as a work in self-criticism."  Thus, in Norkus's 
interpretation the 'political sociology' model is essentially a strong corrective to the 
                                                 
47 This division might make sense insofar as Lawrence Scaff notes how Weber 'came' to sociology later in 
his career while beginning more strictly as an economist.  Thus, Norkus's categories seem to parallel 
Weber's own intellectual development but he never offers a convincing account of how the two terms are so 
different as to constitute two separate forms of investigation. 
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original flawed interpretation.  His attempt to 'redeem' Weber ignores a fundamental 
component to his overall work.  As Lawrence Scaff writes, "Weber's 'nationalism' was a 
logical political correlate to his economic thought" (Scaff 1989, 31).  Assuming 
significantly independent 'economic' and 'sociological' nationalisms presupposes 
significantly independent economic and sociological investigations on Weber's part, 
which is a presupposition that does not adequately describe Weber's work. 
 The other issue besides that of consistency is the issue of whether it is possible to 
read Weber's political and scholarly works together, or must we keep them separate.  The 
conflation of the political and the intellectual seems to be a major issue when interpreting 
Max Weber.  For someone who was so concerned with methodological investigation and 
a strong notion of science, Weber was, for his life, quite invested in politics.  For 
someone who claimed himself to be "not an active politician, nor will he ever be one," 
(Weber 2002, 133)48 he repeatedly noted that politics was 'his old secret love.'  As such, it 
would be foolish to believe we could cleanly separate the political from the scholarly 
writings.  Or as Mommsen claims, "there is in fact a fairly intimate connection between 
Weber's scholarly work and his political creed; in a way they are even two sides of the 
same coin.  Weber's scholarly work has certainly been substantially stimulated by 
political considerations of a very fundamental nature." (Mommsen 1974, 25).49   
 This chapter will attempt to think both sets of writings together.  In addition, in 
this chapter, I will investigate Weber's nationalism by proceeding with the assumption 
                                                 
48 This statement may be right on a narrow technical basis, but one would be hard pressed to make that 
claim that not being an active politician somehow made him, or his writings, less politically-inflected. 
49 Of course, by agreeing with Mommsen's characterization of Weber's way of working while disagreeing 
with Mommsen's content of Weber's work I am offering a double critique of Mommsen: that he misread 
not only Weber's work on nationalism, but has misread the political implications for this work. 
   191 
 
that one can find a consistent line of thought throughout Weber's work.  While granting 
the possibility that the later theoretical writings on nationalism differ to some degree 
from the earlier works, this is more an issue of self-clarification than a major shift in 
emphasis (Mommsen) or complete break in conceptual thinking (Norkus).  This set of 
assumptions is being upheld for two specific reasons.  The first is that an operating under 
the idea of an excessive separation, shift or change in Weber's writings runs the risk 
(especially for Weber) of overly psychologizing his work.  That is to say, to put forth an 
idea of two Weber's, separated by his period of illness. Rather than falling into this all-
too-easy periodization, it would be more fruitful to look for significant connections 
throughout his work.  This task is easily abandoned or obfuscated with an excessive 
reliance on psycho-biography and it prevents us from seeing clearly just how concerned 
Weber was, throughout his life and all manners of work, with certain key ideas.  
 These key ideas, which form a strong continuity throughout his work, are the 
second reason why this chapter assumes continuity on the issue of nationalism throughout 
his writings.  Moreover, it is my contention that only by acknowledging these key ideas 
as consistent concerns in Weber's work that we can come to understand and appreciate 
his ideas on nation and nationalism.  The two most important ideas in Weber's work are 
the two giant and inescapable powers of the modern disenchanted age: capitalism and 
bureaucratization.  Weber saw capitalist development as 'inescapable for us' as part of our 
fate, and bureaucratization was seen by him as an 'inescapability' of the modern world.  
While his scholarly works were devoted to an intellectual understanding of the histories, 
methods, emergence and characteristics of capitalism and bureaucracy, his specifically 
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political writings brought forth another, socially immediate, concern that involved these 
giant structures.  In his essay “On the Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia”, 
Weber asks, "how can democracy and freedom be maintained in the long run under the 
dominance of advanced capitalism?" (Weber 2002, 69)  As for the issue of 
bureaucratization, in his essay “Parliament and Government in Germany”, Weber asks, 
"How is it at all possibly to salvage any remnants of 'individual' freedom of movement in 
any sense, given this all-powerful trend towards bureaucratization?" (Weber 2002, 159).  
A third potential question might be how to avoid the leveling of democracy that seems to 
accompany bureaucratic rule in the modern world.  These apprehensions are made all the 
more pressing when we remember the basis of Weber's sociology: the acting individual.  
Given these massive structures, what is the ultimate fate of the acting individual in the 
modern world? 
 These concerns all come together in the main premise that informed all of 
Weber's writings and scholarly undertakings.  Mommsen sums this project up nicely 
when he writes: 
[Weber] worked hard to enlighten people's minds, and to suggest solutions which might 
enable to individual to hold his own against the rise of seemingly omnipotent 
bureaucracies, and to help Western societies to hold in check those social forces which 
were about to suffocate silently, but remorselessly the liberal individualistic, social 
structures of his day. (Mommsen 1974, ix) 
I believe that it is only in light of this undertaking that we can begin to understand the 
'spell of nationalism' that permeates Weber's work, but is little defined.  To be more 
precise, it is against the two inescapable forces of modernity, bureaucracy and 
capitalism, that we must place Weber's ideas about the nation. I argue that it is only by 
placing his idea of nationalism against the backdrop of these totalizing structures we can 
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see how Weber's nationalism and his sociological individualism are related.  As Sung Ho 
Kim writes, "In the end, nation and civil society formed an integrated idea in Weber's 
liberal nationalism, all for the purpose of empowering our agency and cultivating a self-
governing individual-cum-citizen" (Kim 2004, 171).  This purpose that Weber imputes to 
the nation (Kim's 'liberal nationalism') can be illuminated when we see how he connects 
the nation to certain key concepts, namely: history, culture, politics, freedom and 
responsibility.  Moreover, these concepts, which for Weber are indispensable for 
engaging in meaningful human activity, and thus living meaningful human lives in 
modernity, are manifested in modern society in large part through the nation.  As Mark 
Warren notes, "Weber's nationalism and statism, then, are not sui generis, but rather 
interdependent with his liberal commitment to persons." (Warren 1988, 37)  In fact, I 
argue that Weber’s nation is unthinkable without specific recourse to these very concepts, 
which are infused into his very understanding of the purpose, content and form of the 
nation.  This is not to say that Weber envisions a wholesale re-enchantment of the world 
through the nation, for as he makes clear, "the fate of our times is characterized by 
rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the 
world'" (Weber 2000, 155).  However, Weber's unique characterization of the nation 
serves, "to provide a balance of power to the rapidly bureaucratizing state.  Rather than 
an ultimate goal, nationalism was instrumental to this ideal" (Kim 2004, 170). Although I 
believe Kim is largely correct in this assertion, there is one specific component to 
Weber’s nationalism that he does not feature in his analysis. Kim minimizes one of the 
ways that nationalism is supposed to achieve these goals. Weber’s understanding of the 
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nation turns national identity and nationalism more generally, into a temporal, and 
historical, concept. I argue that Weber does this because this form of national 
consciousness as historical consciousness is a way to expand or re-conceptualize ideas of 
political responsibility, freedom, and action to fit the icy modern world of bureaucracy 
and the ‘iron cage’ of modernity. 
II. Placing Nationalism: Weber in the Context of German Nationalism(s) 
 In order to demonstrate just how important this temporal and historical dimension 
is to Weber’s understanding of the Nation, it is helpful to first contrast Weber with some 
of the dominant forms of nationalism that he contended with. Unfortunatley, because 
many scholars ignore this historical dimension, there is a tendency among many scholars 
to conflate Weber’s position on nationalism with some of the prevailing German 
nationalisms of the time. Most notably are Raymond Aron and Wolfgang Mommsen, 
both of whom see Weber advocating German nationalism as being, in itself, the highest 
goal and purpose that can be served.  According to Mommsen, "[Weber] declared the 
national idea to be a kind of ultimate value which had to come first in politics and 
economics alike." (Mommsen 1974, 26)  This assertion seems quite credible as Weber 
asserts in “The Nation State and Economic Policy” that, "The economic policy of a 
German state, and, equally, the criterion of value used by a German economic theorist, 
can therefore only be a German policy or criterion." (Weber 2002, 15)  His subordination 
of politics to German nationalism seems all the more pronounced as he writes, "It goes 
without saying that the vital interests of the nation take precedence even over democracy 
or parliamentary rule." (Weber 2002, 133)  Due to this exalted idea of the German nation-
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state, which Aron calls, "the supreme value to which he would subordinate everything in 
politics, the God (or daemon) to which he had sworn loyalty," (Aron 1971, 87) Aron and 
Mommsen see Weber as endorsing a nationalistic form of absolute (or near absolute) 
power-politics, and they emphasize his thoughts on imperialism, the idea that nations 
must compete for 'elbow room' in the international arena, and the strict connection of 
politics to the 'pragma of power' to support their position. 
 Other authors read Nietzsche’s influence on Weber’s work and see in his 
conception of politics a certain elitist strain, wherein, “the active choice of a meritorious 
lie style is found only among particularly gifted individuals, while most people are 
incapable of developing such ‘virtuoso ethic’” (Shafir 1985, 527). Regina Titunik notes 
that “Weber is typically characterized as a “Nietzschean” or “aristocratic” liberal whose 
primary concern with that prospect for freedom of exceptional individuals in the midst of 
a bureaucratically administered world” (Titunik 1997, 682). To make this point, critics 
often point to Weber’s use of Nietzschean terminology and language within his own 
work, most notably in The Protestant Ethic, where Weber’s lament over the future of the 
‘last men’ can be read through a distinctively Nietzschean lens: “Then, however, it might 
truly be said of the “last men” in this cultural development: “specialists without spirit, 
hedonists without a heart, these nonentities imagine they have attained a state of 
humankind never before reached” (Weber 2002, 121). Among some commenters on 
Weber’s nationalism, this type of aristocratic political sentiment is translated into the 
nationalist context. In this interpretation, Weber’s promotion of German nationalism is 
seen through a Nietzschean-aristocratic lens. Gary Abraham sees Weber's nationalism as 
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a position of 'anti-pluralism'; focusing on the Freiburg address, and Weber's call for social 
unification, Abraham claims that, "Weber wanted individuals to be free to adopt the 
dominant ethnic-national identity, and if certain groups did not immediately appear to be 
disposed to such a choice, he thought they should be encouraged to make that choice by 
state policy" (Abraham 1991, 65).  Although Abraham acknowledges that Weber does 
not reduce nationalism to one specific characteristic, but instead stresses a variety of 
factors that form the nation, he still sees this nationalism as a forcefully homogenizing 
one concerned with the question of "how 'we' can shape racial characteristics, in the 
widest sense, for the future." (Abraham 1991, 48). While I believe that Abraham does a 
disservice to a general understanding of Weber’s position on nationalism, and his concern 
with a racialized reading of Weber misunderstands several of Weber’s own key points, in 
raising the question of nationalism, Abraham focuses on a very important element: the 
notion of ‘how “we” can shape racial characteristics’. The 'we' that informs Abraham's 
understanding of the national question can help us to recognize what I would like to call 
Weber's 'nationalist paradox' that I believe is essential to understanding what nationalism 
means in Weber's own work, and for distancing his notion of nationalism from both the 
aristocratic, power-political, and racial conceptions that have already been used to 
categorize Weber’s own understandings.  
To understand this ‘nationalist paradox’ we need to set nationalism as a term 
alongside Weber’s own methodology and try to work out their relationship. As a 
scientist, Weber believed that "the fundamental unit of social analysis is individual 
conduct" (Bendix 1946, 518).  Mommsen makes a similar observation when he notes that 
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Weber rejected the idea of 'collective concepts.' In the introduction to his magisterial 
Economy and Society, Weber himself writes, “for sociological purposes there is no such 
thing as a collective personality which “acts”” (Weber 1978, 14). For Mommsen, 
methodological individualism this is a further sign of Weber's 'aristocratic individualism' 
but from a purely scholastic standpoint, it alerts us to the idea that, as a social scientist, 
Weber's primary concern was always at the level of the individual.  Gunther Roth makes 
an even more bold statement about Weber's individualism when he writes that, for 
Weber, "in history, only men act, not social organisms or reified collectivities" (Roth and 
Schluchter 1979, 205).  Thus for Weber, the importance strictly falls upon the individual, 
and the acting individual as a unit of analysis and the causal agent in history.   
However, individual action, especially within the modern world, needs to be 
understood within the context of powerful institutions. Andrew Koch reminds us that, 
“Weber saw modern life as an interplay of the various types of rationality as they became 
manifest in particular institutional forms. All social life was characterized by the 
formation and adherence to institutions…defined as patterns of behavior carried out by 
human individuals” (Koch 1993, 134). So while individuals are the unit of analysis and, 
“collective concepts…were simply the concepts used to describe the patterns of 
individual behavior within a large social context” (Koch 1993, 134), we cannot 
understand human action without understanding how that action is influenced and 
moderated through the rationality of modern institutions.  Additionally, as we have noted 
above, nationalism seems to be a 'spectral presence' in his work, it might also be seen as a 
‘spectral institution’. Furthermore, nationalism, and the nation, are terms that are used to 
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describe at least a collectivizing enterprise and at most, as Abraham claims, a 
homogenizing force and idea.  So how does this institution, an essential part of what 
Shafir calls a “totalistic political doctrine” (Shafir 1985, 521), fit into Weber's 
individualistic understanding of the world?  One of the main themes this chapter will 
investigate is the extent to which Weber's 'nationalistic paradox' can be understood.  In 
other words, "how is his nationalism compatible with his reputation as an individualist?" 
(Norkus 2004, 391).  If his nationalism is as ‘realpolitic’ as Aron and Mommsen believe 
it is, it would seem that the paradox will most likely resolve itself when the concept itself 
swallows up the individuals contained within it. This ‘homogenizing force’, as Abrahams 
describes it, would seem to be overpowering when confronted with ‘acting individuals’ in 
the modern world. 
For this type of analysis to be in any way accurate, I believe that it must rely on 
what I would call the narrative of Weber as a ‘pessimistic social scientist’, insofar as his 
research leads him to the conclusion that the ‘iron cage’ of modernity is all but 
inescapable. Moreover, this pessimism, as a defining feature of his sociological and 
political economic investigations became a key element in his political claims and 
beliefs. Andrew Koch describes this pessimistic narrative of Weber’s scholarship by 
noting that, “There is no escape from the pessimism that has come to characterize 
Weber’s work given his beliefs about science and human nature. Every step forward is a 
step deeper into the abyss” (Koch 1993, 144). However, I would like to assert that this 
pessimistic understanding of Weber is misleading in its conclusions and inaccurate in 
describing the trajectory of his thought (academic and otherwise). This is not to deny a 
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certain pessimism to Weber’s thought: after all, he is largely indebted to Marx and 
Nietzsche, two of Ricoeur’s three ‘philosophers of suspicion’. So while this pessimistic 
starting point may be accurate, the course that this standard narrative charts moves along 
a trajectory that does quite a bit of violence to Weber’s own ideas, as well as his general 
intellectual and political development. In re-evaluating Weber’s position on nationalism, 
I hope to course-correct this story. 
The characterization of Weber as a 'pessimistic social scientist' of modernity 
produces the following rough narrative.  Through the course of his investigations, 
"Weber came to the conclusion that liberal modernity and its normative foundation in 
natural rights theories had become obsolete, which prompted him to seek such illiberal 
institutions as charismatic-elitist leadership, amoral realpolitic and irrational 
nationalism." (Kim 2000, 197-8). This 'irrational' nationalism can take many forms 
according to different interpretations: Andersons 'dominant ideology,' Aron and 
Mommsen's 'imperialist nationalism,' and Abraham's 'anti-pluralism' are all examples of 
this type of nationalism that Weber is supposedly to have 'fallen into' as a result of his 
despair over the 'iron cage' of modernity.  Furthermore, Weber’s understanding of 
modernity as a “condition of coercive conformity and dull passivity” (Titunik 1997, 680), 
leads him to this conception of nationalism as a means to re-invigorate a world of 
banality and lack of purposeful action and direction. Ultimately, “In no sphere of modern 
life did Weber see the emergence of a new source of rationalizing and ethical prophecy 
capable of making living meaningful and coherent again” (Shafir 1985, 527).  Because 
Weber believes that the general conditions of modernity are not able to provide this type 
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of direction and meaning, he takes recourse in the only things available: irrational 
concepts and ideas that might help individuals, “select and adopt meaningful attitudes 
toward life” (Shafir 1985, 517). Thus, the ultimate end for Weber’s disenchanted 
narrative is a recourse to the irrational and, perhaps, aesthetic. Absent any meaningful 
modern concepts that could revive meaningful human existence, Weber settles for what 
he might consider pre-modern ideas. A recourse to charisma based concepts an ideas 
seems to form his only possible ‘way out’ of this pessimistic conclusion. 
However, I would like to assert that a more careful investigation of Weber's own 
ideas about the nation, its construction, and its purpose reveal a much more complex 
picture than is commonly granted by those who frame Weber as merely a power-politics 
nationalist.  Although I will argue, at the end of this chapter, that Weber does indeed 
conceptualize ‘the nation’ as a means to perhaps re-imbue the modern world with 
meaning and purpose, he does so in a way that avoids irrationalism and overtones of pre-
modern religion and charisma. To begin with, nowhere in his theoretical discussion of 
'the nation' as a 'structure of power' does the term 'nationalism' arise.  In his discussion he 
mentions 'sentiments of prestige,' 'sentiment of solidarity,' and 'national sentiments' (the 
closest he comes to the term nationalism.  What is more astonishing is that in the works 
normally considered highly and overtly nationalistic (a claim that I would not quarrel 
with on a general level), “Between Two Laws” and “The Nation State and Economic 
Policy”, the term is also conspicuously absent.  This is not to imply that Weber is not 
concerned with nationalist issues, for he clearly is in those writings.  Norkus, following 
Palonen, writes that "Weber was rather reluctant to identify himself as a 'nationalist.'" 
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(Norkus 2004, 392).  What is more, Weber claimed that "our policy will furthermore, 
necessarily be anti-nationalistic, not antinational." (Norkus 2004, 392)  This declaration 
by Weber seems to confirm the suspicion that he neither uncritically assimilated 
dominant views on nationalism into his own work nor that he was comfortable with the 
prevailing ideas about nationalism, and German nationalism in particular.  His analysis of 
the nation and the sentiments that form national bonds (akin to nationalism) demonstrates 
a very unique mix of components that go into his understanding of the nation.  What this 
might indicate, however, is that Weber was consciously attempting to steer away from 
this term.  Where he was trying to steer his ideas toward is what we shall turn to next. 
 The most immediately recognizable element of Weber's analysis of the nation is 
his insistence on the irreducibility of the nation and national sentiments, to any one 
factor.  Weber writes that "the fervor of this emotional influence does not, in the main, 
have an economic origin.  It is based upon sentiments of prestige." (Weber 2000, 171)  
While resisting the temptation to reduce the nation to a mere superstructural 
phenomenon, Weber further complicates the reducibility of the nation in his discussion of 
national sentiment.  Weber notes that, "one must be clearly aware of the fact that 
sentiments of solidarity, very heterogeneous in both their nature and their origin, are 
comprised within national sentiments." (Weber 2000, 179) Thus, the very motivations 
that comprise national sentiment seem to be diverse even within the 'national' community.  
Weber was especially interested in moving away from a biological or race-based 
reduction of the nation.  He warns that, "We had better disregard entirely the mystic 
effects of a community of blood, in the sense in which the racial fanatics use the phrase." 
   202 
 
(Weber 2000, 177)  In this passage, it is clear that, "Weber, for one, would have none of 
the 'zoological nationalism,' as he put it, that was cultivated at some German universities, 
as well as in the Pan-German league and other societies of that kind devoted to political 
agitation." (Mommsen 1974, 33)  In addition to rejecting the biological determination of 
national identity, he rejected the idea of the nation as a linguistic community.  If national 
sentiment cannot be reduced to such a thing as biology, race, or language, does Weber 
posit any type of dominant causal factor? I would like to argue that the dominant factor 
Weber identifies not only allows us to reconfigure his understanding of the nation and 
nationalism more generally, but provides us with a very useful conception of nationalism 
in the furtherance of the construction of a public hermeneutic.  
III. Weber's Nation and National Sentiment 
In Weber’s writings, the dominant factor that emerges as quite important for the 
creation of national sentiment is the idea of collective memories.  On the issue of memory 
and national sentiment, Weber writes, "The reason for the Alsatians' not feeling 
themselves as belonging to the German nation has to be sought in their memories.  Their 
political destiny has taken its course outside the German sphere for too long; their heroes 
are the heroes of French history" (Weber 2000, 177).  Certain memories, especially 
memories of victorious battles, as well as general “memories of a common political 
destiny” (Weber 1978, 923), seem to play the most important role in Weber's definition 
and understanding of national sentiment.  In this sense Weber seems to be echoing Ernest 
Renan's conception of a nation as sharing a structured memory, rather than based in 
claims of language, blood, or religion.  Renan claims that "the essence of a nation is that 
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all the individuals share a great many things in common and also that they have forgotten 
some things." (Renan 1961, 892)  Weber's insistence on the importance of memory in 
fostering and sustaining national sentiment seems to equate the nation with what Norkus 
describes as a 'collective memory community'. However, this reliance on memories might 
lead us to a problematic conclusion. Much the same way that we theorized the purpose 
and presence of the Athenian conception of autochthony, can this be seen as a Weberian 
nostalgia making a retreat into a type of origin myth? In her discussion of Weber’s 
analysis of the historical emergence of the city, she notes that Weber’s understanding of 
the structure of the city as a political community relies upon “The myth of an origin, the 
symbolic founding” (Schwartz 1985, 548). Might the same thing be true with regard to 
Weber’s conception of the nation as a political community? Abraham believes this is 
indeed the case, and he claims that in Weber's conception of the nation, "those 
developments in history that account for the existence and character of the nation of the 
political community and its development also possess cultural significance" (Abraham 
1991, 66). Abraham’s argument here is interesting, for while he still argues that Weber’s 
nationalism should still be seen primarily in racial terms, he also sees the construction of 
the racial identity of the national community precisely within this historical link. This 
link, the continuous survival of this origin myth, serves as a type of 
historical/mythological authority that confers an identity upon current generations by 
their 'forefathers'.  Abraham here seems to be echoing a claim most famously captured by 
Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals: 
Here the conviction prevails that the race only exists by virtue of the sacrifice and 
achievements of the forefathers-and that one is obliged to repay them through sacrifice 
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and achievements: a debt is recognized, which gnaws incessantly…ultimately, the 
forefather is necessarily transfigured into a god! (Nietzsche 1996, 69-70) 
What both Nietzsche and Abraham are claiming is that a 'collective memory community' 
runs the risk of being imprisoned within the very memories that sustain it.  A type of 
historical weight that is impossible to overcome is projected into the past, and as a result 
the 'collective memory community' is authoritatively bound and delineated. 
 Although Weber does not shy away from the importance of memory in sustaining 
national sentiment, I believe that he is not attempting to use memory to tie national 
sentiment to the preservation of past political structures.  For as much as, in “The Nation 
State and Economic Polity”, Weber argues that future generations should be able 
“recognize the character of its own ancestors in us” (Weber 2002, 15), he argues that is 
cannot be our duty to impose ideals upon them. In fact, much of Weber's work can be 
seen as an invective against the return of past political forms, despite the fact that 
memories serve as a context within which identity is acknowledged and political activity 
is undertaken.  Weber notes that because history has moved on and the political and 
social reality of the world has changed a restoration of old political forms, or a holding on 
to past political arrangements could be politically disastrous.  In “The President of the 
Reich”, Weber passionately argues that the German people should "debar all members of 
the dynasties from this office [presidency] in order to prevent any restoration by means of 
a plebiscite." (Weber 2002, 305). Moreover, much of Weber's discussion of the Junker 
class in “The Nation State and Economic Policy” can be seen in the same light.  Much of 
this piece is dedicated to the issue of how the rise of capitalism will change the fate and 
face of German politics.  Weber notes that the rise in the political importance of cities as 
opposed to landed estates demonstrates that there are major demographic, cultural and 
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political shifts that result in large part from the social reorganization that modern 
capitalism produces.  Because of this reorganization of politics, the Junker class, once 
invaluable to German politics, was now reduced merely to struggling for their narrow 
economic existence as a class.  As such, Weber saw the Junker class as no longer a viable 
political form of leadership for the German state.  With changing historical structures 
comes the concomitant need to change political forms to adapt. 
 It is not just certain political forms that Weber believes become antiquated in 
history but national, or political, culture can also wane.  One of the results of the 
disenchantment of the world is the loss of the ultimate authority for 'the ultimate and 
most sublime values'.  What this means for a Weberian conception of culture is: "that 
which is historically given becomes 'culture' because we assign significance to a finite 
part of it, not because of its supposedly valid content, inherent meaningfulness, or 
ontological status." (Scaff 1989, 85). If 'culture' cannot be objectively and absolutely 
measured by some type of transcendental standard, but is only granted the status of 
culture when it is given meaning by a certain segment of 'cultural beings' endowed with 
the capacity to produce meaning in/on the world, culture becomes just as susceptible to 
the vicissitudes of history as political forms or classes.  Weber was keenly aware of this 
fluctuation of cultural ideals and norms in the movement of history when he wrote that, 
"even our highest, our most ultimate ideals in this life change and pass away.  It cannot 
be our ambition to impose them on the future." (Weber 2002, 15).  Insofar as Mommsen 
is correct in noting that Weber's thought on nationalism embraced a definition of the 
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nation as the embodiment of cultural values and traditions, we need to view the idea of 
cultural values and traditions as temporal.   
National sentiment, as Weber sees it relating to culture, is to be concerned not 
with creating the culture and identities of the next generation(s) but rather creating the 
conditions under which future generations can create their own culture.  In Weber's 
conception, the past can help produce the conditions for the realization of the present 
(culturally and politically) but it cannot assume itself as the present.  The goal of national 
culture is to allow future generations of cultural beings to produce their own meaning in 
the world.  Thus Weber is attempting to keep open-ended the very historical processes 
that both Nietzsche and Abraham saw as closing off possibility and potentiality.  This 
would seem to force Abraham to at least slightly qualify his belief that "Weber's 
nationalism is based on a version of the Kulturstaat theory that modern societies must be 
based on a common culture." (Abraham 1991, 35).  The necessity of continual re-creation 
not simply of political groups but of culture seems to mark Weber as opposed to memory 
as a nostalgic mythical understanding.  In this regard, "he, for one, would have nothing in 
common with Stefan George and his personality cult, or with Spengler's Germanic 
myths." (Mommsen 1974, 103).  The culture that Abraham sees as being homogenizing 
and problematic in Weber's account actually seems to be open up to more change than he 
might like to admit. 
 This understanding of culture as an ongoing process of creation is closely related 
to Weber's general conception of history, which involved "his insistence on keeping 'the 
future as history' open to human will and resolution." (Roth and Schluchter 1979, 201). 
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This also brings to light one final aspect of national affinity and culture inherent in 
Weber's understanding of the nation.  Although Weber was reluctant to reduce the idea of 
the nation to any singular conception, he ultimately did (at least provisionally) settle upon 
what he saw as the 'common object' behind the idea of 'the nation,' and for Weber, that 
common object is "located in the field of politics." (Weber 2000, 176)  As Kim notes, 
"national groups are first and foremost political in nature – not cultural groups and certain 
not ethnic or linguistic ones." (Kim 2004, 170). If we remember that for Weber, politics 
is about contestation than we see the true nature of the Weberian idea of culture that is 
supposed to animate the nationalist sentiment.  Scaff writes that, "[national] culture is 
preeminently a sphere of disagreement, value conflict and competing 
Weltanschauungen." (Scaff 1989, 85).  If nation is fundamentally a political concept, as 
Weber claims it is than the idea of open contestation and struggle lies at the very heart of 
the concept.  It cannot be reduced to culture, linguistics or anything else that is seen as 
outside of politics, to contestation and choice.  Culture remains a part of the nation only 
because it comes into being only through a process of production and signification. 
 All of Weber's comments concerning the relationship of the nation to culture, 
history and politics crystallize in perhaps the most explicitly consistent line of thinking 
that runs throughout his writings: that the nation, and national purpose are defined most 
explicitly, perhaps heroically, through its concern for future generations.  This, in fact, 
most precisely characterizes what Weber means when he writes of 'our responsibility 
before history'.  In Economy and Society, Weber writes, "the attachment to all this 
political prestige may fuse with a specific belief in responsibility towards succeeding 
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generations," (Weber 2000, 172) and this inter-generational responsibility is a theme that 
is only magnified in his explicitly political writings.  In The Nation State and Economic 
Policy, Weber contends "If our work is to have any meaning, it lies, and can only lie, in 
providing for the future, for our descendants." (Weber 2002, 14)  Yet as some 
commentators have noted, this is a very specific form of 'providing for the future,' one 
that has been characterized as distinctively Nietzschean.  In The Nation State and 
Economic Policy, Weber is not concerned with the 'well-being' that future generations 
will enjoy, or the 'kind of economic organization' that is handed down to them, but rather 
'what kind of people they will be'.  In a particularly telling passage, Weber writes: 
It is not given to our generation to see whether the fight we are engaged in will bear fruit, 
nor whether posterity will acknowledge us as its forefathers.  We shall not succeed in 
exorcising the curse that hangs over us (that of being the belated offspring of a great, but 
past political epoch), unless we discover how to become something different: the 
precursors of an even greater epoch. (Weber 2002, 28) 
The idea of a 'belated' generation becoming the precursors of an even greater epoch has 
strong resonances with Nietzsche's claim in The Twilight of the Idols that the most 
painful condition (contemporary humanity as he saw it) often prepares the way for new 
greatness to emerge. Regardless of how closely we would like to tie Weber’s thought 
here directly to Nietzsche, the salient point for our purposes is that while Weber is trying 
to define the nation and national sentiments through the idea of memory and history, he is 
attempting, much like I argue Machiavelli does, to understand the intra-generational 
relations contained within this memory community in a way that does not close down 
political possibility and political agency. Rather than the memory connection being one 
of indebtedness, it should encourage political activity. Nancy Schwartz notes that while 
the creation myth is central to Weber’s analysis, “Weber says the myth claims that the 
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origins were in man’s free will…if it is true that such a myth is crucial, there must be 
ways for the citizen to re-enact the founding, to make it real in his own life...participation 
by the citizen would be a way of recovenanting the original purpose of the community” 
(Schwartz 1985, 548). Now while I believe the use of the term ‘original purpose’ might 
be a bit problematic given my earlier analysis of Weber, Schwartz is pointing to an 
important component of Weber’s understanding of this memory community, whether a 
city or a nation. While this communal memory produces some type of intra-generational 
bond that establishes a sense of identity, a purposeful version of that bond is one that 
recognizes the ability of past generations to act decisively, that recognizes the ability to 
act decisively as the inheritance of the present generation, and that recognizes the ability 
to act decisively as perhaps the most important trait that must be protect for future 
generations. 
 Now that we have drawn out the major premises and ideas that inform Weber's 
own highly nuanced and complicated understanding of the nation, we must look at how 
this conception of the nation is meant to fit into Weber's overall description of modernity.  
This will involve not only bringing back the concepts related to the idea of the nation and 
national sentiment but also how this idea helps to inform more precisely Weber's 
important notions of responsibility, conviction and freedom. I believe that it is in this 
discussion that we can fully fuse Weber’s idea of the nation with Machiavelli’s 
conception of the political community as an historical phenomenon, as well as the larger 
project of conceiving of a ‘public hermeneutic’. 
IV. The Role of the Nation in Modernity 
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Mostly importantly, for our discussion, is the way in which Weber sets his 
(fragmented) analysis of ‘the nation’ within the broader context of the politics and society 
of modernity. While, as discussed above, Weber’s analysis of the nation is fragmentary in 
nature, it is impossible to fully engage with these ideas separate from the political 
background that Weber sets them in front of. This is important because it moves us away 
from Machiavelli’s interesting, yet somewhat unhelpful idea of ‘decay’, and toward a 
more engaged discussion of the specific dynamics at play. Instead of using such a broad 
and imprecise term, Weber directs our attention to specific elements within modern 
politics that, to return to Machiavelli’s language for a moment, might be the cause of the 
‘decay’ that Machiavelli and Weber both seem concerned with. Both writers see the need 
for decisive principled action as an antidote to a certain weakening of politics within the 
community (city, state, etc…), but Weber’s analysis offers us a very clear description of 
the causes of this decay, as well as a way in which he believes that politics can be 
reinvigorated through the concept of the nation. In order to clarify this, it would be 
beneficial to see exactly what, for Weber, defines this political ‘decay’ and to see how 
that decay as the direct result of specific forces and structures in the modern world. Once 
we can understand how these structures work to limit and devalue political action, we can 
see how Weber’s idea of ‘national sentiment’ and the historical/memorial way in which 
Weber frames this sentiment can act as some type of remedy to this situation. 
In “The Nation State and Economic Policy”, Weber makes note of a nadir that he 
sees in German political development.  He writes, "after the struggle for the nation's unity 
had been won, and its political 'situation' was an established fact, a peculiarly 
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'unhistorical' and unpolitical spirit seized the rising generation of the German 
bourgeoisie, drunk as it was with success and thirsty for peace.  German history appeared 
to be over." (Weber 2002, 24)  This unhistorical/unpolitical political crisis manifested 
itself, for Weber, in the lack of true political leadership that characterized Germany near 
the turn of the century.  Instead, what Weber saw as the likely future of German politics 
was, “the triumph of the iron cage of bureaucracy, the growing dominance of the party 
machine in the age of mass democracies, the decline of innovative leadership within the 
iron law of oligarchy” (Turner 1993, 158), and increasing political and social stagnation. 
The Junker class which, as previously mentioned, once formed the political core of 
Prussia had devolved into a type of anachronism, fighting politically for its narrow 
economic interests.  However, surveying Germany, Weber saw no alternative party or 
group capable and ready of taking over for the declining Junker class.  In addition, the 
dour political situation ran much deeper than simply a crisis of leadership, for it 
"necessarily accompanied a crisis in citizenship.  It also had to be understood as a product 
of a system of relationships rather than as a temporary, incidental feature of the political 
landscape." (Scaff 1973, 133) Weber saw, at the heart of this issue exactly that: a 
manifest lack of articulated and committed citizenship.  This lack was due primarily to 
the three inescapable conditions of the modern world: capitalism, bureaucracy and the 
disenchantment of worldviews.  Taking Weber's conception of the nation as it has been 
explicated, we can now begin to see how the nation as a concept serves as a means to 
invigorate and substantiate German citizenship, serves as a (partial) antidote to great 
forces of modernity that Weber saw as having such a negative impact upon German 
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society, and ultimately, serves a means to preserve an amount of personal and political 
freedom in the modern world. 
The issue of freedom in this analysis is an important one and worth elaborating on 
for the purposes of our argument. As mentioned above, Weber is often concerned with 
the question of exactly how freedom can be maintained in a modern world that is 
increasingly defined by the massive social and political structures that we see gaining in 
power and importance. Given this reality, how can spaces, or practices of freedom be 
carved out and maintained?   I believe that, even though the language used by Weber 
departs from that of Machiavelli, they are close to sharing a common concern here. We 
saw in chapter three that Machiavelli seems to be interested in strong principled action 
that is the result of a (individual or collective) virtù. In his understanding of freedom, I 
believe that Weber is also looking for a means to encourage and develop such a type of 
principled political action. Regarding Weber’s understanding of freedom, Kari Palonen 
writes, “the personal freedom of life conduct demands an exercise of freedom in a more 
or less open horizon of action” (Palonen 1999, 528), and it is this ‘open horizon of action’ 
that is essential. Weber’s understanding of freedom or free action is one that is not 
directly related to the ends of an activity, or the direct goals of action, but rather, is seen 
as, “a condition of the openness of action” (Palonen 1999, 536), and one where the 
‘situation of acting’ is the most essential part. Ultimately for Weber, a world in which 
political freedom exists, is one in which the conditions are such that individuals are able 
to choose and commit to a plan of action in as unconstrained a manner as possible. Now 
while Machiavelli sees virtù based action as increasingly difficult within a community 
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beset by decay, Weber wants to present us with a modern world in which the conditions 
of life and politics work to reduce the possibilities of freedom.  
The rise of the modern state, and politics within the modern state, in the West is 
connected with emergence and continual refinement of both capitalism and bureaucracy, 
and "the modern state is characterized by impersonality." (Scaff 1989, 167).  The 
bureaucratically organized and run state is one in which "community action [is carried] 
over into rationally ordered 'societal action'…societal action which is methodically 
ordered and led." (Weber 2000, 228).  It is characterized by 'precise obedience within 
habitual activity'.  In addition, both the emergence of the modern capitalist market and 
the bureaucratic state are interested in "a discharge of business according to calculable 
rules and without regard for persons." (Weber 2000, 215).  For Weber, the bureaucratic 
state means a displacement of politics.  This displacement takes the shape of a conflict 
between "the formal rationality of bureaucracy and the substantive rationality of politics." 
(Warren 1988, 34).  Wolfgang Schluchter notes that when bureaucratic politics takes 
over, vigorous political discourse is slowly but seemingly irretrievably abandoned, with 
the result being that politics is subsumed within an impersonal bureaucracy so that 
nobody takes responsibility for political decisions, or as Lawrence Scaff writes, 
“administrative action is condemned to a kind of alienation and unaccountability, to a 
separation between humans and their means of action that Hannah Arendt once 
appropriately called “rule by nobody”” (Scaff 1989, 168).  The rise of a politics 
constrained by these massive structures is, for Weber, a condition wherein we see the 
“bureaucratic usurpation of political decisions” (Scaff 1989, 156), and a dwindling of the 
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possibilities for principled political action. If freedom is seen as a condition for the 
openness of action, it would seem that, within an increasingly bureaucratic state, those 
possibilities are fewer and further between. 
Alongside the rise of state bureaucracy, we see the further development of 
capitalism as a structure that dominates the modern world, and for Weber, capitalism, just 
like bureaucracy, produces a diminution of political action. As Brian Turner writes, for 
Weber, “the administrative routinization, specialization of tasks, and calculation of 
behavior required by advanced capitalism were seen to be incompatible with freedom and 
democracy” (Turner 1993, 187). The way in which capitalism successfully uses the same 
tools and techniques as bureaucracy, further delimits the sphere of free action. In addition 
to the furthering of the bureaucratic structure and rationality, there is another important 
way in which capitalism also decreases the capacity for principled action: by producing 
within the individual a very narrow set of interests and pursuits.  As with the example of 
the Junker class in Germany, capitalist undertakings force one to narrow the sphere of 
interests and actions, away from larger concerns and toward the immediate and unending 
rational action that capitalism necessitates.  This same narrowing of focus is also 
attributed to the leveling democracy, which Weber sees as an accompaniment to the 
bureaucratic state.  Kim notes that for Weber, "the danger of democracy, as Tocqueville 
insists tirelessly, lies in the fact that each individual may be exclusively pre-occupied 
with his or her own interests and that citizens may no longer aspire to any public ideal." 
(Kim 2004, 149).  Rather than pursuing any type of ‘public ideal’, Given the impersonal 
nature of these modern structures, and the thoroughly routinized action which they create 
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and demand, "Weber's criticism seems to be predicated on the recognition that all of these 
organizations fail to cultivate the idealized citizen he calls a 'personality,' who is capable 
of principled and even defiant moral actions with a passionate conviction and a sense of 
responsibility." (Kim 2004, 153). This failure to create a ‘personality’ is important in this 
regard, for it allows us to see exactly how Weber believes these structures reduce the 
sphere of free political action.  
It is not enough to see these structures as outwardly dominating individuals’ 
ability to act, or perhaps to see their size so dwarfing the individual that we are compelled 
to see our potential actions as having no effect on the outcome of any decisions. While 
those elements are important, a focus on the personality reorients us to a type of internal, 
or psychological effect that these structures have on the individuals who are confronted 
by them. As Andrew Koch writes, “Weber saw modern life as an interplay of the various 
types of rationality as they became manifest in particular institutional 
forms….institutions were, for Weber, defined as patterns of behavior carried out by 
human individuals” (Koch 1993, 134). Simply put, Weber sees existence within these 
structures as having a profound impact on who are, and how we see ourselves, internally, 
and the behavior that we then manifest outwardly. Weber sees this change in the basic 
structure of our personality, as one of the largest impediments to principled action in the 
modern world. In making this claim, we can again see Weber’s debt to Nietzsche, 
specifically the second essay from On the Genealogy of Morals. In that essay, Nietzsche 
describes what he sees as the process by which ‘the oldest state’ uses forms of violence 
(both physical and psychological) to ensure that “this raw material of people and semi-
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animals was at last not only thoroughly kneaded and pliant but also formed” (Nietzsche 
1996, 86). For Nietzsche, the formation of the modern subject is identical to the 
construction of a ‘bad conscience’ and with the growth of this ‘bad conscience’ we see, 
“this instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed, incarcerated with and finally able to 
discharge and vent itself only on itself” (Nietzsche 1996, 87). Thus, Nietzsche focuses on 
the ways in which the psychology of the subject is formed through a life lived in modern 
conditions. Though Weber avoids focusing extensively on the idea of ‘violence’ and 
describing this process as one in which, “the oldest ‘state’ thus appeared as a fearful 
tyranny” (Nietzsche 1996, 86), his analysis is right in line with the idea of the modern 
world as “an oppressive and remorseless machine” (Nietzsche 1996, 86), and for Weber, 
as for Nietzsche, what is important is to see how that ‘remorseless machine’ impacts the 
psychology and personality of the modern subject.  
We can see this Nietzschean concern emerge quite clearly at the end of The 
Protestant Ethic, when Weber analyzes the end result of the ‘puritan calling’ as it has 
found its way into the modern world, and most importantly, helped to create the modern 
subject. Weber writes,  
The puritans wanted to be men of the calling-we, on the other hand, must be. For when 
asceticism moved out of the monastic cells and into working live, and began to dominate 
innerworldly morality, it helped to build that might cosmos of the modern economic 
order (which is bound to the technical and economic conditions of mechanical and 
machine production). Today this mighty cosmos determines, with overwhelming 
coercion, the style of life not only of those directly involved in business but of every 
individual who is born into this mechanism, and may well continue to do so until the day 
that the last ton of fossil fuel has been consumed. (Weber 2002, 86-87) 
In this analysis, Weber is illustrating how a certain psychological state (the ‘calling’) 
produced a vast economic order (the mighty cosmos of capitalist economic production), 
and that order, in turn coerces a certain universal psychology or personality (the style of 
   217 
 
live of every individual born into that mighty cosmos). Thus, while Weber is in many 
ways concerned with the technical issues of the modern world (legitimacy, rationality, 
bureaucracy), he is also interested in how those technical issues and the structures that 
utilize them, create a type of psychological personality, and how “the development of an 
ethical ‘style of life’ that was ‘spiritually adequate’ for the formation of modern 
capitalism” was able to achieve “a remarkable and enduring ‘victory in the souls’ of 
human beings” (Scaff 1989, 89). It is these results, and these ‘psychological victories’ of 
the institutions of modern life that interest Weber as much as anything else.  
In describing this social-psychological aspect to Weber’s work, Andrew Koch 
writes, “as individuals adjust themselves to the requirements of external, formal, 
structures, and become dependent on those structures for their new identity, there is only 
one political outcome that is possible. The adherence to an internal set of norms and 
substantive values is replaced by the substantive requirements of the external culture” 
(Koch 1993, 142). In this regard, Koch could easily be describing the cultural analysis 
from the end of The Protestant Ethic discussed above. Additionally, for Weber, the 
construction of the personality of the modern subject adds to the limiting of the 
possibility of principled political action, as “’order,’ ‘control,’ ‘duty’ and ‘discipline’ 
replace the more ‘sublime values’ that are not in retreat before the march of rationalism 
in modern culture” (Koch 1993, 142). Thus, it is not just an institutional requirement of 
capitalism or bureaucracy that narrows our political commitments, in Weber’s estimation, 
it is the fact that these institutional requirements produce in the modern subject a certain 
psychological dependency on those requirements, which creates a narrowing of our 
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psychological and political fields of vision. As our psychology and our modern 
personalities and ‘styles of life’ become attuned to, and internalize, the needs and 
requirements of the modern world, those rationalities dominate not just external 
requirements, but internal logic and understandings. 
 To further complicate the social-psychological component to Weber’s diagnosis 
of the modern world we must add perhaps his most trenchant commentary on the 
conditions of the modern world. In addition to these social and political structures we 
have already discussed, Weber added one more component that he saw as a hindrance to 
conditions of freedom and the possibility of principled political action: the 
‘disenchantment’ of the world, and the disenchantment of modern worldviews. As Weber 
saw it, the disenchantment of the world brought with it the retreat of the 'ultimate and 
most sublime values' and a subsequent recognition that moral or ethical positions had no 
objective grounds from which they could, in the last analysis, be completely justified.  In 
addition, the disenchanted world found itself in an inescapable historical continuum.  
Weber notes that due a recognition of this continuum as part of the modern world, "the 
individual life of civilized man, placed into an infinite 'progress,' according to its own 
imminent meaning should never come to an end, for there is always a further step ahead 
of one who stands in the march of progress.  And no man who comes to dies stands upon 
the peak which lies in infinity." (Weber 2000, 139-140)  This unceasing progress 
eliminates the 'finality' of life, or at least a notion of a finality with meaning and as such, 
'man' cannot be 'satiated with life' that is always being surpassed by history and progress.   
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So, for Weber, it is not only the psychological dependency upon modern rational-
institutions, but also the seeming ‘infinity’ of the world bears down oppressively upon the 
finitude of the individual.  This leads us back to the questions we posed earlier: given this 
situation of existence in the modern world, how can one be made aware of the possibility 
of principled action in the world? For Weber, I believe that the answer lies in the new 
political vantage point that is offered by nationalism and the inter-generational 
commitment that it entails.  The commitment to future generations is the phenomenon 
that, according to Weber, "stirs us as we think beyond the grave of our own generation." 
(Weber 2002, 15). Additionally, the understanding that the nation is a community of 
memory, and thus transcends the present in two distinct directions (both the past and the 
future) offers an enlarged understanding of the place of the individual within the nation, 
as well as an enlarged understanding of the role of political action in the present.  
Typically Weber is seen as offering one of two choices: accept the fundamental 
lack of meaning offered by the 'progress' of modernity or retreat to religion which 
provides meaning but denies the nature of modernity as endless progress and subjectivity.  
In fact, some note that the only time Weber is seen as offering a meaningful component 
to life is "in war, when the individual can believe that he knows he is dying for 
something." (Weber 2000, 335).  It could be argued, however, that the nationalist 
commitment to future generations provides a distinct alternative.  Inter-generational 
commitment is a means by which an individual can recognize the historical continuum, 
accept it as a fact of the modern world and yet still find meaning in it, rather than simply 
despair over the lack of holistic finitude that the individual faces.   By envisioning 
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himself as the 'precursor to an even greater epoch,' nationalist sentiment allows the 
Weberian citizen to find conviction and meaning in one's life, or, as Weber notes in his 
discussion of dying in wartime, the belief that you are dying for something.  This is not to 
make the utopian claim that Weber's nationalism somehow displaced or could make 
unnecessary war in the modern world.  Weber would never have made that claim, but the 
issue here is that these feelings of national prestige, and the nationalistic commitment to 
other generations, when cultivated, allow the idea of conviction and principle to exist 
outside of those moments of war that provide the archetypal blueprint for such 
conviction. This action becomes possible because Weber believes this way of 
understanding the nation, and the individuals’ position within it, cultivates a greater 
understanding of one’s responsibility as a political actor, and that actor is able to use that 
new understanding as a motivation for the type of action that Weber is searching for. 
For Weber, responsibility in the modern world is a means by which the narrow 
sphere of interest and action that is conditioned by bureaucracy, a leveling democracy 
and capitalism is enlarged, and a new engaged political vision can emerge. It proves to be 
something of an antidote to the psychological dependency the modern subject exhibits 
with regard to the rationalities of modern institutions such as capitalism and bureaucracy. 
Scaff notes that "responsibility from its earliest appearances in Weber's language of 
action was meaningful not merely for the person, but for the future, in relation to 
subsequent generations." (Scaff 1989, 183).  The recognition of those whom the actor 
was responsible for in her/his actions immediately provides the actor with a context 
within which to think about actions and the responsibility for them.  For principled action 
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to be a realistic option, "some kind of belief must always be present," (Weber 2002, 355) 
and I would argue that in the ethic of inter-generational responsibility, you can see belief 
readily present itself.  It is an ethic that is removed from the religious and other world 
views that, in Weber’s reading, have been forced from public life, but it is an ethic that 
reinforces itself and expands its sphere of commitment, thanks to its expanded 
understanding of identity and belonging.  However, this form of inter-generational 
responsibility also tempers the ethic of absolute conviction that Weber sees as being 
dangerous to political action if unchecked. 
For Weber, "an ethic of conviction…is predicated on an absolute belief in the 
innate goodness of a certain action that transcends time and space and that, by virtue of 
its goodness, can even remove the burden of responsibility for its consequences." Weber 
famously, does not want to completely distance himself from the ethic of conviction, “the 
ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility are not absolute opposite. They are 
complementary to one another, and only in combination do they produce the true human 
being who is capable of having a ‘vocation for politics’” (Weber 2002, 368). And while 
Weber’s two famous ‘ethics’ must complement each other, it is important to note how his 
understanding of ‘nationalist sentiment’ can be seen as a means of invoking principled 
action that avoids the absolute certainties of the ethic of conviction, most notably the fact 
that “responsibility for the consequences is lacking” in a pure ethic of conviction. In 
order to see how this is possible, we need to return briefly to the narrative of Weber as 
the pessimistic social scientist. 
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 For some thinkers who subscribe to this narrative, Weber’s despair over the 
direction of modernity: the loss of meaning, the loss of action, and the prospects of the 
iron cage, lead him to embrace a conception of politics that borders on the irrational. 
Gershon Shafir notes that as a result of Weber’s diagnosis of the modern world, 
“charismatic leaders, capable of combining intellectual and mass needs, and of creating a 
new merit directed to a new destiny, seem again to be called upon in the modern world” 
(Shafir 1985, 522). Additionally, “Weber…reserved the role of the innovator to the 
charismatic leader. Though both the intellectual and charismatic individual share the 
endeavor to seek out a meaningful life, the latter is also distinguished by a sense of 
personal mission, which drives him to put his vision in effect” (Shafir 1985, 518). Given 
the way in which “Charisma has a central role in Weber’s conception of social change” 
(Koch 1993, 140) it might seem as though Weber has an interest in a certain political re-
enchantment through the emergence of charismatic leaders, in order to combat the patient 
‘hard business’ of politics in the modern world. The outcome of this is that “Weber is, so 
to speak, able to prop up the state by an appeal to certain irrational political instincts in 
the masses towards the nation state” (Turner 1993, 197). Only in this way, by appealing 
to the irrational, or holding out hope for the charismatic politician to emerge, can we be 
saved from the icy night of bureaucratic politics. Again quoting Turner, “[Weber’s] 
theory of political organization required the intervention of charismatic authority in order 
to avoid the dangers of political stagnation” (Turner 1993, 158). It would seem that, 
given his despair over the world of modern politics, a return to charismatic leadership 
would be perhaps a most important element. 
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But if charisma was so important to Weber, and if his politics really did rely on a 
certain irrationalism, or at least a marked preference for the charismatic as opposed to the 
intellectual leader, how are we to square this with his seeming repulsion at those modern 
political movements that Weber saw as wholeheartedly embracing that very thing. In 
“The Profession and Vocation of Politics”, Weber claims that “although politics is 
something done with the head, it is certainly not something done with the head alone” 
(Weber 2002, 367), and while this may lend some credibility to the idea of charismatic 
leadership, it is important to note that Weber is not discounting a rational element to 
politics. Clearly this is not a retreat into the irrational, but is simply reminding us that 
Weber’s politics does require a certain amount of belief (tempered as it may be by 
rationality and intellectual leadership). Additionally, Weber’s condemnation, in Science 
as a Vocation, of those who, despairing the condition of the modern world, run back into 
open arms (and doors) or the church as a way to avoid the conditions of the modern 
world, indicates that those movements that are not willing to honestly confront those 
conditions, but rather retreat into the irrational or the pre-modern, are dangerous 
alternatives. What Weber is looking for is “a conception of responsibility or 
accountability as a vocational ethos” (Scaff 1989, 183) that attempts to open up an 
enlarged space for political activity, but does so through a direct confrontation with the 
conditions of the modern world. 
It is true that Weber’s attachment to the ethic of conviction is an important one, 
because it touches on a fundamental issue that Weber wants to hold onto in the modern 
world: a conception of more robust political possibility, or an enlarged sphere of political 
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action. Weber notes the importance of this enlarged vision when he writes, “it is of 
course entire correct…that what is possible would never have been achieved if, in this 
world, people had not repeatedly reached for the impossible” (Weber 2000, 369), and 
Lawrence Scaff sees this desire to reach for ‘the impossible’ as a feature of the ethic of 
conviction. However, Weber requires a political stance that simultaneously includes 
striving for the impossible, with a tempering of the ethic of convictions’ understanding of 
goals that transcend time and space.  
Weber's nationalism is predicated upon a certain open-ended political 
development. As he writes: 
When, as a politician, he is moved by the political fate of his people…he will think in 
terms of the next two to three generations, even where the creation of new political 
formations is concerned, since these are the people who will decide what is to become of 
his nation. If he proceeds differently, he is no politician but one of the litterateurs. In this 
case, let him concern himself with the eternal truths and stick to his books, but he should 
not step into the arena where the problems of the present are contested (Weber 2002, 270-
71) 
Given that Weber’s conception of politics seems to roundly reject ‘eternal truths’ or 
unchanging political formations, he also cannot fully embrace an ethic of any kind that 
transcends time and space as Weber understands the virtues and cultures connected that 
to nationalism are fundamentally a) conditioned by time (generation to generation) and b) 
cannot be known in advance because the acting subject will not have the same subjective 
standpoint as will future generations, from which they will judge culture, goodness, and 
the like.  This subjectivist impossibility of knowing the culture and political world of the 
generations the actor is beholden to forces the actor to recognize a 'pathos of distance' 
between herself/himself and others, tempering the conviction which is animating the 
political action. Therefore, while expanding political horizons, allowing for the ethic of 
responsibility to emerge, and providing, with the modern progress of history a conviction 
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that one's life has a worthwhile meaning, Weber's nationalism sets limits on the extent to 
which an immediate, subjective conception of that conviction can judge political action; 
as Weber writes, "three qualities are pre-eminently decisive for a politician: passion, a 
sense of responsibility, judgment." (Weber 2002, 352).  Weber's nationalism can be seen 
as being a significant factor in providing a space for the cultivation of all three of these 
qualities in the modern world. This dual sense of conviction and responsibility, the two 
ethics that must be combined in whomever discovers a 'vocation' for politics can be seen 
as coalescing around Weber's idea of, and commitments inherent to, national sentiments 
that Weber theorizes. 
 The disenchantment of the world brought about a paradoxical situation for 
modern politics and modern life.  At the same time that politics can be seen as the type of 
activity through which one can cultivate a manifestation of responsibility, the lack of 
completely objective values makes politics a more demanding test of responsibility than 
ever before.  In the face of that anguishing paradox as well as the giant structures of 
power that emerged, Weber attempted to find something that could serve as a guide for 
meaningful political activity.  Kari Palonen notes that Weber "does not, however, oppose 
individual freedom to political action but maintains a close connection between them." 
(Palonen 1999, 523).  If this is so, than are we to locate our freedom within the nation? I 
believe that this is very much the case, for Weber. And it is precisely the historical nature 
in which he theorized the nation, and the historical conception of responsibility that 
emerges from within it, that allows him to make that claim. 
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Max Weber saw the nation and national sentiment as counterbalances to the 
powers of bureaucracy, capitalism, and the narrow views of life they offered in a 
thoroughly disenchanted world.  With this in mind we can see what Weber meant when 
he wrote about "the specific function of the leading economic and political strata to be the 
bearers of the nation's sense of political purpose.  In fact, this is the only political 
justification for their existence." (Weber 2002, 21).  Weber noted that in 'great moments' 
(such as times of war) the national purpose became more tangible to the entire 
population, but it subsided during 'normal times'.  Weber's national political education 
used "the nationalist sentiments as an alternative way of imbuing secularized modern 
society with a sense of collective purpose that would contribute to the formation of 
autonomous personalities."  The purpose of a political economist is only political if the 
work being done fosters an opening of the spheres of responsibility and possibilities for 
principled action.  This is one of the reasons why Weber was so critical of the Junkers.  
Rather than espousing "national-public spiritedness and somber realism, [they] embraced 
a misguided glorification of vain power politics, as reflected in the popular longing for a 
new Bismarck and mass support for overseas expansion." (Kim 2004, 147).   Moreover, 
economic analysis of the Junkers can help explain why they are attempting to pursue such 
a policy, and thus, to demonstrate how it either forwards or diminishes the interests of the 
nation as a whole. 
 This is not to deny Weber's position as a political realist; he held no illusions 
about war and instability in the world as a condition of modern politics but his realism, 
and his nationalism was not an ultimate value, as Aron contends.  Here again, this sets 
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him apart from other German nationalist thought that conceived of a pure power politics.  
For Weber, "the popular nationalism of the day did not represent an acceptable 
stance…suffering from an arrogant blindness, it disclosed unrivaled irresponsibility and 
destructive potential…the achievements of the mere power politician were externally 
meaningless and inwardly weak and empty." (Scaff 1989, 182). In fact, it is because 
power and politics are so intertwined that pure power politics is excessively dangerous if 
it is not tempered by responsibility and a sense of duty.  Power politics as such is 
indistinct from a bureaucratic politics that lacks a strong value commitment, notably a 
strong value commitment to individual human beings. For Weber, it is this sense of 
responsibility and commitment that emerges when we begin to see this historical 
conception of a national sentiment become an animating factor in modern politics. Pure 
‘power politics’ is tempered by this enlarged commitment but irrational nationalisms are 
also avoided because Weber’s nationalism is not a sentiment that arises out of a retreat 
from the disenchanted conditions of the modern world, but acknowledges them and still 
works to find the kind of purposeful commitment that Weber sees as the hallmark of the 
‘ethic of conviction’. Moreover, this nationalism, because it is not predicated on the 
existence of some type of trans-historical values or goals, avoids complete identification 
with an ethic of conviction: it cannot see itself as absolute in any sense, but must, by its 
very nature, leave itself open to further action, contingency, or value-judgments. 
V. Conclusion 
I believe that understanding of ‘national sentiment’ is helpful in three important 
respects. First, by situating his discussion of ‘national sentiment’ in the context of 
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modern politics, Weber gives us a very clear framework for analyzing how political 
action in the present can be constrained and how strong political commitments can be 
weakened. While both Machiavelli and Weber can be seen as proponents of ‘principled 
political action’ as being necessary for the survival of the political community, both 
thinkers force us to ask the question why we should pay such attention. For Machiavelli, 
the answer is helpful, but ultimately, not as helpful as we might like. His various 
discussions of the inevitability of political ‘decay’ and ‘corruption’ seem prescient, but 
there is not much to explain what this corruption is and how it functions within society. 
Aside from some analysis of the changing nature of religious rites and practices, 
Machiavelli is largely silent on this issue. Because of his silence, it is quite easy to see 
him as simply a theorist who places a higher value on the qualities, people, and practices 
of the past and denigrates the present. In the last chapter I showed how this reading was 
incorrect in several important ways, but because Machiavelli fails to offer a clear 
discussion of the cause of this decay, other than it being related to the political 
community being part of an historical continuum, this reading is easy to understand. 
Under the spell of this reading, we might see Machiavelli as arguing for a simple return 
to ‘the past’ as the antidote to the decayed conditions of the present. 
Weber’s analysis helps us clarify this tension between the past and the present. 
Given Weber’s analysis of the present it is clear that a simple return to the past would be 
as unwise as any other imaginable possibility. In this regard, let us again remember 
Weber’s criticism of the Junker class in Germany. Because political, social, and 
economic conditions have changed, a simple return to the politics of the past is not just 
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unadvisable, but would be ruinous to the political community. Weber is not despairing of 
the politics of the present in order to argue for a return to the past; political renewal must 
engage directly with the condition of politics that the present makes possible: capitalism, 
bureaucracy, disenchantment. While Weber’s nationalist sentiment allows us to 
acknowledge, like Machiavelli does, that the political community is an historical 
community political activity must be more than an exercise in political nostalgia.  
Secondly, Weber’s idea of the nation as a concept allows us to avoid the earlier 
issue I raised with Machiavelli regarding how this political renewal is supposed to unfold. 
I argued that within Machiavelli there seems to be a tension between an aristocratic 
reading of political renewal and a more democratic one. I believe that by placing subjects 
within the nation, or by seeing ‘national sentiment’ as something to which one has access 
simply by virtue of being part of that historical collectivity, Weber allows us to, 
somewhat fruitfully, sidestep this controversy. Although some commentators see a strain 
of Nietzschean aristocratic sensibility within Weber’s work, there is nothing within this 
understanding of national sentiment that supports such a reading. I am not making the 
claim that Weber himself is offering us a strong democratic project, that is not his goal or 
aim (but will be our aim in the next chapter), but he does allow for a politics that moves 
somewhat confidently in that direction. To understand this, we need to remember how 
‘national sentiment’ can be seen as a counterforce to the limiting conditions of modernity 
that Weber was so concerned with. By focusing on how those conditions act upon the 
passions, motivations, and psychologies of all modern subjects, Weber is giving us a 
clear picture of how he believes this modern lack of political commitment is a common 
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condition within modernity. Thus, national sentiment seems to be consistent with 
Weber’s commitment as a methodological individualist. When Weber asks how 
individual freedom is still possible in the modern world, I answer that by understanding 
yourself as part of a nation, as the inheritor of this ‘national sentiment’, individual 
freedom can be preserved. 
The last important aspect of Weber’s idea of national sentiment gives us a bit 
more clarity with regard to just how individual freedom can be preserved under the 
conditions of modern life: through the concept of political responsibility. In this chapter, I 
argue that against the forces of the modern world that work to shrink and limit the scope 
of responsibility, Weber’s idea of national sentiment offers a possible means through 
which responsibility can be expanded and heightened. By situating oneself within the 
continuum of past-present-future, the citizen is able to better comprehend an enlarged 
conception of the political community itself. Paul Ricoeur writes that, “a political body 
exists not only in the present but in the past and in the future, and its function is to 
connect past, present, and future. In a political community several generations exist at the 
same time; the political choice is always an arbitration between the claims of these 
different generations” (Ricoeur 1986, 210). In this sense, it is telling that Ricoeur is 
contrasting the political community, and political commitments, with mere technical 
commitments, which he defines as occurring “only in the present and only according to 
the present system of tools” (Ricoeur 1986, 210). The historical nature of the nation, 
captured by Weber in his idea of a nationalist sentiment as not only a collection of 
memories, but a means by which individual citizens can see themselves as 
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simultaneously the inheritor of memories as well as being a part of the memories that will 
be inherited in the future, offers this enlarged conception of the political community, 
which can allow for an enhanced idea of political responsibility to emerge. Seen as a part 
of this national sentiment, individual responsibility can escape, with much greater ease, 
the technical, limited, and narrowly circumscribed responsibilities of a technological, 
bureaucratic, capitalistic, and disenchanted modernity.  
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Chapter Six 
 
The past of every society always contains aspirations, hopes, and promises that 
have not been fulfilled. 
- Bernard Dauenhauer,  
    Paul Ricoeur: The Promise and Risk of 
Politics 
I: Introduction 
 If, as I argued in Chapter four, Niccolò Machiavelli gives us a vision of a political 
community as an historical phenomenon, thanks to his concern with the ideas of decay, 
corruption, and rebirth, Max Weber places that understanding squarely within the late-
modern world and clarifies its importance regarding issues of citizenship and political 
action. Through the concept of ‘the nation’, I argue that Weber attempted to bring this 
historical conception of politics to the fore. My claim was that, despite his reputation as a 
(pessimistic) theorist of disenchantment Weber was actively looking for something that 
would encourage principled political action without needing to retreat into theories of 
mysticism or irrationality. Weber was searching for concepts that would face the 
conditions of late-modern politics, and still offer the possibility of individual freedom. 
 Weber was only able to put forward that concept of ‘the nation’, because he 
distinguished his understanding of ‘the nation’ from the ethic German nationalisms that 
were so prevalent, by putting forward an idea of ‘the nation’ as a community of memory. 
In his speech, “The Nation State and Economic Policy”, he highlights what he takes to be 
the essential historical consciousness that political actors must take. Weber outlines a 
complicated dynamic that envelops us within something like a common culture or 
tradition, while acknowledging a sense of political openness that is just as important. 
Weber writes, “Even our highest, our ultimate ideals in this life change and pass away. It 
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cannot be our ambition to impose them on the future. But we can want the future to 
recognize the character of its own ancestors in us.” (Weber 2002, 15). A politics that 
‘imposes’ itself on the future is one that does not allow for the future well-being of that 
cultural community. Thus, for Weber, the national community is made up of ‘inheritors’ 
insofar as they exist within a context of law, politics, and economics in which they find 
and understand themselves; a context that predates them and into which they become 
actors. However, Weber insists that those actors be able to work to create new political 
ideals to replace those that, through the course of time, have ‘passed away’.  
Paul Ricoeur writes, “But tradition…remains a dead tradition if it is not the 
continual interpretation of this deposit: our “heritage” is not a sealed package we pass 
from hand to hand, without ever opening…Every tradition lives by grace of 
interpretation” (Ricoeur 2007, 27). Just as Ricoeur believes that tradition without 
interpretation is ‘dead tradition’, Weber is worried that a political system that is inherited 
without being made, is equally as problematic and, echoing Machiavelli’s concerns, can 
very easily lead to political and cultural decay. In light of this, we can make sense of 
Weber’s assertion that, “It is dangerous, and in the long term incompatible with the 
interests of the nation, for an economically declining class to exercise political rule” 
(Weber 2002, 21). For Weber, I would argue, it is not just that an ‘economically 
declining’ class is dangerous simply because of their economic position. For Weber, they 
are dangerous because they carry with them an entire set of political ideals and goals that, 
over time, grow more incongruous with the changing needs and ideals of modern life. 
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 There is another reason why I believe Weber insists on this complex dynamic to 
the historical nature of community, which has to do with the idea of an enlarged sense of 
political responsibility. As much as Weber is worried about an economically declining 
class exerting power, he warns that, “it is more dangerous still when classes which are 
moving towards economic power, and therefore expect to take over political rule, do not 
yet have the political maturity to assume the direction of the state” (Weber 2002, 21). 
Here again, I believe it is fruitful to bring the analysis back to this historical nature of the 
political community. The historical outlook that Weber is arguing for in “The Nation 
State and Economic Policy” is one that he believes, “stirs us as we think beyond the 
grave of our own generation” (Weber 2002, 15), and this outlook is one that imbues the 
work of politics with importance and gravity. In situating this historical outlook firmly at 
the basis of modern politics, Weber argues that, “If our work is to have any meaning, it 
lies, and can only lie, in providing for the future, for our descendants” (Weber 2002, 14). 
But of course, for Weber this notion of ‘providing for the future’ must be tempered by his 
conception of the political community as existing with history: we must ‘provide’ for 
future generations without ‘imposing’ on them. We must strive for our own ideals, while 
simultaneously recognizing their impermanence. 
 While it would be a horrible oversimplification to reduce Weber’s conception of 
political maturity50 to this historical understanding of the political community, I believe it 
provides an essential component. Acknowledging the political community as an historical 
community, and forwarding a conception of politics that embraces this dynamic is a way 
for his ethics, the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction, to come together in a 
                                                 
50 Which is well outside the bounds of this dissertation. 
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meaningful way. While in “The Profession and Vocation of Politics”, Weber does 
distinguish certain defining traits of both ethics, he argues that, “the ethics of conviction 
and the ethics of responsibility are not absolute opposites. They are complementary to 
one another, and only in combination do the produce the true human being who is 
capable of having a ‘vocation for politics’” (Weber 2002, 368). The ethic of 
responsibility, where the actor is aware (and acts in awareness of the idea that “one must 
answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of one’s actions” (Weber 2002, 360), and the 
ethic of conviction where the purity or absoluteness of the political goal is paramount 
seem to find an imperfect melding within this historical vision of the political 
community. The pure conviction of political action is tempered by a responsibility not 
simply to ourselves, but to our descendants, and their ability to act decisively in the future 
for themselves, and for their own ideals and goals.  
 I would argue that this enlarged sense of political ethics, combining both 
conviction and responsibility, is a direct consequence of situating ourselves, as political 
actors, into an historical context that is constantly aware of, and politically sensitive to, a 
relationship between predecessors, contemporaries, and descendants. Regarding this 
threefold relationship, Ricoeur notes, “as Alfred Schutz develops this notion, we are 
oriented, not only to our contemporaries but also to our predecessors and to our 
successor; this temporal sequence constitutes the historical dimension of action” (Ricoeur 
1986, 185). As we saw in chapter one, Schutz attempts to orient social action along this 
historical axis, noting that our potential motivation as actors in the world can only be 
understood if we take that relationship seriously, if we acknowledge that action, 
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“comprises both a backward reference to the past and an orientation toward the future” 
(Schutz 1967, 90). That is, the situatedness of political actors in that historical continuum 
as the descendants of ancestors, and the ancestors of future descendants, plays a 
fundamental role. I believe we see Weber constructing a similar framework. Political 
activity can be made meaningful when it is seen as a continuation of that historical 
relationship. This process of reception and engagement, of ‘providing’ without 
‘imposing’ is a key element in his understanding of the political maturity of political 
actors. This maturity is arrived at only through recognizing, and embracing, this enlarged 
sense of political responsibility – which emerges when political actors see themselves as 
acting within that historical tradition, and as part of that ‘memory community’.  
 As important as these theoretical forays are that Weber allows us to take, and as 
important as that clear distinction between acting and imposing will be for a theory of 
public hermeneutics, this interpretation of Weber only gets us so far. I would like to 
sketch briefly what I see as constituting the two most important weaknesses that we must 
overcome. The first is Weber’s tying together the relative health or robustness of a 
political community to the positioning of ‘rising’ or ‘declining’ classes within the 
community, as well as relying on a notion of the political ‘maturity’ or ‘education’ of 
entire classes of citizens, understood as some type of acting collective. Not only does this 
seem to place an overly mechanistic structure of politics onto a more fragmented reality 
(can we really rehabilitate over monolithic concepts like a class or the bourgeoisie?), but 
it runs the risk of identifying the (potential) political health of the community as the 
exclusive province of a specific sector, or group within the community.  
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 I see this type of (mis)identification as having two consequences. The first is that 
identifying any specific group within society as a ‘rising’ group and charging it with the 
political health and future prospects of the community runs the risk of producing an 
‘aristocratic’ understanding of politics, tasking a group with a type of political good 
fortune that other groups inherently lack. In his essay, “What Revolutionary Action 
Means Today”, Wolin himself cautions us against thinking in these terms when he writes, 
“the problem is not to show that a social class should seize power – no social class in an 
advanced society can pretend to the universality of right which Marx presupposed in the 
workers of his day – but to reinvent the forms and practices that will express a democratic 
conception of collective life” (S. S. Wolin 1992, 249). Thinking in terms of rising or 
declining classes serves as a major impediment to the democratic impulse that Wolin is 
drawing our attention to: the construction of new ‘forms and practices’ that bring to light 
a democratic collective existence.  This mechanistic construction is especially 
problematic when we think that many of the groups within a political community that 
might not be seen as ‘tasked’ with the political health of the community: the poor, sexual 
and racial minorities, and other marginalized groups, would continue to be quite 
efficiently marginalized under this conception of political health. Thus, the collectivity 
expressed through the antagonism of distinct classes would most likely continue to 
construct ‘collective life’ in a way that is exclusionary and oppressive toward those 
groups that cannot effectively claim to be a ‘rising’ political class. 
 The second major weakness has to do with a need to develop the ‘memory’ side 
of the ‘memory community’ that Weber sees as fundamental to his definition of the 
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nation. What is needed is a conception of the construction of this ‘memory community’ 
as a more dynamic process. While Weber does seem to take notice of the fact that any 
idea of the presence of these memory communities in the modern world have to content 
with a certain instability, as he claims that “the differences in national sentiment are both 
significant and fluid” (Weber 1978, 925) it is important to note that Weber locates this 
fluidity between different nations rather than within the individual national communities 
themselves. In fact, differences, or fluidity within the community seems to exist outside 
his theoretical framework. This leads directly to a tension that I see existing between the 
freedom and openness Weber desires for political action and a closure that he seems to 
ascribe to the memories that sustain the memory communities. Weber writes, “The 
significance of the “nation” is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the 
irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through 
the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group” (Weber 1978, 925). Note the shift in 
terminology between his earlier assertion that our ultimate ideals eventually fall away, 
and now, where the values that make up the nation are irreplaceable. This seems to 
position Weber as caught between an irreplaceable context and a desire for an openness 
of action within that context, without acknowledging that an openness of action might 
require a certain openness of the context itself. Weber argues that it is not our duty to 
‘impose’ ourselves upon our descendants, but if we act within an historical continuum 
that is characterized by a need to preserve ‘irreplaceable’ cultural values, does that run 
the risk of the ‘imposition’ that Weber is wary of?  How can we maintain a robust 
political openness if the contexts within which we are acting are not subject to the same 
   239 
 
type of interpretive openness. I would argue that this tension is ultimately too much, and 
that political openness, absent a similar openness to the values, memories, and contexts 
within which we will be acting, is impossible. The transmission of values and the process 
of reinterpretation must be seen as connected to one another. 
 This is not to bury Weber, nor necessarily to praise him, but to claim that these 
tensions point to a concern that must become part of our work as we move forward: the 
irreplaceability of the interpretation and contestation of the tradition that these ‘memory 
communities’ find themselves within. I would like to use this insistence on interpretation 
in order to argue for a political theory that approaches these ‘memory communities’ from 
a less hierarchical position. As I see it, the overarching issue with Weber’s work on 
‘national sentiment’ is that he approaches these memory communities from a largely 
unacknowledged perspective of authority and hierarchy. His use of ascending and 
declining classes, his insistence on the irreplaceability of certain cultural values that 
structure the memory community seems to be an understanding of this community that 
comes from the position of an already established authority that goes unacknowledged 
and un-interrogated in Weber’s work.  
 In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur writes, “the identity of a person or a community is 
made up of those values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or 
community recognizes itself” (Ricoeur 1992, 121). But if these values and memories are 
of such fundamental importance, it must be remembered that Ricoeur also believes that 
only those values will continue to exist that survive the process of ‘reinterpretation’. I 
believe that Weber’s language of irreplaceable values does not offer the same subtlety, 
   240 
 
and these weaknesses produce an understanding of the ‘memory’ side of the equation that 
allows for very little difference, and almost no contestation at the level of the framework 
within which Weber wants to see principled political action. The rest of this chapter will 
be devoted to an analysis, and integration, of Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with Sheldon 
Wolin’s theory of democracy that allows us to fully flesh out a conception of democracy 
as a ‘public hermeneutic’ and that re-contextualizes the dynamics of this historical 
understanding of the political community that Weber has developed; encouraging the 
type of principled political activity that Weber hopes for, but that I believe his theoretical 
assumptions render difficult. 
II. Tradition: Interpretation and Appropriation 
“Submission to traditions precedes their examination” 
- Paul Ricoeur, Ethics and Culture 
In his essay, “Fugitive Democracy”, Sheldon Wolin writes, “Democracy is not 
about where the political is located but about how it is experienced. Revolutions activate 
the demos and destroy boundaries that bar access to political experience” (S. S. Wolin 
1996, 38). This summarizes much of what theorists have been attentive to in Wolin’s 
work: the idea of democracy as transgressive, and as action carried out by the demos. 
Nicholas Xenos neatly summarizes these when he claims that Wolin’s democracy is, 
“egalitarian, participatory, decentralist, and constituted by active citizens” (Xenos 2001, 
26). This is not to deny any importance to these ideas within Wolin’s lifelong 
engagement with the problems of democracy; in fact they are quite central to his work. In 
his description of fifth century Athenian ‘radical democracy’, Wolin claims that it was, 
“the work of the demos…the politics of the demos was disorderly and often rebellious, 
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defined by its opposition to existing arrangements” (S. S. Wolin 1995, 41). However, I 
want to shift my focus slightly, while still remaining not merely sympathetic to, but 
supportive of, those other concerns. In keeping with the spirit and, I believe, the 
theoretical goals of Wolin, but perhaps departing from the more familiar democratic 
concerns of his work, one of the primary goals of this chapter is to build upon this idea of 
democracy as an experience.  
Although he is not always consistent with the language he uses to describe 
democracy, we can often see him using language that that seems to point to a common 
concern with democratic activity. In his essay “Norm and Form”, perhaps his most 
sustained theoretical analysis of this idea of democracy, he asserts that, “democracy is not 
primarily a set of political institutions but a cultural practice” (S. S. Wolin 1995, 50), and 
later in the same essay he claims that “Democracy needs to be reconceived as…a mode 
of being” (S. S. Wolin 1995, 54). When take as a constellation of terms, they all point at 
something important to his democratic theory, which we will pursue throughout this 
chapter. Namely, that for Wolin, any robust conception of democracy that does justice to 
the potential of the idea needs to be understood in terms of a political experience, an 
activity with a certain depth that connects to our mode of being in the world, as 
individuals and, as we shall see, as part of a community. Specifically, I will be concerned 
with how this notion the experience of democracy is connected to the idea of 
remembrance, and how memory, history and political participation come together in 
ways that are mutually constitutive and reinforcing. In order to make these connections 
more deliberate I want to bring his work into a sustained dialogue with the hermeneutical 
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philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, and show how by incorporating this hermeneutical 
philosophy more directly into Wolin’s work, we can arrive at a conception of democracy 
that is highly attuned to Wolin’s main concerns over democratic action in the 
contemporary world, while resisting what I see as some of the shortcomings that weaken 
the impact of his later work, Democracy Inc. 
I would argue that Paul Ricoeur is a helpful addition to any theory of democracy 
that is rooted in a notion of democracy as an ‘experience’ because Ricoeur’s 
philosophical work has consistently, and innovatively, combined phenomenology with a 
general a general theory of hermeneutics that he develops through his engagement with 
the work of both Heidegger and Gadamer, where “existence as it relates to a hermeneutic 
philosophy always remains an interpreted existence” (Ricoeur 2007, 24). And I believe 
that, once we see how some of the major aspects of this theory fit together with the earlier 
analysis of the relationship between the political community, political action, memory, 
and history, we will be able to bring these various strands together that does justice to an 
idea of democratic experience that is rooted fundamentally in the notion of the experience 
of democracy as hermeneutic practice.  
At first glance, Ricoeur’s combination of these two philosophical traditions might 
seem at first like an uncomfortable paring together of two traditions. Hermeneutics is a 
theory based on the notion that “there is no self understanding that is not mediated by 
signs, symbols, and texts; in the last resort understanding coincides with the interpretation 
given to these mediating terms” (Ricoeur 2007, 15), while phenomenology, for Ricoeur, 
is a philosophy that “discovers, in place of an idealist subject…a living being, which 
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from all time has, as the horizon of all its intentions, a world, the world” (Ricoeur 2007, 
9) and is devoted to understanding the world as it is immediately experienced by the 
‘living being’ and the “struggle of the self to identify itself through its perception of the 
world and the other person” (Scott-Baumann 2009, 11). As he writes in Oneself as 
Another, “if there is an existential category especially appropriate to an investigation of 
the self…it would be that of thrownness, thrown-there” (Ricoeur 1992, 327). So, for 
Ricoeur, phenomenology is a philosophy that attempts to understand the ‘living being’ by 
investigating how beings immediately experience the world that they are thrown into. 
However, Ricoeur insists this notion of a philosophy of pure reflection can run into 
serious failings and flaws: a philosophy that uncritically seeks to understand the 
‘experience’ of living beings can easily slip into a type of naïve philosophical idealism. 
He believes that a turn to hermeneutics allows us to “free phenomenological reflection 
from the idealistic temptations to which it is prone” (Jervolino 1996, 71). Ricoeur writes, 
“what hermeneutics has ruined is not phenomenology but one of its interpretations, 
namely, its idealistic interpretation” (Ricoeur 2007, 25). What is at danger, for Ricoeur, 
in his concern over an idealistic phenomenology, is the idea that the living being 
experiencing the world does not experience it outside of certain structures that can 
function in such a way as to distort experience, and this distortion can only be overcome 
with a move toward a hermeneutic process.  
As Richard Kearney notes, “Ricoeur’s hermeneutics thus exposes phenomenology 
to a radical awareness of the limits and obstacles of consciousness” (Kearney 2004, 14), 
and Ricoeur believes that understanding must include interpretation if it is to, even 
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provisionally, work to overcome those obstacles that stand in the way of consciousness 
and experience. Drawing perhaps on his earlier analysis of Freud, where Ricoeur 
marveled at the psychoanalytical process of the interpretation of dreams and drives as a 
means to overcome psychological resistance, he later remarks, “phenomenology must 
become hermeneutic because what is closest to us is what is most covered over” (Ricoeur 
1988, 87). And while Ricoeur is interested in a philosophy that is focused on 
understanding our ‘being in the world’, we need to confront the reality that all human 
understanding is bound up with those obstacles and barriers. Or, as writes, “hermeneutics 
is in effect, a reflection on the “presuppositions” of any understanding of the world” 
(Ricoeur 2013, 99). This is not to make the claim that at the ‘end’ of the process of 
hermeneutics we will arrived at a purely heightened understanding of ourselves in the 
world that is free from barriers and presuppositions. There will never be an existence that 
is free from distortions, but the point of tying hermeneutics to an engagement with 
presuppositions and the ‘covered over’ nature of human life is to remind ourselves of this 
never ending process. We can interpret to try to understand better, to try and overcome 
some presuppositions that we confront, but the process will always remain unfinished. 
This is not, however, a failure for Ricoeur, for it is always also a reminder to avoid the 
easy trap of relying on an idealistic philosophy relying on unmediated notions of human 
experience and understanding. An understanding that is arrived at through an unmediated 
notion of experience is the very hallmark what Ricoeur sees as the fatal flaw in idealist 
phenomenology, and this move from unmediated to mediated consciousness, of 
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experience mediated by interpretation, is Ricoeur’s answer to the temptation toward 
idealism. 
Johann Michel argues that, in fusing these two philosophical traditions, “Ricoeur 
sought both to conserve and surpass phenomenology with the resource of hermeneutics” 
(Michel 2015, 101), which draws our attention to part of project, but seems to leave out a 
crucial element to Ricoeur’s unique combination. Just as, for Ricoeur, hermeneutics was 
able to help phenomenology overcome its idealist presupposition, phenomenology 
provides a fundamental corrective to a pure theory of hermeneutics. Ultimately, it is 
Ricoeur’s major philosophical assertion that, “phenomenology remains the indispensable 
presupposition of hermeneutics. On the other hand, phenomenology is not able to 
establish itself without a hermeneutical presupposition” (Ricoeur 1975, 85). While he 
argues that hermeneutics helps to overcome a certain phenomenological idealism by 
relating our living experience of the world to interpretation and a certain historical sense, 
we need an awareness of how those interpretation are received and lived by those very 
interpreting beings, the idea that, “behind the texts…there are human beings to act and 
suffer” (Jervolino 1996, 71). Thus, phenomenology brings a sense experience to the 
process of interpretation that forces us to recognize the lived experience of interpretation. 
In this way, Ricoeur’s combination of these two philosophical methods will allow us, I 
believe, to produce a very robust theory of democracy and democratic experience. While 
this chapter, and my engagement with Ricoeur more generally, is not devoted to a 
complete and systematic presentation of his entire philosophical corpus, what is of great 
interest to this project is the way in which I believe his combination of hermeneutics with 
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phenomenology (into a philosophical outlook that, from this point forward, I will simply 
call his hermeneutics) casts the hermeneutical project as a social and political project. In 
this way, Ricoeur’s project, which continually looks to connect a world of interpretation 
of meaning and signs to a world of acting and suffering humans, offers us several 
suggestive ways to pursue a robust theory of democracy and democratic experience is 
rooted in the historical nature of political communities, as outlined in my readings of 
Machiavelli and Weber, but rooted in the historical nature as fundamentally a project of 
interpretation of an ongoing and public process of hermeneutic activity. The first aspect 
of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics that is essential to the development of our democratic theory is 
the idea of distanciation, which according to Ricoeur, must be acknowledged and that we 
must understand plays a fundamental role in any robust theory or practice of 
interpretation. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Ricoeur, following Gadamer, takes hermeneutics out 
of the sphere of biblical and literary interpretation and asserts that hermeneutics is not 
simply epistemological, but it is in fact, an ontological category. That is, interpretation is 
fundamental to our very experience in the world, and cannot be simply isolated as a 
method of scientific or scholastic inquiry. Just as a text can be understood only through a 
process of interpretation, so can human actions, and human existence more generally, be 
understood only through an ongoing process of interpretation of the world, and objects, 
that the individual or group confront. In the essay Explanation and Understanding, 
Ricoeur makes this quite clear when he asserts, “human action is in many respects a quasi 
text. It is externalized in a manner comparable to the fixation characteristic of writing” 
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(Ricoeur 2007, 137-8). Just as a written text is a certain fixation of discourse, the 
externalization of it into an object, which thus makes it open to the process of 
interpretation, Ricoeur wants to see human action, and the human world in a larger sense, 
in much the same light. Our world is experienced, lived and felt by ‘acting and suffering’ 
people, but can only be experienced and understood through interpretation. 
But if hermeneutics is ontological rather than epistemological, it is not simply a 
written text that we are interpreting, what is it that serves the role of the text writ large in 
this ontological situation. The answer for Ricoeur is the idea of tradition. As he writes, 
“human beings discover…the fact that they first find themselves amid traditions” 
(Ricoeur 2013, 73). To see ourselves as hermeneutic brings is to see ourselves as 
enmeshed within traditions. So what then, is essential for our ability to interpret these 
very traditions that we find ourselves living within? For Ricoeur, it is the idea of 
distanciation which is key to our understanding of just how we are to situate ourselves 
with regard to tradition, as well as how we are to see the relationship between received 
traditions, and the presence of acting and suffering beings in the world.  
Like Weber’s idea of nationalism, Ricoeur sees traditions as historical, that is to 
say, they come down to us through a process of transmission through successive 
generations, and to understand any community as an historical community, we need to 
see it as engaged in a continual process of possessing, passing-on, and receiving these 
historical traditions in which we, as members of a community, cannot stand outside of. In 
the third volume of Time and Narrative, Ricoeur asserts that, with regard to tradition we 
“rather are always first of all in the position of being heirs” (Ricoeur 1988, 221). This 
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idea of being heirs to tradition as mush as anything else means that the situation of being 
found within a tradition is inescapable. David Linge, in his introduction to Gadamer’s 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, makes this inescapability of traditions that Ricoeur borrows 
quite clear when he writes, “as prejudice and tradition, the past also defines the ground 
the interpreter himself occupies when he understands” (Gadamer 2008, xv). But this 
raises an interesting point, and one that Ricoeur is quite invested in proposing an answer 
to. If we cannot stand outside of those traditions, how can we properly be seen as being 
able to interpret them in any meaningful sense, and what allows us to position ourselves 
as interpreters of a tradition that serves as the very ground upon which we are 
interpreting? This is where, for Ricoeur, the notion of distanciation becomes so essential.  
Distanciation refers to a certain distance at which we, by virtue of being part of an 
historical community, stand with regard to the tradition(s), texts, and artifacts in question, 
or more specifically, it is “the effect of being made distant from the producer of a text 
and the cultural condition under which he or she wrote” (Simms 2003, 39). Gadamer 
refers to, “the insuperable difference between the interpreter and the author that is created 
by historical distance” (Gadamer 2006, 296), and this distance is essential for Ricoeur’s 
understanding of the process of interpreting received traditions. According to Ricoeur, 
“the concept of distanciation is the dialectical counterpart of the notion of belonging, in 
the sense that we belong to a historical tradition through a relation of distance which 
oscillated between remoteness and proximity” (Ricoeur 2007, 35). That is to say, the 
traditions in which we find ourselves, as part of a community are seen as both present and 
historical, and this dialectical relationship, for Ricoeur, offers up essential space for the 
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process of meaningful interpretation and the active reception of tradition to take place. 
John Thompson believes that this issue of distanciation crucially separates the 
hermeneutics of Ricoeur from that of Gadamer, their similar ontological claims about 
hermeneutics notwithstanding. Thompson argues that, “this distanciation which Gadamer 
regards as an ontological fall from grace appears as the very condition for the possibility 
of hermeneutics,” for Ricoeur (Thompson 1981, 67), where “a certain dialectic between 
the experience of belonging and alienating distanciation, becomes the mainspring, the 
key to the inner life, of hermeneutics” (Ricoeur 2007, 297). Rather than seeing a choice 
between, “alienating distanciation and participatory belonging”, which Ricoeur argues is 
an unproductive (and faulty) binary, he proposes “a positive and, if I may say so, 
productive notion of distanciation” (Ricoeur 2007, 76). What this productive 
acknowledgement of distanciation does is allow Ricoeur to posit a specific type of 
relationship to tradition that we, as inheritors of tradition, are able to take, a specific 
relationship that involves, and emerges directly from a constant relationship between 
distance and belonging. In his essay, The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation, 
Ricoeur argues that, “we must place at the very heart of self-understanding that 
dialectic…distanciation is the condition of understanding” (Ricoeur 2007, 88). This self-
understanding, whether individual or collective, must incorporate this productive notion 
of dialectic between distanciation and belonging.  
When Ricoeur uses the term ‘alienating’ to describe the condition of distanciation, 
he wants to suggest that the distance is alienating only in the sense that it allows us to 
stand at some level of remove from the object itself. Distanciation is productive for 
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Ricoeur because in this sense, the alienation attributed to distanciation is productive. It 
allows us to take a critical distance from the material that we have received. Andreea 
Ritivoli argues that, “Ricoeur departs from the Gadamerian approach because he believes 
that distance from the past can become a critical vantage” (Ritivoli 2006, 87). Ritivoli 
draws our attention to a key element in understanding how Ricoeur wants to repurpose 
this notion: tying to the construction of a ‘critical vantage’ which is central to his idea of 
how we truly ‘belong’ to a community. In his work Memory, History, Forgetting, 
Ricoeur offers an understanding of society as having, “the burden of transmitting from 
one generation to the next what it holds to be its cultural acquisitions” (Ricoeur 2004, 
60), and much of that entire work can be seen as a philosophical treatise on the myriad 
connections between memory and community, or society. But unlike Weber, who seems 
to vacillate between his desire to not ‘impose’ on the future and the ‘irreplaceability’ of 
certain transmitted cultural values, this ‘memory community’ that Ricoeur proposes is 
fundamentally different. As Ritivoli notes, “in Ricoeur’s view, a tradition constitutes a 
community of interpretation” (Ritivoli 2006, 75). And by connecting these two ideas, the 
‘community of memory’ with the ‘community of interpretation’ we can see just how 
Ricoeur uses distanciation and alienation in a productive fashion. 
We, as members of any political community, are constituted by our relationship to 
inherited traditions. And while, for Ricoeur, we stand, at least initially, as ‘heirs’ to 
tradition, and as the recipients of them, that does not capture the entirety of the 
relationship. For it is just as important to note that we are also interpreters of tradition: we 
need to interpret it in order to understand the meaning it has for us. However, by 
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incorporating this idea of ‘alienating distanciation’ into the equation, Ricoeur offers us a 
powerful understanding of interpretation. Based on the very fact that we are interpreting 
traditions that stand at a distance to us, and are in fact ‘alien’ to us, interpretation is 
necessary to overcome this type of distance. In Existence and Hermeneutics, Ricoeur 
writes, “the purpose of all interpretation is to conquer a remoteness, a distance between 
the past cultural epoch” (Ricoeur 2007, 16). But we are only able to conquer this distance 
between ourselves and this tradition, if our process of interpretation is one of a certain 
kind. Ricoeur believes that, given these social realities of distanciation and tradition, any 
real act in interpretation involves not just revealing a certain meaning or understanding, 
but must also actively engage in producing meaning for ourselves. In his essay, 
“Hermeneutical Logic”, Ricoeur makes this very clear when he writes, “an interpretation 
is not genuine unless it culminates in some form of appropriation, if by that term we 
understand the process by which one makes one’s own what was initially other or alien” 
(Ricoeur 2013, 61). In Ricoeur’s estimation, the process of ‘making one’s own’ 
something that was alien can only happen when interpretation is joined together with 
appropriation. That means that interpretation is an active process in two fundamental, and 
deeply related senses: it is active with regard to approaching those symbols, values, and 
texts that make up a tradition in order to understand them, but furthermore, it is active in 
that we, as interpreters need to make that tradition meaningful for us, for our 
contemporary political condition, and responsive to our political needs. Understanding 
past tradition is not enough. In Ricoeur’s hermeneutic presentation of society, it is 
essential that understanding include repossession. Or, to stay more faithful to the terms 
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that Ricoeur himself relies upon, the interpretation of traditions must always necessarily 
be a re-interpretation, “values cannot be preserved if they are simply passively received” 
(Dauenhauer 1998, 28).  
In The Promise of Risk of Politics, Bernard Dauenhauer notes the way Ricoeur 
sees interpretation functioning in its mediation of active agents and the traditions they 
inherit. He initially argues that, for Ricoeur, “the self is always an embodied self both 
made possible and constrained by its material and cultural situation, but also capable of 
genuine initiative, in inaugurating something new” (Dauenhauer 1998, 109). This 
theoretical intervention, defining the embodied self as both constrained as well as capable 
of initiative and invention begins to draw the contours of Ricoeur’s citizen.  For Ricoeur, 
we cannot understand citizenship outside of the potential for initiative, for ‘inaugurating 
something new’. As he writes in Time and Narrative, “initiative is, above all else, what 
actualizes the competence of the acting subject” (Ricoeur 1988, 257). The acting subject 
is only an actor so long as they can act at bringing something new into the world. Here, 
we can see shades of Weber’s desire for principled political action. However, while 
Ricoeur claims the importance of this notion of initiative, the fact that we, as actors, are 
‘embodied’ means that we must understand initiative in a specific way. Dauenhauer later 
argues that, “we have all been born into a world already furnished with ethical value. 
Though we can and do “transvalue” the received values, we cannot create them beginning 
from zero” (Dauenhauer 1998, 227). The fact that we are, to some degree, constituted by 
traditions, and ‘embodied’ by the histories and memories contained within those 
traditions means that our initiative is not some type of absolute category, and that we 
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must recognize the fact that “we are never in a position of being absolute innovators” 
(Ricoeur 1988, 221). This is the dynamic that Ricoeur sees as functioning through his 
concept of reinterpretation. Reinterpretation allows us to receive the past but, through this 
process of ‘making our own’ what is ‘alien’ to us, the distanciated past, we are capable of 
initiative, and able to inaugurate novelty through this engagement with tradition. 
Ultimately this is what Ricoeur hopes to achieve through his embrace of distanciation: 
acknowledging the distance of a tradition allows us to make it ours through a process of 
reinterpretation that involves an ever present, though not absolute, claim to innovation 
and novelty.  
This brings us to an important set of questions, however. What exactly, for 
Ricoeur, is the difference between a passive reception of the past and an active 
reinterpretation? When he calls for a ‘making our own’ of the distanciated past, what 
exactly of the past are we making our own? Several authors draw our attention to this 
specific dynamic, though I believe their ultimate presentations of this engagement with 
tradition, while not incorrect, is lacking a certain amount of persuasiveness. Dauenhauer 
describes this Ricourean process quite succinctly when he writes, “however much they 
are shaped by the heritage they receive, it is their responsibility to preserve their heritage 
by their free, creative reinvention of its values” (Dauenhauer 1998, 51-2), and this 
language runs throughout his work on Ricoeur. In addition to ‘preservation’ through 
reinvention, Dauenhauer argues that “a cultural tradition remains alive only so long as it 
constantly creates itself anew” (Dauenhauer 1998, 87). Several other authors look to 
Ricoeur’s dynamic understanding of tradition in much the same way, imbuing their 
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analysis with similar language and points of contention. Richard Kearney writes that, for 
Ricoeur, “tradition needs innovation in order to sustain itself as a living transmission of 
meaning capable of being reactivated” (Kearney 2004, 6). Both Kearney and Dauenhauer 
engage certain terms to try and encapsulate this connection between interpretation and 
initiative, to describe this process of interpretation that only succeeds when the project of 
making something new is attached to it.  References to a ‘living tradition’ that is not 
simply ‘passively received’ abound in these works. They both very clearly link these 
communities to an ongoing process of active creation. Andreea Ritivoli nicely 
summarizes this cultural community when she argues “Ricoeur emphasizes the 
individual’s conscious participation in imaginative practices that lead to the formation of 
a community” (Ritivoli 2006, 58). What is important about this analysis is the fact that 
they all point to an essential creative facility that is at work in this cultural 
reinterpretation of tradition, and, indeed, at work in the very cultural identity of these 
communities.  
It is my contention that, as helpful as these analyses are, they leave a certain key 
aspect under-theorized, which means their interpretations remain somewhat critically 
underdeveloped. In short, I believe that these authors fail to account for exactly what it is 
in this process of interpretation/reinterpretation that allows us to make the claim that 
these new interpretations are, somehow, alive.  That is, what is it about this interpretation 
that makes it somehow more meaningful, more vital, and essential to an active 
community? To return briefly to simple textual hermeneutics, just because we offer a new 
interpretation of a text, doesn’t necessarily mean that this new interpretation somehow 
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becomes a more ‘vital’ way to understand the work.  Can we not pose the same question 
to this larger form of hermeneutical understanding? What is it that allows us to link the 
existence of a ‘new’ interpretation or understanding of a cultural tradition to the larger 
claim that it is, therefore, more alive, or imbued with meaning for us? This assumption, 
however, is made both in Kearney and Dauenhauer’s work. They both contrast received 
tradition with reinterpreted tradition, one being more alive and necessary than the other. 
However, they seem to displace the important question of just how this reinterpretation 
allows us to make the claim for vitality. In another essay on Ricoeur, Dauenhauer seems 
to point to at least a provisional answer to this question when he argues that, “each 
society must face the judgment of subsequent generations” (Dauenhauer 1997, 132). This 
linking of reinterpretation to the notion of judgment is helpful, for it does begin to point 
us toward a certain understanding of this process of reinterpretation: it is a method 
whereby levels of individual and collective judgment about the qualities of inherited 
tradition are made and, perhaps, repurposed. But I argue that this simply pushes the 
question further into the distance. What is it about Ricoeur’s idea of cultural 
interpretation that links up with judgments? How exactly does distanciation, the key 
feature of Riceoeur’s theory, function as a component of judgment? I believe that Ricoeur 
offers us a compelling answer, one that is largely unacknowledged in Kearney, 
Dauenhauer and Rivitoloi, but that offers us a complete picture of this hermeneutic 
process. In order to illustrate this more clearly, we will need to turn to another important 
element in Ricoeur’s philosophy: the idea of a ‘critical hermeneutics’. 
III. A Critical Hermeneutics and the Interpretation of Ideology 
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 Ricoeur’s idea of a critical hermeneutics stems from his intervention into the 
Gadamer Habermas debate of the 1960’s. Ricoeur, ever the mediator, sought to find a 
‘third way’ between the hermeneutic method of Gadamer, with its insistence on the 
necessity of interpretation and the recovery of tradition, and Habermas, who insists that 
the hermeneutical project lacks a meaningful component of critique, and as such, 
generally fails to move beyond the status of a project that produces the uncritical 
acceptance of the traditions of a society. More to the point, Habermas believes that the 
interpretation occasioned by hermeneutics has no space for interrogating the ideological 
distortions of past traditions. Or, as Ricoeur summarizes, “Gadamer inevitably turned 
hermeneutic philosophy toward the rehabilitation of prejudice and the defense of tradition 
and authority, placing this philosophy in a conflictual relation to any critique of ideology” 
(Ricoeur 2007, 273). In place of hermeneutics, Habermas offers the notion of a critical 
social science that, rather than reflecting upon tradition, is engaged in analyzing the 
ideological distortions and repressive tendencies inherent in tradition, or as Ricoeur 
argues, “the critique of ideologies sees in the same tradition the place par excellence of 
distortions and alienations” (Ricoeur 1974, 248). Crucially for Habermas, a critical social 
sciences, by unmasking these distortions and alienations, by freeing us from the 
distortions inherent in tradition, moving us toward a more liberated future. Where 
Habermas sees Gadamer’s hermeneutics as reinvesting tradition with authority, 
Habermas outlines a critical social theory that works to unmask authority from the past, 
and replace it with a regulative future goal of authority freed from ideological distortion. 
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 Ricoeur proposes what he calls a critical hermeneutics, where “he argues that 
Habermas’ concerns can be addressed within a hermeneutical framework and that 
philosophical hermeneutics can incorporate within itself a Habermasian impulse toward 
critique” (Piercey 2004, 262) Ricoeur simultaneously attempts to resuscitate 
hermeneutics (though not necessarily Gadamer himself) from the charge leveled at it by 
Habermas, while at the same time incorporating some of Habermas’ social critique by 
demonstrating that Habermas’ separation of critique from tradition is an untenable 
opposition. Continuing his uneasy relationship with Gadamer, Ricoeur notes, “in spite of 
his earlier critique, it is to a theme of German Romanticism that Gadamer returns, linking 
authority to tradition. That which has authority is tradition. When he comes to this 
equation, Gadamer speaks in Romantic terms” (Ricoeur 2007, 279). Gadamer may, in 
Ricoeur’s estimation, fall prey to the very Romantic hermeneutics that he cautions 
against, but this does not exhaust the entirety of hermeneutics, it simply forces a re-
evaluation of Gadamer’s contribution, an acknowledgement that “Gadamer often 
expresses himself in ways that downplay the critical recourse of hermeneutics” (Piercey 
2004, 265). It is this reevaluation that Ricoeur uses to bring hermeneutics closer to 
Habermas’ critical social science. Ricoeur writes, “I want to show…however…that 
hermeneutical philosophy has other resources and that it is required by its internal logic 
to reintroduce a critical moment…as a necessary dialectical factor of the hermeneutical 
process” (Ricoeur 1974, 252). It is this ‘critical moment’ that ultimately serves as the 
hinge upon which Ricoeur brings together hermeneutics and critical social science. 
Ricoeur is interested in formulating this idea of a critical hermeneutics that, while 
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remaining true to the interpretative reality that hermeneutics proposes, and the 
acknowledgement of a relation to tradition that accompanies it, also contains that ‘critical 
moment’ that he sees as having been given a clearer articulation within critical social 
science. 
 Ricoeur simultaneously takes issue with Habermas’ insistence on seeing tradition 
as simply the reservoir of ideological distortions as well as his methodological insistence 
on rupturing critical theory from tradition. For Ricoeur, this engagement with Habermas 
proceeds into two distinct ways. The first, is the frank acknowledgement by Ricoeur that, 
“critique is also a tradition. I would even say that it plunges into the most impressive 
tradition, that of liberating acts” (Ricoeur 2007, 306), and as such, Habermas’ insistence 
on a radical separation is, from even a logical standpoint, untenable. Ricoeur continues to 
argue that critique in the contemporary world might not even be a possible undertaking if 
that ‘tradition’ of critique “were effaced from the memory of mankind” (Ricoeur 2007, 
306). Thus, for Ricoeur, part of what we ‘inherit’ within our tradition, is the ongoing 
critique of tradition, and if we are to rupture our connection to tradition, does that meant 
that this element of critique similarly lost? Allison Scott-Bauman draws our attention to 
this reconfiguration, noting that Ricoeur, “described hermeneutics as disruptive…when 
we want to interpret our relationship with tradition and interpret it critically” (Scott-
Baumann 2009, 173). Now the difficulty for Ricoeur here is that this critique of tradition 
is not always the most present or obvious moment, and it will take work in order to 
unearth it, but it is precisely this very process of unearthing this tradition as critique, that 
he poses as one of the main tasks of a critical hermeneutics. 
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 Just as critique itself has/is a tradition, the process of criticizing tradition can only 
take place from within a tradition. As discussed above, Ricoeur sees us as embodied 
individuals, who can only exist within, and as part of, inherited traditions and cultures, 
and any theory of critical engagement must take that claim seriously. While Ricoeur has 
great sympathy for Habermas’ interest in emancipation, he restates his longstanding 
assertion that, “none of us finds himself place in the radical position of creating the 
ethical world ex nihilo” (Ricoeur 1974, 268). Therefore, any critical enterprise can only 
arise from within a certain set of traditions, from a certain cultural, social, and political 
standpoint. Or, as Robert Piercey notes, “the critique of ideology is possible only on the 
basis of hermeneutic presuppositions – that is, on the basis of its embeddedness in a 
highly specific historical tradition” (Piercey 2004, 267). Our understanding of tradition, 
especially our understanding of whatever types of distortions and alienations we see 
within those traditions, can only come to consciousness and become part of our political 
engagement, from a position located within those traditions themselves. To highlight this, 
Ricoeur asserts that “we must confess that we are always situated within history in such a 
fashion that our consciousness never has the freedom to bring itself face to face with the 
past by an act of sovereign independence” (Ricoeur 1974, 252). In this way, Ricoeur 
brings together crucial elements of these two modes of inquiry to fashion his 
understanding of critical hermeneutics. The hermeneutic presuppositions, that of existing 
within traditions and histories are brought together with an interest in emancipation 
through a process of critiquing ideology, as well as systematic distortions found within 
those traditions. This process of criticism and interest in emancipation, however, cannot 
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locate itself outside of inherited traditions and cultural forms, but must be seen from 
within. In combining these two practices, Ricoeur hopes to avoid a flattening out of both. 
Just as “Ricourian hermeneutics never turns into the mere praise of tradition” (Michel 
2015, xvii), critical social investigation cannot be seen as the mere opposite of tradition, 
or the product of a project and consciousness that is wholly outside of traditions. By 
combining elements of them both into this project of critical hermeneutics, Ricoeur offers 
us a heightened, and more complex, sense of both. 
  I would like to finish this discussion of critical hermeneutics by returning to the 
idea of distanciation, which now can be seen as playing an even more important role. For 
Ricoeur, it is the very fact that we stand at a distance from these traditions that we are 
able to incorporate that critical element into the process of hermeneutical explanation and 
interpretation.  Here we now see much more clearly what Ricoeur means when he writes 
about the process of ‘making ours’ what is alien and distant to us, which was missing in 
the discussions by Kearney, Dauenhauer, and Ritivoli. This process of reinterpretation 
through distanciation, whatever else it entails, must incorporate this critical element of 
unmasking ideological distortions. In engaging with what is alien to us we must work out 
what alienations (in a more Marxist conception of the term) are being transmitted to us 
through tradition, and within the historical cultural communities that we find ourselves 
belonging. Because Ricoeur embraces distanciation as a productive element within 
hermeneutics, tradition is to a substantial (but not a complete) degree, de-linked from 
authority (contra his interpretation of Gadamer), and the process of reinterpretation is 
now seen as a process of re-constructing that authority, through a critical analysis of the 
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distortions and ideological constructions found within the interpreted traditions. This 
gives us a more complete answer to how we should understand those descriptions of 
‘living’ traditions. The active part of this reinterpretation has to do with a critical 
engagement with experiences of ideology and distortions contained within any historical 
traditions, communities, and practices.  This leads us to a very important question about 
what, for Ricoeur, is the nature of ideology, and how he sees ideology functioning within 
this idea of tradition. 
 A key to understanding Ricoeur’s hermeneutics comes with the acknowledgement 
that every major component of his philosophy indicates a limit to which we can never 
extricate ourselves, despite a need to constantly engage with them. Just as we can never 
get outside of the need to interpret, and we can never find a position outside of tradition 
and history, neither can we find ourselves outside of the presence and influence of 
ideology. However, this does not mean that an engagement with ideology, as a constant 
presence within our communal existence is impossible, or unnecessary. In fact, such an 
engagement is essential for maintaining the political and social well-being of the 
communities we find ourselves in. Due to the fact that, for Ricoeur, we cannot get outside 
of, or fully extricate ourselves from a lives lived through the force and presence of 
ideology, it serves several important, and related functions. And it is only through an 
engagement with the understanding that Ricoeur has of ideology, that we can understand 
the full consequences of his theory of reinterpretation, and the true importance of a 
critical hermeneutics. Specifically, for Ricoeur, we need to understand the way in which 
he casts ideology as a resolutely historical phenomenon. 
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 In his work, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, Ricoeur gives his clearest and most 
systematic accounting of how he understands the role(s) of ideology, and the account of 
ideology that he gives here informs a great deal of the rest of his work on memory, 
history, and hermeneutics. Drawing largely on the theory of ideology offered by Louis 
Althusser, Ricoeur writes, “a system of oppression survives and prevails thanks to this 
ideological apparatus which both places the individuals in subjection and at the very 
same time maintains and reproduces the system. Reproduction of the system and 
ideological repression of the individual are one and the same” (Ricoeur 1986, 133). Just 
as Althusser claims that the presence of what he calls Ideological State Apparatuses in 
society insures the reproduction of an entire social system that the economy demands, 
Ricoeur wants to make a similar (though slightly more cautious) claim. Ricoeur 
eventually distances himself from Althusser, especially over the distinction Althusser 
makes between ideology and science, which Ricoeur believes is an untenable distinction. 
However, what he finds useful in Althusser’s conception is the idea that “ideology 
reflects in the form of an imaginary relation something which is already an existing 
relation, that is, the relation of the human beings to their world” (Ricoeur 1986, 136), and 
this relationship that ideology reflects is key to the first purpose that Ricoeur assigns to 
ideology.   
 In continued sympathy with Habermas’ project of emancipation, Ricoeur will not 
distance himself from the idea that ideology serves a distorting function, but that does not 
capture the entirety of it.  In fact, we cannot make sense of the distorting function of 
ideology without understanding the larger and more general purpose that Ricoeur 
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attributes to ideology. Regarding this larger purpose, Ricoeur borrows heavily from the 
anthropology of Clifford Geertz when he argues that “whether distorting, legitimating, or 
constituting, ideology always has the function of preserving an identity, whether of a 
group or individual” (Ricoeur 1986, 182), and elsewhere he refers to it as the “guardian 
of identity” (Ricoeur 2004, 83). Specifically, for Ricoeur, ideology serves to integrate 
identity on two levels it “supports the integration of a group not simply in space but in 
time. Ideology functions not only in the synchronic dimension but also in the diachronic 
dimension” (Ricoeur 1986, 261). This ties ideology directly to history and memory, in 
that he recognizes the ideological component of social and cultural memories in 
performing an integrative function. Ricoeur argues that, “the memory of the group’s 
founding events is extremely significant; reenactment of the founding events is a 
fundamental ideological act” (Ricoeur 1986, 261). The memory of these acts, and in 
many cases the ‘re-enactment’ of these acts serves to produce and legitimize a sense of 
identification that individuals make to a community and that a community makes to itself. 
Recall Wolin’s discussion of the American bicentennial celebration: “a bicentennial 
might be thought of as an official story that narrates a past to support an image of 
collective identity that conforms a certain conception of the present” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 
3). Here, we can clearly see the fundamental attributes Ricoeur gives to ideology: a 
narration of a collective identity, the acceptance of a conception of the present. Though 
Wolin does not use the term ‘ideology’, he notes that these celebrations ultimately 
‘legitimate’ a specific understanding of the present. Thus, memory’s larger ideological 
function is that of integration. In trying a community together, “the underlying integrative 
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function of ideology prevents us from pushing the polemical element to its destructive 
point – the point of civil war” (Ricoeur 1986, 263). Any community that is to have any 
sort of permanence, can only do so, according to Ricoeur (again borrowing from Geertz) 
if there is a strong level of integration that can overcome “the threat of the lack of 
identity” (Ricoeur 1986, 261), and produce a certain level of stability and continuity with 
regard to the symbolic identification that is shared by the members of the community. 
 In making these claims, Ricoeur is arguing that “ideology is similarly basic and 
ineluctable” (Ricoeur 1986, 259). We cannot see it as something that belongs simply to 
the ‘superstructure’ of society, the way that Althusser, despite the importance he gives to 
ideology, seems content to do. Nor can we argue that ideology is synonymous with 
distortion, as Habermas does. Instead, we need to see that ideology “belongs within a 
broader framework that recognizes the fundamentally symbolic structure of human 
existence” (Dauenhauer 1998, 215). Ideology serves as the means by which individuals, 
and communities, come to identify and understand themselves. If we come to understand 
ourselves, as individuals and members of a community, through the symbols we are 
confronted with: texts, values, and traditions, then ideology is thus constitutive of the 
very idea of community and identity. But if ideology is simply constitutive of how we 
make sense of our symbolic identities, does that not eliminate the ‘critical moment’ that 
Ricoeur places at the heart of his critical hermeneutics? Allison Scott-Baumann argues 
that “it is clear that Ricoeur wants us to become expert in exercising suspicion” (Scott-
Baumann 2009, 44), but if ideology is simply symbolic integration, how are we able to 
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become at all suspicious of the ideological distortions deposited within history, traditions, 
and the past more generally? 
 Simply because ideology is integrative for Ricoeur does not mean that it ceases to 
be both distorting and working in the continual service of the legitimation of alienation 
and domination, for Ricoeur does argue that, “ideology, when all is said and done, 
revolves around power” (Ricoeur 2004, 83). Similarly, just because we cannot get outside 
of ideology, does not mean that we cannot unmask those very distortions, to which we 
are subjected. Rather, we need to understand the specific way in which Ricoeur 
understands ideology to function with regard to authority and the distribution of power. 
In doing this, we will be able to understand the distorting and legitimating effects of 
ideology that give purpose to Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics. Ultimately, we will be able 
to grasp just how Ricoeur’s notion of reinterpretation, by joining it to the 
acknowledgement of these other functions of ideology, allows for this critical 
hermeneutics to serve what Ricoeur calls initiative, and what Weber imagined as 
principled political action. 
IV. Ideology and Surplus-Value 
“What is at stake in all ideology is finally the legitimation of a certain system of 
authority” 
- Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia 
 
 In his Introduction to The Presence of the Past, Sheldon Wolin defines a 
constitution as, “not neutral or purely formal; they are prescriptive…Constitutions and 
their politics are about power: about what power is to be used for, by whom, and 
according to what understandings and justifications, as well as to privilege certain public 
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meanings and symbols” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 3). For Wolin it is not just that a constitution 
is a document that settles questions of power, but it is also a rhetorical document that 
attempts to persuade and offer a legitimation for that distribution of power. Wolin writes, 
“As a political event the Constitution represented a settlement about power on terms that 
the leaders of the dominant interests…agreed upon and believed they could persuade the 
politically significant part of the population to accept” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 3). This is to 
say that a constitution not only distributes power and authority, but is also the beginning 
of the political and social project of justifying, legitimizing, and perpetuating that 
authority. This definition of constitutions as distributions and legitimations of power and 
authority, helps us highlight what, for Ricoeur, is the central role that is played by 
ideology, understood now in its legitimizing (Habermas would say distorting) function. 
 In a concise description of Ricoeur’s analysis of the relationship between 
constitutions and the state, Bernard Dauenhauer writes, “Whatever the constitutional 
form of the State, power is of its essence. All constitutions distribute power. In doing so 
they establish limits and oppositions” (Dauenhauer 1998, 76) and because the state, and 
constitutions, are ultimately about power, the question of legitimacy cannot be removed 
from the discussion. In the introduction to Ricoeur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, 
George Taylor writes, “the question of legitimacy is ineradicable in social life…because 
no social order operates by force alone” (Ricoeur 1986, xvi). Ricoeur here is concerned 
with the legitimation of leadership, that is, what right does political leadership have to 
exercise that control over the population. As Ricoeur writes, “the legitimation of 
leadership confronts us with the problem of authority, domination, and power, the 
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problem of the hierarchization of modern life. Ideology has a significant role here” 
(Ricoeur 1986, 12). But he is also interested in the legitimacy of the institutions that 
support hierarchy and power, and it is in relation to those two concerns that the concept 
of ideology returns to his analysis. But just what is the role that ideology plays? How 
does it insert itself into the discussion of power and authority? 
 Ricoeur argues that in any political system there is always a gap between the 
amount of authority and power that is claimed by political leadership, and assumed by 
political institutions, and the rationale or justification that can be made on their behalf. It 
is here that ideology becomes absolutely essential. As Ricoeur argues, “ideology occurs 
in the gap between a system of authority’s claim to legitimacy and our response in terms 
of belief” (Ricoeur 1986, 183). In a creative repurposing of a central Marxist term, 
Ricoeur refers to the functioning of ideology in this gap as a type of ‘surplus-value. 
“Ideology functions to add a certain surplus-value to our belief in order that our belief 
may meet the requirements of the authority’s claims” (Ricoeur 1986, 183). Ricoeur 
extends this analysis of the surplus value of ideology in his later work, Memory, History, 
Forgetting, where he writes, “ideology is supposed to add a sort of surplus value to our 
spontaneous belief, thanks to which the later might satisfy the demands of the authority” 
(Ricoeur 2004, 83). What Ricoeur is pointing to here is that ideology allows for a smooth 
functioning of power and authority by symbolically legitimating its workings and 
applications. A specific (ideological) conception of the past becomes, in a sense, a 
reservoir of authority to legitimate a present arrangement of political institutions and a 
certain distribution of power, which allows for the functioning of power and domination 
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while largely masking its operation. As Ricoeur writes, “law can mask the relation of 
force only in the measure that the power of the state flows from the ideality of the past” 
(Ricoeur 2007, 253). This notion of the ‘ideality’ of the past, which we saw functioning 
in Pericles’ Funeral Oration as a means to legitimate and perpetuate not only a certain 
identity, but a specific arrangement of power and authority, is key to understanding the 
legitimizing function that ideology serves. 
 I would like to argue a further point here, however, with regard to how ideology 
functions in Ricoeur’s theoretical schema. By perpetuating a sort of ‘ideological past’, 
ideology itself works to rhetorically obfuscate the historical and, more importantly, the 
contingent, nature of the current distribution of power and authority. When discussing the 
beginning and growth of political societies, Ricoeur argues, “their violent birth then 
becomes reabsorbed in the new legitimacy which they foster and consolidate. But this 
new legitimacy always retains a note of contingency” (Ricoeur 2007, 258). Just as the 
Athenian myth of autochthony served to obscure the historical origins of Athens in order 
to perpetuate a stable and enduring political identity and structure, the removal of 
contingency from the origins of modern societies seems to function in much the same 
way. Legitimacy, specifically the ‘surplus’ legitimacy supplied by the ideological 
functioning of the past covers over, or renders invisible, that contingency. Much the same 
way that Castoriadis argues that the already imagined institutions of society serve to de-
historicize social arrangements and roles, the ideological impulse to remove contingency 
makes it easy for a society to continually overlook the largely democratic idea that, 
“political power seems to…pose the specific problem of its self-constitutions and, 
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correlative to this, of its self-limitation” (Ricoeur 2000, 89). Because these questions of 
self-constitution and self-limitation are minimized through the lack of acknowledgement 
of historical contingency, the relationship between power and the emergence of political 
institutions is largely severed. While Ricoeur notes the importance of founding events for 
the stabilization of identity, he also notes that the celebration of founding events has a 
problematic component to it, one that is directly related to this issue. He writes, “What 
we celebrate under the title of founding events are, essentially, acts of violence 
legitimated after the fact by a precarious state of right. What was glory for some was 
humiliation for others” (Ricoeur 2004, 79). And of course, for Ricoeur, this legitimating 
state of ‘right’ is made less so by the smooth functioning of ideology.  
 While I would like to side step the issue of ‘founding violence’,51 what is 
important for our purposes here is the way in which this understanding of state 
legitimation is productive of a political/historical consciousness in which, “past losses are 
dissociated from present choices, and as a result the range of choice is circumscribed by 
the needs and wants of the victors” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 4). As history is seen as less and 
less contingent, “we feel our historical experience as a totalization in process” (Ricoeur 
1974, 282). Historical contingency and political contingency, in this sense, seem to march 
hand in hand. As long as we do not see the political past as contingent, as long as we do 
not see our history as one of conflict, loss, and struggle, current political arrangements 
will continue to be buttressed by the ideological production of legitimacy and the smooth 
flow of ‘surplus power’ to the central political institutions of the state. Ultimately this 
means that “the questions of what is discursively possible in a given historical situation” 
                                                 
51 Again, something that could not be adequately treated within the confines of this dissertation. 
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(Ricoeur 2000, 119) will be similarly very narrowly circumscribed. The lack of political 
possibility that Ricoeur fears is described by Bernard Dauenhauer as ‘political 
ossification’. For Dauenhauer, “a “formalist” ossification…would refuse to give serious 
consideration to any significant modification of the society’s main political institutions” 
(Dauenhauer 1998, 271), and he sees one of Ricoeur’s major political goals as being the 
resistance of this type of political ossification. What Dauenhauer excludes from this 
analysis, however, is the way in which ideology serves as a major contributing factor to 
the production of this ossification. Dauenhauer offers some remedies: more open 
participation, the attentiveness of citizens to their ‘others’, but by not directly tying 
ideology to how these solutions might work, he leaves out a connection that is key in 
understanding why more participation is important, and why these strategies helps resist 
this ossification. 
 If, for Ricoeur, individuals and communities “are constituted in their identity by 
taking up narratives that become for them their actual history” (Ricoeur 1988, 247), then 
we need to see ossification as one possible result of this process of identity-formation. 
For as important as these identities are to the integration of the community, the 
integrating function of ideology can become (in Ricoeur’s terminology) pathological, and 
in this sense, “something becomes ideological…when the integrative function becomes 
frozen” (Ricoeur 1986, 266), when the process of integration becomes so powerful that 
political structures and the distribution of power becomes ossified and more and more 
resistant to change. This ideological distortion, the superabundance of integration and the 
constant presence of ideological ‘surplus value’ can work to desensitize a political 
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community to the contingency of its foundation, laws, and institutions, and as such, the 
space for democratic potential and democratic energies is more narrowly circumscribed. 
In this sense, the ‘totalization in process’ that Ricoeur assigns to any political society 
edges closer and closer to reality. It is in this sense, that Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics 
plays an indispensable role. For Ricoeur, the critical side of hermeneutics must confront 
this ideological distortion toward ossification by, “establishing the limits for any claim to 
totalization” (Ricoeur 2004, 343). This bringing together of the distortions of ideology 
with Ricoeur’s hermeneutic project now allows us to recast, with a bit more clarity, 
Dauenhauer’s potential solutions to ossification. If ideological distortion emanates 
primarily from the growth in power of a specific identity that is narrated by a community 
that becomes their ‘official history’, any attempt to break the spell of that ideological 
distortion needs to start from the fact that “narrative identity…can include change, 
mutability” (Ricoeur 1988, 246), but where would that change and mutability come 
from? While Weber, much like Ricoeur, seems to want to resist the encroaching prospect 
of political ossification, Weber’s insistence on the irreplaceable values of the nation 
precludes him from offering a strong antidote. Ricoeur, however opens up possibilities 
where Weber seems to deny them. For Riceour, the ability to resist political ossification, 
to resist the ‘totalization in process’, is found in the process of destabilizing those very 
historical and cultural values that Weber notes are constitutive of then nation. 
 If ideology functions (both in its integrative mode as well as its more distortive 
modes) by producing and reproducing a history that works to create identity, stabilize 
institutions, and promote political legitimacy, any antidote to that functioning must 
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approach history, and the traditions that are sustained by that history, in a different way. 
For Ricoeur, this alternative approach sees “history…as an extensive development of 
meaning and as an irradiation of meaning from a multiplicity of organizing centers” 
(Ricoeur 2007, 39). This idea of history as multiplicity is essential, for it allows us to 
contest the ideologically functioning of history as a totality in process, and “this very 
plurality chips away from within the very concept of history as a collective singular” 
(Ricoeur 2004, 301). It is most important, however, that this not simply be seen as an 
exercise in reading history, but as an exercise in the democratic recovery of historical 
voices and alternative meanings as a specifically political project. In Ideology and 
Utopia, Ricoeur argues that “dissident voices are fundamental to the democratic process 
itself” (Ricoeur 1986, 249), and this engagement with otherness and democratic 
participation must include, and in fact is largely dependent on this historical recovery. If 
ideological institutions promote stability, than the reinterpretation undertaken by a critical 
hermeneutics, is inherently de-stabilizing. Dauenhauer notes this instability when he 
writes, “it is also possible, within limits, to tell more than one story about the same set of 
events” (Dauenhauer 1998, 277-8), and the political importance of these ‘conflicting 
stories’ is revealed more fully when we see how they connect to the histories and 
traditions that lie at the heart of all political communities. As Ricoeur argues, in The 
Course of Recognition, “the relating of memories can also turn into a conflict through the 
competition among memories about the same events that do not agree” (Ricoeur 2005, 
254). Additionally, this contestation of memory must take place around the very same 
structures that offer stability and identity to the political community. As Dauenhauer 
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notes, “only if these founding events receive different, and even competing accounts, can 
they avoid becoming part of a stultifying, even dangerous tradition” (Dauenhauer 1998, 
277). Thus, the histories and traditions that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics wants us to actively 
re-interpret are important because their reinterpretation makes plural what is increasingly 
seen as singular, and fractures the ossification that accompanies whatever is increasingly 
seen as a totalizing narrative. For Ricoeur, the dissident voices of any democratic project 
are largely dissident voices of the past. 
V. Ideology and Utopia 
  If I have so far argued that the move toward totality that is occasioned by 
ideology is a powerful one, it has to do with the link that Ricoeur establishes between 
ideology and tradition, it is because, as Bernard Dauenhauer argues, “The problem posed 
by traditions is that…what is transmitted claims to have a distinctive authority, the 
authority of the past” (Dauenhauer 1998, 224). Ideology enables tradition to be seen as a 
specific historical narrative that carries with it legitimation and the ability to stabilize 
contemporary relations of power due to its social ‘surplus value’. However, Ricoeur 
insists on carving out a space for the ‘note of contingency’ that is present within every set 
of historical traditions that engage the political community, a contingency that ideology 
can cover up, but never erase. This insistence on the part of Ricoeur is substantiated by 
his claim that it is not only contingency that can never be fully erased by ideological 
‘surplus value’ but the existence of difference. As Ricoeur argues, “one aspect of the very 
idea of traditionality…is that identity and difference are inextricably mixed together in it” 
(Ricoeur 1988, 20), and as much as ideology functions to suppress difference, the idea of 
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‘difference within traditions’ is inescapable. Just as Ricoeur wants to understand this 
critical hermeneutics as engagement with ideological distortion, it is also a process by 
which these differences within tradition, regardless of how much they have been 
suppressed through the functioning of ideology, are recovered. Kearney offers a succinct 
elaboration of this project when he writes, “in interpretation we endeavor to reappropriate 
those meaning that have been disappropriated…we strive to recover that which has been 
removed” (Kearney 2004, 31). But how, exactly do we connect Kearney’s comment to 
Ricoeur’s more overtly social claim about the existence of difference within tradition? 
 For Ricoeur, difference within tradition refers to alternative social and political 
possibilities that have been, at least partially ‘disappropriated’ or removed from the more 
ideologically inscribed understanding of tradition. In this sense, recovering the difference 
at the heart of tradition means “we must struggle against the tendency to consider the past 
only from the angle of what is done, unchangeable, and past. We have to re-open the past, 
to revivify its unaccomplished, cut-off – even slaughtered – possibilities” (Ricoeur 1988, 
216). For Ricoeur, it is the very process of re-interpretation that allows us to become 
aware of these alternative possibilities. And most importantly, this recovery is not simply 
a matter of ‘straightening out’ the historical record, or having a more ‘accurate’ 
understanding of the past, but it is the very thing that can serve as motivation and 
inspiration for future-oriented political action, our expectations for future-oriented 
political action can allow us to engage more clearly with those disappropriated parts of 
the past. In this sense, Ricoeur’s hermeneutical project is more radical in its political 
implications, and open to the realization of political possibilities, that some authors give 
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him credit for. C. Bryn Pinchin argues for a strong sense of conservatism to Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutical project, claiming that “there is no vision here of historical tradition as 
oppressive, imperialist, or patriarchal, and no sense of struggle, discontinuity, and 
exclusion” (Pinchin 1997). Given how distinctly Ricoeur connects the process of 
reinterpretation with the recovery of ‘unaccomplished possibilities’ as well as the very 
fact that he locates difference at the heart of tradition, and the this recovery of difference 
serves as the primary motivating force for his re-interpretive recovery, any claims that his 
hermeneutic theory favors stability of contestation seems to miss the essential tasks with 
which he charges hermeneutics. Additionally, I would argue that his critical 
hermeneutics, as a process of re-interpretation does not just look to acknowledge the 
possibilities buried in the past, but attempts to connect those past possibilities with 
political action.  
 Regarding this connection, Ricoeur writes, “the repercussion of our expectations 
relative to the future on the reinterpretation of the past may have as one of its major 
effects opening up forgotten possibilities, aborted potentialities, repressed endeavors in 
the supposedly closed past.” (Ricoeur 1988, 227). By embracing distanciation, traditions 
and histories can be reinterpreted in a way that brings to light, not simply the contingency 
of present political arrangements and structures of power, but an awareness of the 
repressed differences, and the buried past potentials that reside within traditions and are a 
part of all histories. But for Ricoeur, if the recovery of these alternative (forgotten) 
possibilities is an important political task, how does that recovery then feature in, or help 
to produce those ‘expectations relative to the future’ that he connects to reinterpretation? 
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How do these historical recoveries connect to his idea of ‘initiative’, of the “intervention 
of the agent of action in the course of the world” (Ricoeur 1992, 109)? To accomplish 
this, Ricoeur puts forward the idea of ‘utopia’, which Ricoeur sees as a concept and 
practice that “unmasks surplus-value” (Ricoeur 1986, 298), that results from the power of 
ideology as legitimation. 
 Ricoeur ties his understanding of utopia to his previously elaborated concept, 
ideology, connected the two via the issue of power. He writes, “both ideologies and 
utopias deal with power: ideology is always an attempt to legitimate power, while utopia 
is always an attempt to replace power by something else” (Ricoeur 1986, 288). This is 
not to say that Ricoeur believes that any utopian project can eliminate the existence of 
power from social life; that would be an impossible task. Rather, he sees ‘replacement’ of 
power as really the ability to offer alternative conceptions of how power should be 
distributed. In this sense, he also connects ideology and utopia together by noting that 
each one is connected not just to the existence of power, but to its legitimation. Whereas 
ideology, through the generation of ‘surplus-power’ legitimates existing arrangements of 
power and authority, “utopia also operates at the level of the legitimation process; it 
shatters a given order by offering alternative ways to deal with authority and power” 
(Ricoeur 1986, 179). Utopia, as a process of expressing alternative visions, re-acclimates 
our (individual and collective) understanding of, as he notes in The Just, what is possible 
at our given historical juncture. Utopia, “in the positive sense of the term, extends to the 
boundary line between the possible and the impossible” (Ricoeur 1986, 253), and by 
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offering ‘alternatives to the existing arrangements of authority and power’, allows us to 
engage in “the exploration of the possible” (Ricoeur 1986, 310). 
 Ricoeur is indebted to the work of Karl Mannheim to the degree that ideology and 
utopia must be seen as relational terms. Ricoeur writes, “The merit of Karl Mannheim, is 
that he both connected ideology and utopia and at the same time reserved their 
differences” (Ricoeur 1986, 272). Additionally, Ricoeur finds Mannheim helpful in his 
assertion that “a utopia is not only a set of ideas, but a mentality” (Ricoeur 1986, 274). 
Mannheim defines this utopian mentality as “all situationally transcendent ideas…whish 
in any way have a transforming effect up on the existing historical-social order” 
(Mannheim 1936, 205), and his underlying notion that all utopian mentalities are 
incongruous with reality and work to, in Ricoeur’s estimation, ‘shatter’ the given reality, 
demonstrates the debt that Ricoeur’s understanding of the term has. However, there are 
several issues that Ricoeur takes with Mannheim’s sociology that are key to this analysis. 
 Most importantly for Ricoeur, is Mannheim’s insistence that the utopian mentality 
seems to be in sharp decline. After discussing his historical utopian types, Mannheim 
argues, “the historical process itself shows us a gradual descent and a closer 
approximation to real life of a utopia that at one time completely transcended history” 
(Mannheim 1936, 248). That is, Mannheim believes that each successive utopian 
mentality has become less incongruous with reality than the one previous and “that each 
utopia…manifests a closer approximation to the historical-social process” (Mannheim 
1936, 249). Ricoeur believes that because of Mannheim’s insistence on incongruity as the 
measure of utopia, “he must take the elimination of noncongruence as a positive 
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gain…since it expresses an attempt to cope more closely with social reality (Ricoeur 
1986, 281). For Ricoeur this is a major point of contention: where Mannheim seems to be 
as least somewhat optimistic about this diminishing of utopian mentalities Ricoeur wants 
to resist this understanding. In fact, I would argue that Ricoeur wants to ‘recover’ the 
noncongruence of the utopian mentality, as part of his hermeneutical project. Mannheim, 
says Ricoeur, “believes that the category of totality has been effaced, and he thinks that 
his is the main character of our epoch” (Ricoeur 1986, 282). This would explain 
Mannheim’s claim that the contemporary world is “no longer in the making” (Mannheim 
1936, 257). However, as we have seen, Ricoeur is looking for tools that will allow us to 
resist such a totalizing conclusion, to re-insert notes of contingency and allow us to 
question that ‘totalization in process’. In fact, for Ricoeur it would seem that politics 
would be impossible without such resistance. 
 However, Mannheim’s explicit connection between the utopian mentality and the 
idea of ‘rising’ social strata seems to mitigate his claims that utopian mentalities are 
declining and congruence is the defining feature of contemporary life. Mannheim himself 
acknowledges the presence in the world of “those strata whose aspirations are not yet 
fulfilled” (Mannheim 1936, 257), which would seem to render his earlier claim 
problematic. If the utopian mentality is tied to social strata that are not dominant in the 
world, doesn’t that imply at least the (potential) continued existence of the utopian 
mentality, of forces and ideas that active work to shatter given political and social 
structures? Ricoeur insists as much, noting that “today the problems of the Third World 
would completely shatter this image. Nothing is less true than Mannheim’s claim that we 
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are “in a world which is no longer in the making”” (Ricoeur 1986, 282). Wouldn’t the 
existence of these ‘strata’ speak to the very issue that Ricoeur claims is fundamental to 
his project of ‘critical hermeneutics’: the recovery of alternatives and possibilities that 
have been suppressed and overlooked by the current configuration of power and 
authority. While Ricoeur resists the strict compartmentalizing of this process of 
reinterpretation into specific classes or ‘strata’, Mannheim’s acknowledgement of those 
unfulfilled aspirations speaks to the very claim that Ricoeur is making: this 
reinterpretation, this re-engagement with those lost or suppressed aspirations is the very 
thing that allows us to continually resist that totalization. 
 For Mannheim, ideology and utopia are related, but contestatory. Utopia is that 
which works to shatter a given reality, while “the ideological mentality assumes the 
impossibility of change” (Ricoeur 1986, 175). We must remember, however, that Ricoeur 
acknowledges the integrating function of ideology, and as such, we cannot posit such a 
simple relationship: ideology as preserving, utopia as shattering. As Ricoeur notes, “even 
a historical force that works to shatter the present order also presupposes something else 
that preserves the identity of a certain group, a certain class, a certain historical situation, 
and so on” (Ricoeur 1986, 180). Ricoeur wants to hold on to the integrative function of 
ideology as necessary to the functioning of his notion of utopia, even as this utopian 
impulse works against the distorting function of ideology, and the totalization that it 
works to produce. We need to see this utopian ‘shattering’ as emerging out of that 
integrative understanding of ideology because it is only through an engagement with 
those historical traditions that structure a society that a utopian project can emerge. 
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Dauenhauer writes, “Healthy utopianism does not concoct its aspirations from whole 
cloth. It constructs them…by drawing on past possibilities that were left unrealized” 
(Dauenhauer 1998, 317). Otherwise, we run the risk of encouraging “the “pathological” 
role that Ricoeur grants to utopia – that is, a radical project of social and political change 
that does not have any basis within the space of experience” (Michel 2015, 138). This 
pathology can emerge because, for Ricoeur, a utopian project without an historical 
anchor, runs the risk of losing a sense of collective purpose and common care for one 
another that adds, for Ricoeur, an important component to the utopian project. As he 
writes, “the interest in emancipation would be empty and anemic unless it received a 
concrete content…if it were not confirmed by our capacity to creatively reinterpret our 
cultural heritages” (Ricoeur 1974, 266). If we cannot locate an emancipatory project 
within a cultural tradition, and as one that takes its bearings from the dynamics of that 
tradition, Ricoeur believes that such an abstract movement can have no true political 
purchase, and hence, no effectiveness. The integrative function of ideology, on the other 
hand, “can help provide the utopian imaginary with a space of experience and 
rootedness” (Michel 2015, 136). Lastly, Ricoeur argues that utopia must be rooted in that 
historical experience of tradition because it is the best way to inspire action. He writes, 
“We must resist the seduction of purely utopian expectations. They can only make us 
despair of all action, for lacking an anchorage in experience, they are incapable of 
formulating a practical path directed to the ideals that they situate “elsewhere”” (Ricoeur 
1988, 215). Ricoeur wants to avoid this despair that can come from positing a purely a-
historical or non-contextualized utopia because of the difficulty (impossibility) of 
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realizing such a project. For Ricoeur, the goal of this idea of utopia, is to inspire action: 
not just a utopian mentality, but a politics as well. 
 What then, is Ricoeur’s utopian politics? For Ricoeur, it involves, “the imagining 
of an alternative way to use power” (Ricoeur 1986, 192). That is to say, the ultimate goal 
of Ricoeur’s use of the idea of ‘utopia’ is as a project of imagination (re-imagination) and 
initiative, the process of acting in the world. But this acting must be seen as emerging 
from that historical setting in which it emerges. As Dauenhauer writes, “initiative takes 
place in a historical present, a present that has predecessor presents and anticipated 
successor presents” (Dauenhauer 1998, 116). Political imagination is nourished by this 
utopian drive, and, as George Taylor asserts, “the utopian quality of the imagination 
moves us from the instituted to the instituting” (Ricoeur 1986, xxx). The use of this 
terminology brings us back to Castoriadis and his project of ‘radical autonomy’, “the 
(radical) socially instituting imaginary in contrast with the socially instituted imaginary” 
(Michel 2015, 133). However, Ricoeur’s insistence on the relationship between utopia 
and the integrative function of ideology produces a fundamental difference. Where 
Castoriadis insists on a complete break between the ‘instituted’ and the ‘instituting’, 
Ricoeur argues that the two must be seen as part of the same larger structure. He argues 
for “two functions of the social imaginary. The first moves toward integration, repetition, 
reflection. The second…tends toward wandering. But you cannot have one without the 
other.” (Ricoeur 2007, 186). Moreover, the production of the new out of received 
institutions, while seen by Castoriadis as an impossible project, is essential for Ricoeur 
who acknowledges that, “new social and political imaginary meaning are always 
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inherited from prior imaginary forms” (Michel 2015, 132). This is possible for Ricoeur 
because he acknowledges the existence of ‘difference’ within the received past, where the 
past is not seen as closed, but as the repository of suppressed possibilities and aborted 
potentialities. Additionally, where Castoriadis poses autonomous, democratic societies as 
those that are completely self-creating and self-limiting, Ricoeur believes that “there still 
persists extra-social sources and what he calls the “residual violence” of political 
institutions, even in democratic societies” (Michel 2015, 132), which is largely, for 
Ricoeur, contained in the ‘surplus-value’ that ideology can confer, even upon the most 
democratic social conditions, that no society can ever be free of.  
 Ultimately, Ricoeur argues that history and tradition must be understood as 
carriers of difference as much as anything else, and it is acknowledgement of that 
difference that emerges through reinterpretation. Those differences at the heart of 
received traditions, which are largely the residue of “forgotten possibilities, aborted 
potentialities, repressed endeavors in the supposedly closed past” (Ricoeur 1988, 227), 
can be seen as those possibilities for collective life and political community that have 
been suppressed by the current ideological construction of authority and legitimacy that 
describe and define the contemporary community. These potentials serve as an animating 
force for the very utopian project that Ricoeur is looking for, a utopian project that can 
inspire political action and participation. Through an engagement with those suppressed 
alternatives, through a reinterpretation of the ‘differences’ at the heart of all traditions, 
Ricoeur believes that we can productively, and significantly, re-imagine the distribution 
of power and authority that shape our political communities, and our collective lives. I 
   283 
 
would now like to bring this into dialogue with Wolin in order to clarify his spectral idea 
of a ‘public hermeneutic’ as a core element to democratic experience. 
VI. Wolin, Ricoeur, and a Public Hermeneutic 
 A consistent theme in the work of Sheldon Wolin is his tying of democracy to a 
process of recovery. In The Presence of the Past, he argues that the book “might 
justifiably be considered essays in retrieval” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 4), and elsewhere he 
describes democracy as “a political moment, perhaps the political moment, when the 
political is remembered and re-created” (S. S. Wolin 1996, 43). This theme persists even 
into his most recent work on democracy, Democracy Inc., where he writes about the 
necessity of “going back for democracy” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 276). In his analysis of 
Wolin, Scott Nelson deliberately ties this idea of recovery or remembrance to the practice 
of democracy, arguing that, “this ‘will to remember’ – to partake in the work of memory 
– is critical to vital democracy’s ethos or its culture” (Nelson 2010). However, much of 
the commentary on Wolin’s work focuses less on this aspect of recovery, and rather 
draws our attention to how Wolin posits democracy as a creative force: not retrieving 
from the past, but rebelling against it. George Kateb argues that for Wolin, “the 
democratic moment is by its very nature rebellious or revolutionary” (Kateb, Wolin as a 
Critic of Democracy 2001, 40), and even commentary more sympathetic than Kateb’s 
draws our attention to this same idea. Nicholas Xenos argues that “the democratic 
moment must be a moment of transgression of boundaries and not a renewal of them” 
(Xenos 2001, 34). These commentaries are not wrong to emphasize this element of 
Wolin’s democratic theory. Though I argued in the first chapter that Wolin conceptually 
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distinguishes democracy from revolution, he does bring the two terms close together, and 
identifies some shared dynamics. In discussing the origin of Athenian democracy, Wolin 
notes (approvingly) that, “democracy was born in transgressive acts for the demos could 
not participate in power without shattering the class, status, and value systems by which it 
was excluded” (S. S. Wolin 1996, 37). This ultimately leads Xenos to make that claim 
that democracy, for Wolin, is a term that is mean to illustrate how “the striving of the 
demos challenges and overflows the forms that attempt to contain it” (Xenos 2001, 31). 
As important as this element is to the unique presentation of democracy that Wolin 
offers, I believe that to take the full measure of his theorizations, both aspects of his 
understanding of democracy – recovery and rebellion – need to be thought of together.  
 Wolin captures this relation when he writes, “The answer is…to reclaim our 
politicalness. This means not only finding new democratic forms but of recovering an old 
idea, the idea of Everyman as a morally autonomous agent” (S. S. Wolin 1982, 57). 
While here, Wolin’s idea of recovery is aimed at a very specific political concept, we see 
throughout his work multiple references to political recovery that is less specific, but 
seemingly just as important. It is only in a productive joining of the creation of ‘new 
forms’ with the retrieval of past ideas, or the recovery of some lost inheritances (recall 
the discussion of ‘birthright’ from Chapter One) that we see the full flowering of Wolin’s 
democratic theory. In the first chapter, I attempted to show how Wolin could maintain the 
relationship only by incorporating (in the limited way he does) the idea of a ‘public 
hermeneutics’ into his analysis, as well as conceiving of citizens as ‘interpreting beings’. 
Furthermore, I claimed that because this hermeneutic element drops out of his later work, 
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the tension between retrieval and creation that animates the heart of his early work is lost, 
and that loss weakens his project significantly. I would like to demonstrate how a more 
full engagement with hermeneutics might clarify and strengthen his theory of democracy, 
and to do so we must first turn to his idea of ‘politicalness’ or ‘the political’. Not only 
will an examination of these ideas allow us to trace out the hermeneutic potential that is 
inherent in his democratic theory, but it will help us clarify Wolin’s understanding of 
democracy as “not primarily a set of political institutions but a cultural practice” (S. S. 
Wolin 1995, 50), or as discussed above, democracy as experience. 
 At the center of Wolin’s conception of democracy is this notion of recovering the 
‘political’ which he defines in Democracy Inc. as “the idea that a free society composed 
of diversities can nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality when, through public 
deliberations, collective power is used to promote or protect the well-being of the 
collectivity” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 31). That is to say, Wolin connects this ‘coming into 
being’ of this democratic collectivity to the transgressive element of democracy, which is 
why Wolin goes to great lengths to distinguish democracy as experience from settled 
forms of political institutions. Wolin writes that “a constitution in setting limits to politics 
sets limits as well to democracy, constituting it in ways compatible with and legitimating 
of the dominant power groups in the society” (S. S. Wolin 1996, 34), and rather than 
seeing democracy emerge from within a constitutional form, he wants to ask, “what of 
democracy is suppressed by a constitution” (S. S. Wolin 1995)? If democracy is 
essentially about transgressing boundaries, and a constitution is about establishing and 
perpetuating a certain set of boundaries, then the two are in constant conflict, and Wolin 
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urges us to see democracy as a moment that destabilizes and unsettles the instituted forms 
of power and authority housed within, among other things, constitutions. Or, as he 
describes the Athenian democratic movement, “The political challenge of the demos 
inevitable overflowed the customary and institutional boundaries within which elites 
were attempting to fix politics” (S. S. Wolin 1995, 48). 
 However, it is not simply destabilizing, it is not simply about questioning or 
overflowing established barriers. Contrary to Kateb’s claim that “Wolin…attributes no 
creative power to the democratic moment” (Kateb 2001, 40), creativity and innovation 
play a crucial role. In addition to his concern with ‘moments of commonality’ as 
transgressive, he imbues these moments of democratic collectivity with a concern for the 
creations of new forms of (among others) civility, power sharing, and of “people taking 
hold of conditions at hand and steadily shaping them to accord with how they think equal 
beings should live” (S. S. Wolin 1981, 24). This is why, in his essay on revolutionary 
action, he focuses on John Locke as opposed to other more common thinkers of 
revolutionary activity. In this discussion of revolution, Wolin wants to assert that “the 
right to revolt is about devising new institutions…it is about a capacity to share in power, 
to cooperate in it” (S. S. Wolin 1992, 250). That is to say, Wolin’s transgression of given 
boundaries is done in the service of imagining, proposing, and creating new political 
conditions and goals. But if all of this, the transgression of old forms as well as the 
construction of new, is conditioned on the possibility of the creation and recognition of 
commonality among citizens, we need to ask the question, how does that commonality 
arise?  
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 We get a sense of this from Wolin himself. He argues that democracy will always 
be “a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the political survives” (S. S. Wolin 
1995, 55). Here, we seem to be returning to Wolin’s concern with the historical nature of 
citizenship that was analyzed in Chapter One. Our memory of moments of collectivity, of 
the (periodic) historical eruptions of the political seems to be the very condition for its re-
emergence. Nelson echoes this claim when he argues that “Wolin articulates a political 
conception of community that fosters a deliberate tradition-reflective political life, a 
special conception of what it means to live in a community of shared experience” (Nelson 
2010, 38). In his article, Nelson elaborated a conception of political-historical 
recollection that allows for the ‘reconstruction’ and ‘revision’ of the democratic 
collectivity. While I believe that Nelson’s ‘tradition-reflective’ conception of citizenship 
is helpful, Ricoeur’s deliberate use of interpretation, especially with regard to tradition, 
gives us a more nuanced understanding of just how this political-historical recollection 
infuses Wolin’s democratic collectivity with an animating purpose and commonality. 
 As discussed above, Ricoeur understands citizenship, and citizens more generally, 
as being the inheritors of tradition, which is a term that is not alien to Wolin. Wolin’s 
idea of ‘the birthright’ means “we come into this world preceded by an inheritance” (S. S. 
Wolin 1989, 138) and the idea of that inheritance as a tradition permeates many of the 
chapters in The Presence of the Past. Nelson makes the claim that “Wolin intends 
‘tradition’ to be used as a synonym for culture…that community of individuals which 
cares for a nurtures political values like equality, community, legislative power, the good 
life, and democracy” (Nelson 2010, 37), however, I think this is too rosy of a claim. 
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While equality and democracy may be part of a tradition, it is not the whole of it. Our 
tradition also includes constitutional forms (that limit and displace democracy and 
democratic energies) laws, and a certain distribution of power and authority. These are 
parts of tradition that are not immediately supportive of those moments of democratic 
commonality, but instead are concerned with legitimating dominant groups, and 
perpetuating boundaries that serve elite interests. But then how can this tradition, 
containing as it does not simply triumphant moments of collective action, but also 
(primarily) containing moments of elite control and the suppression of democracy, serve 
to re-animate those collective energies of the demos that Wolin is so concerned with 
preserving? 
 Similar to the way I argued that Machiavelli sees the return to principles as a 
means to inspire powerful political action, I believe that this Ricoeurian idea of tradition 
can do the same for Wolin’s conception of democracy, despite how anti-democratic much 
of that tradition may be. Ricoeur writes, “Composed of possibilities that are neither 
chosen nor fettering, but are handed down and transmitted…a heritage is what can be 
received, taken over, assumed by someone” (Ricoeur 1988, 74). I believe that Wolin’s 
theory allows for the possibility that this tradition can in fact work to produce democratic 
power, but only if we face that tradition, that inheritance, in a certain way. This is exactly 
why Wolin “calls for a citizen who can becomes an interpreting being” (S. S. Wolin 
1989, 141), because he is worried that a non-interpreting citizenry will fail to see this 
tradition precisely AS history, as a collection of historical projects that must be critically 
re-interpreted and re-purposed. Instead, they will see it as a set of institutions that are 
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largely beyond the power of citizens. A non-interpreting citizen will instead be 
susceptible to the temptation of what Wolin variously calls ‘biblicism’ or ‘archaism’, a 
mode of understanding our political traditions as containing “privileged moments in the 
past where a transcendent truth was revealed…steadily distancing contemporary society 
from its past…that bind the identity of the believers” (S. S. Wolin 2008, 117). While 
Wolin argues that this archaism produces a sense in the believers of the transcendental, 
unchanging truth of those moments and the pure forms of those institutions, I believe, 
that Wolin sees the other side of this archaism as a profound moment of de-
democratization and disempowerment. In this sense, Wolin writes about 
‘demoralization’, which he sees as “living continuously and hopelessly in circumstances 
where one is assailed endlessly by forces that one cannot understand, much less control” 
(S. S. Wolin 1982, 55), and that eventually the belief in this transcendental truth will lead 
to a condition of existence characterized by demoralization, as adherence to 
transcendental truth can only be purchased at the expense of democratic potential and 
energy. We can see ‘demoralization’ as perhaps the opposite of ‘the political’. One is a 
condition where people recognize the ability to act in common to create new conditions 
of existence, whereas the other is a condition where that possibility escapes citizens: 
rather than collective actors, they see themselves as continually subject to powers beyond 
their capacities for judgement, action, and change. 
 In contrast, an interpreting citizen is one who will approach that tradition in a 
‘critical hermeneutic’ manner, who will understand that traditions must be interpreted in 
order to overcome the alienation and distanciation that exists between the inherited 
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tradition and themselves, to make and remake the tradition that we have inherited. As 
Ricoeur writes, “a living reinterpretation of tradition can permit modern societies to resist 
the leveling to which the consumer society submits” (Ricoeur 1974, 293). The only way 
that citizens can overcome the condition of ‘demoralization’ and of de-politicization that 
in Chapter One we saw Wolin bemoaning, is through a process of ‘living reinterpretation. 
For Wolin’s theory, this distanciation allows us to see this tradition as made up of 
difference, in fact, difference is the essential lens through which the interpreting citizen 
must see this history that has been inherited. With regard to this history, Nelson writes, 
“memories of past successes and failures are indispensable to the forms of democratic 
renewal Wolin hopes can happen” (Nelson 2010, 40), and this is quite close to the 
definition that Ricoeur gives of tradition: a history that contains “unaccomplished, cut-off 
– even slaughtered – possibilities” (Ricoeur 1988, 216). But what is it about these 
‘successes and failures’ or these ‘unaccomplished possibilities’ that are so essential for 
the continued possibility of democracy? I do not want to argue that Nelson is wrong 
when he claims that the memories of successes and failures are tools of remembrance that 
can inspire the emergence of democratic moments of experience, but I believe that 
reducing this historical component of Wolin’s theory to simply remembering past events 
as inspiration is lacking the full measure of the importance of this process of 
interpretation. 
 It is not simply a matter of reviving these successes and failures, or imitating 
them. Rather, when we see these choices, when we see this difference contained within 
the past that we are interpreting in order to overcome the distanciation of tradition, we are 
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presented with the fact that our governing institutions are both historical and ideological. 
They are historical in the sense that they are the result of political decisions made in the 
past and they are ideological in the sense that we can see, following Ricoeur, how they all 
contain a certain amount of ‘surplus power’ that is used to fix, and render legitimate a 
certain distribution of power and authority. This surplus power makes it easy for citizens 
to “become disposed, included in such a way that political authorities can count on their 
active support most of the time” (S. S. Wolin 1981, 10). This disposition that Wolin 
theorizes, a disposition that seems to lie at the heart of his concept of ‘demoralization’ 
has echoes of Ricoeur’s idea that we often feel our historical experience as ‘a totalization 
in process’, which Dauenhauer believes can lead to political ossification. By rendering 
the ideological52 component of our tradition explicit, we can hope to overcome this 
tendency toward political ossification, or totalization. This ossification is what Wolin 
refers to variously as ‘Biblicism’ or ‘archaism’, ways of looking at those inherited 
institutions that “contribute to steadily distancing contemporary society from its past” (S. 
S. Wolin 2008, 117) by positing the past as transcendental, unchanging, and an ideal 
form. Just as Wolin wants to see democracy as a means to destabilize political 
institutions, this reinterpretation of tradition is a means to destabilize the ideological 
power of that very tradition, opening up space for creative re-appropriation and 
engagement: the very foundations of Wolin’s democratic experience. 
 What emerges from Ricoeur’s process of reinterpreting tradition is the ability for 
us to imagine a new distribution of power and authority. For Ricoeur, this is the 
specifically utopian element that is part of the process of reinterpretation: it unmasks the 
                                                 
52 Ideological in this sense more in terms of distortion more than integration. 
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functioning of that ideological surplus value that reinforces the authority of political 
institutions and, in doing so, provides us with an impulse to “reimagine the boundary line 
between the possible and the impossible” (Ricoeur 1986, 253). For Wolin, this too is a 
key element to the democratic potential of citizens, “democracy is committed to the claim 
that experience with, and access to, power is essential to the development with the 
capacities of ordinary persons…power is…something to be used collaboratively in order 
to initiate to invent, to bring about” (S. S. Wolin 1989, 154). The collective engagement 
with power that is the cornerstone of his idea of ‘the political’ ultimately has its greatest 
purpose in the ability for the collectivity to use that power in order to create new forms of 
collective life: new institutions, and new constitutions that reflect this shared conception 
of equality or collective rights. In this regard, it is interesting that in his essay “Norm and 
Form”, Wolin assigns to democracy, a “political surplus, the unwillingness of the demos 
to remain contented with a simple “share” in the major political institutions” (S. S. Wolin 
1995, 49). I would argue that this political surplus that can be accessed through 
democratic action is in a sense the redistribution of the ideological surplus that Ricoeur 
sees housed within political institutions so long as they remained ossified, or are 
experienced primarily as totalized institutions, rather than institutions that are historical, 
and the result of contingent, provisional decisions. This critical, public hermeneutics 
allows us to see contemporary distributions of power as not simply natural, or given 
political phenomena. Instead it is a practice of interpretation that produces “the radical 
denial that social deference and hierarchy are “natural”” (S. S. Wolin 1995, 50), and that 
contemporary distributions of power and authority are simply possible ways of 
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experiencing or navigating power and authority that exist within a universe of 
possibilities: some tried, some not, and some not yet imagined.  
 Just as these differences within the historical material form, for Ricoeur, the 
conditions out of which the utopian drive and imagination emerge, it also appears to be 
an essential part of Wolin’s notion of democratic experience.  Nelson’s claim about 
historical material as inspiration is important for perhaps understanding the specific 
material around which commonality can be formed, but it is important that we remember 
that for Wolin, it is not just about commonality, but it is about commonality in the service 
of experiencing power, and using power to reimagine collective life. The overcoming of 
distanciation and alienation that Ricoeur attributes to reinterpretation is beginning of a 
process that is central to Wolin’s theory of democracy: the ability for a collective to 
assert creative power over and against a set of institutions that limit political activity, and 
largely function to set the boundaries of permissible political activity or claims. By 
rendering these institutions historical, this process of interpretation allows collective 
groups to reposess the surplus power that is otherwise alienated to these institutions, and 
in returning that power potential to the collective, it opens up the possibility for the 
emergence of democratic experience. A reclamation of creative power that destabilizes 
the present forms of institutional arrangements by destabilizing the historical traditions 
that transmit and (if not actively reinterpreted), buttress those very arrangements. The last 
element of this public hermeneutic that is important for our discussion of Wolin has to do 
with one of the most unique, and sometimes frustrating elements of Wolin’s theory of 
democracy: the pronounced ‘formlessness’ that he ascribes to democracy. I wish to assert 
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however, that, from the perspective of a public hermeneutic, this formlessness is not a 
weakness, or an oversight, but is essential to the very functioning of democracy.   
 Wolin variously describes democracy as ‘fugitive’, ‘momentary’, and ‘episodic’, 
and beyond that, he does not offer very much content to the term itself. In “Norm and 
Form”, Wolin writes that “Democracy…is not so much amorphous as polymorphous” (S. 
S. Wolin 1995, 50), and he regularly seems to resist thinking of democracy as any type of 
settled term or idea. This harkens back to his idea of democracy as an experience, and as 
a “moment rather than a teleologically completed form” (S. S. Wolin 1995, 40). This 
polymorphous nature to his understanding of democracy has not gone unnoticed. 
Nicholas Xenos claims that, for Wolin, “Democracy has a protean quality that transcends 
tradition” (Xenos 2001, 27), and Nelson argues that “Wolin appears reluctant to fill in the 
‘content’ of the polis or community…Wolin never supplements the idea of the populace 
or ‘people’ with anything more than a generic gloss” (Nelson 2010, 32), and he refers to 
Wolin’s theory as largely ambivalent53 in how it theorizes these terms and ideas. But this 
does raise an important question: why does Wolin insist on this ambivalence? Is there 
something productive to his defining democracy in this way? 
 One possible answer is that Wolin is reluctant to give much content to the 
definition of democracy in order to keep focus on democracy’s ongoing efforts to 
transcend institutional forms that are established to contain potential democratic energies. 
Kateb argues that, with regard to Wolin’s theoretical disposition, “institutionalization is 
the triumph of form over content” (Kateb 2001, 48) and Wolin worries that we could 
succumb to the widespread belief that “Democracy…is the form of government that has 
                                                 
53 Though it should be pointed out that Nelson does not see this ambivalence as a negative trait. 
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had its revolution” (S. S. Wolin 1992, 240). All of this could lead to a condition where 
we instinctively see democracy as being effectively housed with a certain set of electoral, 
constitutional, and institutional arrangements, thereby allowing us to sidestep the very 
idea of democracy as an experience that transgresses institutional boundaries. Desiring to 
offer an interpretation of democracy as transgressive and repeatedly tied to (though 
distinct from) revolution, Wolin might want to resist the temptation to reduce democracy 
to a clear and concise definition, in order to maintain the tension he posits as existing 
between settled institutional forms and moments of democratic activity. Nelson seems to 
echo this possibility when he argues that Wolin “wants to recover aspects of a democratic 
experience that are at odds with a domesticated democracy, that is, a highly structured 
form” (Nelson 2010, 35), and that is why Wolin relies on these various terms, and 
staunchly refuses to full them with clear and formal content. Nelson goes beyond this, 
however, and argues that these amorphous (polymorphous?) terms are important for 
Wolin because “he sees in them the possibility for critical-reflective energies that can be 
deployed when priorities shift” (Nelson 2010, 35). That is to say, it is not simply in order 
to maintain this tension between form and transgression, but that the terms themselves 
offer a certain purchase when investigating the changing nature of political priorities and 
goals. While I do not want to dismiss either of these claims, I would like to argue that 
there is something even more fundamental at work here with regard to Wolin’s 
ambivalent, or polymorphous descriptions of democracy. I would argue that this 
‘formless’ definition that Wolin gives to democracy is related to the very functioning of a 
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public hermeneutics, and this hermeneutic project draws upon, and is sustained by, this 
very formlessness. 
 Much the same way that Wolin’s conceptualizes democracy as a moment, and not 
a ‘teleologically completed form’, Ricoeur argues that “democracy…is not a finished 
political form. It is a history that is underway and that we must prolong. It is a form in the 
making and under contest” (Dauenhauer 1998, 36).54 This idea of a ‘form in the making’ 
is important to both Wolin and Ricoeur, it draws our attention to the idea that democracy 
is something that is perpetually contestable and changeable, and the various (nearly 
limitless) demands that democratic movements can make, means that tying it to a specific 
form can only limit those possibilities, and defuse its revolutionary spirit, which Wolin 
and Ricoeur seem hesitant to do. As Wolin writes, “Others claim that…a revolution 
against democracy in the name of democracy is a contradiction…as long as a political 
system is democratic, it makes no sense to think of revolutionary activity as an 
appropriate or obligatory form of action” (S. S. Wolin 1992, 240). So by giving a 
concrete form to the idea of democracy means that once that form is established – 
whether it be universal suffrage, open elections, a welfare state, etc – the tendency would 
be to believe that the (potentially) powerful, near revolutionary democratic moments 
should be curtailed, because such activity is no longer necessary nor desirable.  This, for 
Wolin, would be tragic because moments of democratic experience should always be 
seen as potentially able to congeal against conditions of injustice, or relations of power 
that have been institutionally established. Because it would be impossible to really 
                                                 
54 Dauenhauer gets this definition from his translation of an early essay by Ricoeur, “La Crise de la 
Democratie et la Conscience Chretienne”. 
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imagine a set of institutions in which settled power relations are completely just and 
equitable, so too should it be impossible for democratic activity to be severed from its 
potential. But how exactly could this argument be sustained? What argument can we 
offer about the potential of democratic experience that supports this openness of form, or 
this understanding of democracy as a continuous ‘form in the making’? Why wouldn’t it 
be enough to assign democracy a set of formal institutions and concerns that can be 
achieved as a sign of the arrival of a democratic form of government? 
 I would argue that Ricoeur himself gives us a compelling answer this questions 
when he defines his hermeneutical understanding of the world. Ricoeur describes 
existence as an ‘unending’ process of interpretation because we can never arrive at that 
endpoint, or as Kearney writes, “interpretation remains an ongoing process, which no one 
vision can totalize” (Kearney 2004, 5). If, for Wolin, (potentially) democratic citizens are 
‘interpreting beings’ and if we take from Ricoeur the idea that interpretation is a never 
ending process, we can argue that democracy as interpretation, as a public hermeneutic, 
cannot be tied to a set of institutional forms, because doing so would run the risk of 
producing a ‘totalizing vision’ that would disable the type of contestation that 
hermeneutics provides. Its very openness is tied to the hermeneutic impulse that I see 
animating Wolin’s entire project. 
 But it is not simply a technical issue that allows us to see why Wolin’s formless 
conception of democracy is important, there is an important political reason as well. 
Insisting on this formlessness allows for us more assiduously to leave open the possibility 
of new voices that add to the process of interpretation. Much the same way that Ricoeur’s 
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insistence on interpreting ‘difference’ into tradition, an insistence on the hermeneutic and 
political openness of democracy allows for new voices to emerge, voices that can offer 
new interpretations and new frameworks to contest present political forms. William 
Connolly argues that one of the consequences of Wolin’s definition of democracy is that 
“it extends old frontiers by drawing new groups, concerns, priorities, supports, or rights 
into them. Hence, democracy must not be governed too tightly by a prior set of moral 
principles, constitutional rules, corporate dictates or normative codes” (Connolly 2001, 
15). Ricoeur’s notion of a critical hermeneutics directs us to much the same claim. Just as 
Ricoeur argues that interpretation must see difference within tradition, it is essential for 
us to see interpretation as multiple, and never as a unified process producing a ‘totalizing 
vision’ out of that interpretation. As early his writing of Freud and Philosophy, he argues 
that “not one but several interpretations have to be integrated into reflection” (Ricoeur 
1970, 54), and later, when defining hermeneutics, he writes, “what the work of reading 
reveals is not only a lack of determinacy…but also an excess of meaning. For every 
text…is revealed to be inexhaustible” (Ricoeur 1988, 169). But what does this mean for a 
public hermeneutics, how can this hermeneutics confront this inexhaustible excess of 
meaning that can (potentially) be found within the difference we find at the heart of 
tradition. Andreea Ritivoli, draws our attention to a politics that “ draws on the interest 
and beliefs of groups that are commonly not represented” (Ritivoli 2006, 133), and 
Dauenheuer argues that a Ricoeurian political ethic derived from this understanding of 
multiplicity “calls for…people to be hospitable to the memories that foreigners have that 
are constitutive of the identity and distinctiveness of their culture” (Dauenhauer 1998, 
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276). While they are both pointing to an important element in Ricoeur’s conception, it 
becomes clearer when we tie these ‘excluded groups’ or ‘foreigners’ to this hermeneutic 
process. The inclusion of new voices or new standpoints in this hermeneutic process will 
ensure new interpretations, new ways of understanding the difference at the heart of 
tradition, and new challenges to the distributions of power and authority that emerge from 
the traditions that are being interrogated. 
 In Chapter Two I argued that Wolin’s dropping of his nascent hermeneutics leads 
him into a situation where his non-hermeneutic understanding of retrieval moves in a 
conservative direction that leads him perilously close to the idea of retrieval-as-archaism 
that he spends a fair amount of Democracy Inc. critiquing. Additionally, his notion of 
democratic ‘retrieval’ and ‘recovery’ of ‘hard won practices’ promises to move his theory 
toward an undercurrent of the very American exceptionalism that he is so attuned to 
elsewhere. That is to say, this non-hermeneutical project seems to leave him with a 
slightly reified conception of the historical material that he is drawing upon, making it 
difficult, if not impossible, for his project to incorporate alternative historical material. I 
believe that reasserting and making explicit the hermeneutic side to this project can avoid 
the conservatism that colors the reification and quasi-archaism. A public hermeneutics 
that insists on the constant interrogation of tradition can be nourished and sustained when 
it subsequently insists on the inclusion of new voices and interpretative standpoints from 
which to interrogate the traditions that we find ourselves the inheritors of. This allows for 
Wolin’s democratic project to break from the strict confines of the state that he begins to 
succumb to in Democracy Inc., and offer a tentative conception of democracy that, while 
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still primarily concerned with the interrogation of political forms that we associate with 
states (constitutions, electoral systems) is not fully constrained by them, and as a result 
can offer a much more robust conception of ‘retrieval’. A conception that is nourished by 
the inclusion of more voices, more opinions, and more attempts to reinterpret the 
conditions and traditions that give rise to the political institutions that structure our 
collective lives.  
VII. Conclusion 
 The work of Sheldon Wolin is some of the most powerful work on democratic 
theory in the contemporary American academy, and I do not wish to undersell the vitality 
and importance of his efforts. What I have attempted here is what I would call a ‘creative 
re-appraisal’ of Wolin’s work that is designed not to dwell on certain perceived 
weaknesses, but to offer an analysis of how those weaknesses can be overcome if we are 
attentive to, and work to develop, certain ‘semi-buried’ components of his work. To this 
end, I have attempted to understand his theory as a hermeneutical undertaking by drawing 
attention to his use (albeit in a limited way) of the term ‘public hermeneutics’, and then 
expanding on this as a robust possibility. Ultimately, by bringing his democratic theory 
into a more deliberate conversation with the hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, I 
attempt to illustrate how the weaknesses that I believe emerge in his later work can be 
largely mitigated thanks to this deliberate recasting of his democratic project as a 
political-hermeneutic project. 
 In this chapter, I have tried to develop two important features that define this 
public hermeneutic. The first is the way in which the hermeneutic ties together 
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reinterpretation and the recovery of tradition with the Wolinian democratic impulse 
toward the creation of new forms of collective existence, and the transgressing of given 
boundaries and political and institutional restraints. Wolin’s insistence, in The Presence 
of the Past, on citizens as ‘interpretive beings’ means that any retrieval of the past must 
involve the Ricourian process of reinterpretation and the active transmission of traditions, 
which involves actively rethinking and repurposing that tradition. It is a retrieval that 
challenges inherited forms, rather than simply re-presenting them or maintaining them in 
a non-dynamic way. Moreover, this form of reinterpretation allows us to see our 
historical and political traditions not as part of a totalization, or as an ossified vision, but 
as traditions defined by difference within that tradition. This difference allows us, as 
democratic actors to ‘denaturalize’ the given political present, to see within it possibilities 
for alternative forms for the distribution of power and authority within and throughout 
society. Much the same way that Ricoeur sees the ‘utopian’ element of politics arising 
out of the received historical traditions, by reconceptualizing Wolin’s democratic theory 
as a public hermeneutics, we can also see how his theory ties together these twin 
processes of recovery and creation. 
 The second important element has to do with the idea that this hermeneutic 
process can never arrive at a final endpoint. If the critical element of hermeneutics is to 
unmask the distorting functions of ideology, we need to admit that we will never be able 
to arrive at a system free from distortion, and therefore the hermeneutic task, much like 
Wolin (and Ricoeur’s) description of democracy, must be seen as a constant ‘form in the 
making’. Just as the purpose of a public hermeneutic is to resist the ‘totalizing’ tendency 
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of political institutions and the traditions that sustain them, hermeneutics itself must resist 
seeing any interpretation or understanding as similarly totalizing or absolute. This 
repeated opening up of the hermeneutic task will be nourished with the constant addition 
of new voices that will offer up new interpretations of those traditions: unmasking novel 
interpretations of how the surplus-value of ideology is functioning to legitimate political 
systems and offering new alternatives for how those systems can be refashioned and 
reimagined. I argue that this hermeneutic task is well suited to Wolin’s theory of 
democracy due to the ‘formlessness’ that he assigns to the term itself, which allows it to 
adapt to this constant hermeneutic undertaking. This public hermeneutic, the endless 
process of reinterpreting and reevaluating the historical material and traditions that are 
part of our inheritance as citizens, and utilizing those interpretive acts to inspire moments 
of collective purpose and action that are concerned with reclaiming power and 
forwarding new patterns of collective life forms an essential component to the democratic 
theory of Sheldon Wolin, one that strengthens his project: its purpose, and its potential. 
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Conclusion 
 In the introduction to his final major work; Memory, History, Forgetting, Paul 
Ricoeur announces, “I continue to be troubled by the unsettling spectacle offered by an 
excess of memory here, and an excess of forgetting elsewhere, to say nothing of the 
influence of commemorations and abuses of memory – and forgetting” (Ricoeur 2004, 
xv). In this dissertation, I attempted to show why exactly that type of concern might be 
important, because of the impact it might have on citizenship and, more specifically, the 
potential for meaningful democratic participation in the contemporary world. Ricoeur’s 
concern with memory is especially acute due to his insistence on the ontologically 
hermeneutic nature of the world we inhabit. History becomes important politically, and 
collectively, because it is through the interpretation and re-interpretation of history that 
we are able to take possession of the world that we inherit, overcome the distanciation of 
inherited tradition, and we are able to make this history into something vital and alive for 
us. 
 Even though he is less overt about any concerns he might have for history and 
memory, Sheldon Wolin voices concerns over the possibility and potential for democratic 
experience, and for citizens to engage with their democratic and creative potential. I 
argued that the crisis of citizenship that Wolin is so acutely aware of can be understood 
more deeply if we integrate his understanding of democracy and democratic citizenship 
with Ricoeur’s concern for history and his focus on the development of a critical 
hermeneutic. In the end, I argued that Wolin’s crisis of citizenship is in fact, a 
hermeneutic-interpretive crisis. He bemoans the loss of citizens as interpretive beings, 
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and outlines just how that loss can produce a serious democratic deficit. However, 
Wolin’s democratic theory evolves in such a way that (to a degree) loses sight of that 
very hermeneutic-interpretive dimension, and this loss has serious consequences for his 
democratic project overall. Therefore, I attempted to go about the process of 
reinvigorating Wolin’s theory by returning it to the hermeneutical issues that are so 
central to his crisis of citizenship and that, if we return Wolin to those issues, are able to 
return his overall democratic theory to its rightful vital and vibrant place. 
 To show just how these political and historical concerns should more readily be 
ours as well, I attempted to bring this Wolinian/Ricoeurian crisis into a sustained 
dialogue with Niccolò Machiavelli, Max Weber, and Cornelius Castoriadis, three thinkers 
who I would characterize as not being so concerned with the interpretive powers of 
citizens as they are with the political powers of citizens: establishing the conditions for 
principled and meaningful political action is one of the major ambitions that I would 
argue they all share. However, I attempted to show that if we take Ricoeur’s claim 
seriously about the ontological nature of hermeneutics, none of these thinkers can avoid 
historical and interpretive issues. Castoriadis, because he divorces political creativity 
from historical institutions, produces an untenable distinction between active and passive 
societies that doesn’t accurately capture the political dynamics at work in a society that 
can hinder or help creativity. So even though his symbolic and imaginary understanding 
of society moves us in the direction of a hermeneutic theory of politics, ultimately his 
firm insistence on seeing creativity as an ex nihilo product, complicated his project as 
much as anything.  
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 I argue that Machiavelli and Weber offer a more promising connection between 
politics and history. Though neither one of them would be classified as hermeneutic 
philosophers, they each, in their way attempt to link a certain understanding of history 
with political action. Machiavelli insists on the notion of a return to institutions, which I 
have argued he uses not just as historical lessons, but as moments of historical inspiration 
to draw the attention of political actors to their creative political potential. Weber, whom 
I approached through a reconstruction and elaboration upon his scattered theorization of 
nationalism offers us a specific form within which we can see this potentially 
hermeneutic process taking place. The reception of national culture and memories can 
serve as a means to bring a collectivity together, and draw its attention to the possibility 
of principled political action, despite Weber’s pessimism over the crushing conditions of 
late-modern life. While both of these thinkers offer valuable steps toward a fruitful 
elaboration of this hermeneutic process, both are incomplete and tentative steps. 
Machiavelli because it is difficult to understand just who he sees as the interpreter and the 
actor in this process, and Weber because, for all that he tries to connect the reception of 
this historical memory to the potential for activity, he seems to offer a conception where 
the very context itself is not open to contestation or change. 
 To overcome these deficits, I draw on the hermeneutic philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur to fully flesh out what this public hermeneutic looks like. While maintaining a 
connection to the historical material that is received by a political community, he insists 
that any hermeneutic engagement with this tradition is one that needs to not just passively 
receive these traditions but must actively reinterpret an make them one’s own. Thus, a 
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collective actor can, in a sense, emerge, that brings together the reinterpretation of 
tradition with the ability for principled political action. This leads us back to the 
democratic theory of Sheldon Wolin. By integrating this hermeneutic project into his 
larger democratic theory we are able to see how this notion of interpreting can be put in 
the service of creative democratic action, both as inspiration and as a constant re-opening 
of the (fugitive) democratic collective itself. By subjecting tradition and inherited 
institutions to this constant reinterpretation and reappraisal Wolin’s democratic project 
can emerge in a more robust manner that more easily avoids the pitfalls of his project 
when it is divorced from this hermeneutic element. 
 Ultimately, I have attempted to bring together two important philosophic 
concerns. The first is a concern for interpretation, which Ricoeur, firmly within the 
hermeneutic tradition, is attentive to and cultivated throughout his career. The second is a 
concern with political praxis, of action within the political world. I argue that this is the 
overriding concern of Wolin, Machiavelli, and Weber. What I hope this dissertation has 
accomplished, to some small degree, is to allows us to better see these two concerns as 
not disparate ideals, but in fact intimately related. This distinction has a long historical 
tradition itself. In his famous 11th Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx writes that “The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to 
change it” (Tucker 1978, 145)55. I believe that this project combats this prejudice, and in 
fact seeks to restore an important relationship between the two. In a deliberate echo of 
                                                 
55 I do not necessarily want to argue that Marx’s project radically separates interpretation from praxis, in 
fact I think you could argue that Capital is in fact a project of interpretation leading (hopefully) to praxis. I 
would aruge, however, that various understandings of Marx, and especially this line, have produced an 
historical tradition that separates praxis from interpretation. 
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Marx’s very famous phrase, Ricoeur wonders, “can we change without interpreting?” 
(Ricoeur 1986, 70). For Ricoeur, the answer is a resounding no. The two terms are so 
connected that to even think of them as separate projects is not simply unhelpful, but 
unrealistic. Ricoeur writes, “Is not the process of interpretation so primitive that in fact it 
is constitutive of the dimension of praxis” (Ricoeur 1986, 10). Ultimately, my project 
here is an attempt to do justice Ricoeurs very claim about the nature of interpretation and 
praxis. By showing how a concern (however hidden) for interpretation, or the connection 
between memory, tradition, and politics can be seen running though the major political 
theorists in this dissertation, or, in the case of Castoriadis, severing that connection 
proves fatal, I hope to draw our attention to just how an interpretive project and a 
political project can be seen as one in the same. By opening up Machiavelli, Weber, and 
Wolin to these hermeneutic-interpretive concerns I hope to have demonstrated that our 
concern for citizens as interpreting beings is essential to our ongoing concern for citizens 
as political beings, and perhaps, as democratic beings.  
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